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ABSTRACT 
 Decision-making is generally considered a key competence within organisations 
and for individuals. It is crucial in our daily routine and at forks in life. The latter type 
of situation can tremendously impact peoples’ health, wealth, or happiness. Thus, 
the extent to which an individual is able to make sound decisions is of huge 
interest. Measuring this ability would enable people to assess their Decision-
Making Competence (DMC) and identify areas for improvement. 
 
 Most advanced research on individual differences in DMC defines the construct 
mainly in terms of an individual’s ability to resist decision biases - systematic 
deviations from normative decision rules and a concept that is mainly derived from 
behavioural decision theory. This research stream does not typically cover the 
main steps of a decision-analytical process, such as the ability to envision one’s 
objectives, to frame a decision, or to compare alternatives. As a sound decision-
making process must cover several dimensions, including not only the ability to 
deal with decision biases but also the ability to apply decision-analytical rules, the 
decision-analytical side of this construct deserves intensified investigation. 
 
 This research therefore developed a psychometric test that allows the 
measurement of an individual’s performance by a set of six decision-analytical 
dimensions of DMC. On the basis of the corresponding decision-analytical 
literature, cognitive dimensions of analytical DMC were identified and 
operationalized using a catalogue of appropriate decision tasks. In two online 
studies with approximately 500 participants, a psychometrically sound 
performance test was constructed and validated. 
 
 Participants showed reasonable consistent performances across the set of 
Decision-Analytical Competence (DAC) tasks. An exploratory factor analysis 
suggested one factor underlying the presented decision tasks. A confirmatory 
factor analysis demonstrated acceptable model fit indices for the one-factor 
structure of DAC. The aggregated overall test score presented significant 
relationships with measures of decision-making style, fluid intelligence, and 
problem-solving competence.  
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1 INTRODUCTION  
Every day people face thousands of decisions (Keeney, 2004). Many of those 
decisions are fast and frugal ones (Todd & Gigerenzer, 2000), such as what to have for 
dinner, or which newspaper article to read. Obviously, not all decisions that people have 
to address would be considered “no-brainers” (Hammond, Keeney, & Raiffa, 1999, p. 2). 
The majority of important decisions, such as career or health choices, are demanding 
ones, and defined by “high stakes and serious consequences” (Hammond et al., 1999, p. 
2). In such cases decision-makers’ resources are finite and the decision environment 
appears complex, uncertain, dynamic, and competitive (Howard, 1973).  
It is the latter type of decision that frequently impacts humans’ lives significantly 
(Matheson & Howard, 1968). For this reason, it is essential to consider those kinds of 
decisions in a future-oriented and consequences-considering way. The often-occurring 
challenge for people to analytically follow through with those choices or the inconsistency 
in making judicious choices is present in our every-day life. The following three studies12 
illustrate that thoughtless choices can have devastating consequences, especially in the 
early careers and private lives of the young: on average more than a quarter of Germany’s 
bachelor students cancel their studies - in mathematics it is actually every other student 
(Heublein et al., 2015) – 80% of German smokers start smoking before the age of 18 
(Lampert, 2008) and every seventh injury or fatality in a traffic accident in Germany is 
caused by an individual between 18 and 24 years due to speeding (Statistisches 
Bundesamt, 2013).  
From a long-term perspective it is not only the individual that has to deal with the 
consequences of such deficient choices. As demonstrated by these three examples, 
society is impaired by deficient individual decisions in several ways3: The productivity of 
the domestic industry is affected by the shortage of young, and particularly skilled, 
manpower due to breaking off of education. Indirect costs arise from health insurance for 
medical treatments and medication for treating the outcome of long-term smoking. And, 
the state is challenged by direct costs caused, for instance, by police or ambulances use 
rushing to car accidents.  
                                                
1 For the present three examples it is implied that neither quitting one’s study, starting to smoke, or being 
involved in a car accident are desirable developments. The author is aware that there may be individual 
cases, in which these choices might be according to someone’s personal objectives.  
2 The three examples are selected to underline the potential impact choices can have on especially 
young lives. Thereby the studies represent different types of decisions. In section 2.1 the specific 
decision type – here represented by quitting one’s study - addressed by this PhD research is defined.  
3 It is important to note that there are also competent individual choices in accordance with decision 
makers’ objectives, which may conflict with societal objectives.  
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Good decision-making competence (henceforth: DMC) and thereby vigilant choices 
could help people better achieve their long-term and well-considered objectives, thus 
avoid unwise decisions and reduce costs for society.  
By contemplating the importance sound individual decision-making has, not only for 
the individual but also for society, research on DMC in general seems to be indispensable 
in raising public attention to the topic and to induce a greater awareness about the 
relevance of good individual decision-making. 
Increased sensitisation in public would pave the way for and reinforce the 
dissemination of decision-analytical practice and therefore enable manifold applications 
and implementations, for instance, in education and economics. This in turn would 
improve individual decision-making and create better decision-makers (cf. section 2.1), 
which could positively affect an individual’s life and, within a wider scope, our society. 
 
Although “[n]o decision process can guarantee a perfect outcome” (Larrick, 2009, p. 
461), experts from the field of decision science agree that a good decision-making 
process contributes to making sound decisions and achieving desired decision outcomes 
in the long run (e.g. Keeney, 2008; Keren & Bruine de Bruin, 2003; Larrick, Nisbett, & 
Morgan, 1993); accordingly, “a good decision does increase the odds of success and at 
the same time satisfies our very human desire to control the forces that affect our lives.” 
(Hammond et al., 1999, p. 13) Despite the fact that decision science provides several 
approaches to support people in making good decisions (cf. section 2.5), one generally 
accepted definition of DMC and consequently, one standardised method of its 
assessment are missing.  
The majority of prevalent research approaches the construct of DMC from 
behavioural decision theory. In this framework, DMC is defined and assessed primarily in 
terms of the ability to resist decision biases, a systematic deviation from normative 
decision rules. According to the literature (e.g. Baron, 2008), a good decision-making 
process consists of several dimensions, including not only the ability to deal with decision 
biases but also the ability to apply decision-analytical rules. Decision-analytical 
dimensions, in the form of prescriptions, such as the ability to envision one’s objectives 
or the ability to integrate information, are typically not covered by this avenue of 
research. This unilateral attention to the construct of DMC – focusing on behavioural 
decision theory – creates a gap in prevalent research that should be addressed.  
Therefore, the present research aims to approach DMC from a prescriptive 
perspective and to concentrate on the development of a measurement instrument 
capturing individual analytical decision-making. It focuses on a theory-driven definition of 
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decision-analytical DMC that enables measuring an individual’s performance on various 
decision-analytical dimensions by a psychometric4 test. The resultant test instrument 
could allow further investigations of analytical DMC and its influence on human lives.  
 
The following sections of this introductory chapter outline the intention of the present 
Ph.D. research. Section 1.1 provides a short summary of the current status of research 
on DMC, its measurement and why testing analytical DMC is of interest. Section 1.2 
defines the research questions and presents the research objectives. Section 1.3 shows 
how the thesis is structured.  
1.1 THE RELEVANCE OF DECISION-ANALYTICAL COMPETENCE 
Decision scientists have examined decision-making behaviour and processes for 
decades in order to capture human decision-making processes and help people to make 
appropriate decisions (e.g. Milkman, Chugh, & Bazerman, 2009). Three disciplines and 
therefore research foci (cf. Figure 1-1) have emerged from these research approaches: 
the descriptive, the normative, and the prescriptive approach.  
While the descriptive approach originates from behavioural psychology and examines 
human behaviour in terms of how humans typically make decisions (Gilovich, Griffin & 
Kahneman, 2002; Takemura, 2014), the normative approach stems from decision theory 
and focuses on the question of how decisions could be made optimally (e.g. Edwards, 
Miles Jr., & von Winterfeldt, 2007). The latter focuses on rational choice and normative 
models, which are built on basic assumptions or axioms that people should consider and 
that provide logical guidance for their decisions (D. E. Bell, Raiffa, & Tversky, 1988). The 
prescriptive approach (cf. Figure 1–1), also called decision analysis, links both the 
descriptive and normative approach of decision science, yet centres on the query of how 
people can make better decisions (e.g. D. E. Bell et al., 1988; Howard & Abbas, 2015). It 
focuses on helping people make better decisions by using normative models, being 
aware of the limitations of human judgement, and the practical problems of implementing 
a rational model in complex interrelations. Thus, decision analysis is understood as 
normative in theory and thoroughly prescriptive in practice. The overall purpose of this 
science is to support and enable decision-makers in business and in personal situations 
to make better decisions. It is settled on the link between mathematics, economics, 
behavioural psychology, and computer science. The roots go back to the late 1950s, first 
                                                
4 Psychometrics describes “the branch of psychology concerned with the quantification and 
measurement of human attributes, behavior, performance, and the like, as well as with the design, 
analysis, and improvement of the tests, questionnaires, and so on used in such measurement.” (Zedec, 
2014, p. 279) 
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appearing in Schlaifer’s book “Probability and Statistics for Business Decisions” (1959). In 
the 1960s Ronald A. Howard brought decision theory and systems modelling together 
and gave the new discipline its name, decision analysis (c.f. Howard, 1968). In 1968, 
Howard Raiffa published the first book bearing the name “Decision Analysis” (Raiffa, 
1968).  
 
Figure 1-1 Three research foci of decision science (cf. D. E. Bell et al., 1988) 
 
Prevalent research on DMC of individuals combines two of the above described 
decision science disciplines: behavioural decision research and decision theory. 
Behavioural decision research detects significant deviations of actual human decision-
making behaviour from normative standards (e.g. Bruine de Bruin, Parker, & Fischhoff, 
2007). This stream of research provides evidence that people differ within their decision-
making behaviour (e.g. Slovic, 1962; Weber, Blais, & Betz, 2002), and perform differently 
on various decision-making tasks (e.g. Einhorn, 1970; Finucane & Lees, 2005; Finucane & 
Slovic, 2002; Hunt, Krzystofiak, Meindl, & Yousry, 1989). More recent research has begun 
to examine DMC as a psychological construct5 (e.g. Stanovich & West, 2000) and analyse 
correlations between diverse decision-making tasks, or between single dimensions of 
DMC. As one of the first investigations, the work of Stanovich and West (2000) describes 
decision-making performance as a higher-level measure6 with different assessable 
correlated dimensions. This direction of research paves the way for measuring DMC or 
aspects of it and consequently for an evidence-based definition.  
                                                
5 A construct (Cronbach & Meehl, 1955) is a term from scientific theory, especially in psychology. It is an 
explanatory variable, which is not directly observable. That is why psychologists often speak of a latent 
construct, for instance intelligence or motivation (Bortz & Döring, 2005). 
6 As section 2.4 describes, a good decision-making process consists of several dimensions, which will be 
aggregated into the higher-level measure of DAC. 
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Promising approaches of defining and measuring DMC include the studies of Parker 
and Fischhoff (2005) and Bruine de Bruin et al. (2007), which present DMC as a construct 
consisting of seven dimensions, derived mostly from behavioural decision research. The 
authors have created two performance tests; one for youths and one for adults. Both 
allow for measuring an individual’s performance on seven dimensions of DMC (cf. Table 
2-1, p. 37).  
Most of the tasks included in the two tests examine the ability of decision-makers7 to 
deal with different decision biases. The authors assume that individuals with poor DMC, 
on average, perform worse on the test and experience more negative decision outcomes8 
in the long run than those who show sound DMC. An exploratory factor9 analysis of the 
performance test Adult Decision Making Competence index score (henceforth: A-DMC; 
Bruine de Bruin et al., 2007; cf. section 2.2) provides a one-factor model. It shows 
acceptable to good statistical properties in terms of significant test-retest reliability and 
internal consistencies. The work of Bruine de Bruin, Parker and Fischhoff “show[s] 
promise for the development of a normed psychometric test of” DMC (2007, p. 948), 
which serves to objectively assess humans’ DMC.  
Including Bruine de Bruin et al.’s approach, the few existing studies of DMC as a 
psychological construct primarily focus on the influence of biases on human decision-
making behaviour. Data on the validity and reliability of DMC as a psychological construct 
is rare (e.g. Bruine de Bruin et al., 2007; Bruine de Bruin, Parker, & Fischhoff, 2012; 
Finucane & Gullion, 2010; Parker & Fischhoff, 2005).  
 
Thus, the present work focuses on the decision-analytical perspective of individual 
decision-making, instead of the up to now traditional view on DMC as a construct based 
on the behavioural biases perspective. The present Ph.D. research aims to provide a 
decision-analytical definition of DMC and, on this theoretical basis, contrive a 
psychometric test that allows an individual’s performance to be measured on the various 
dimensions of the so-called Decision-Analytical Competence (henceforth: DAC). DAC 
could be seen as one aspect of DMC or the combination of various analytical abilities of 
                                                
7 A decision-maker is “an individual who has the power to commit the resources” (J. E. Matheson & 
Howard, 1968). 
8 “[N]egative decision outcomes [are] sampled across a wide variety of domains and varying in severity 
(e.g., threw out food or groceries you had bought, got divorced, had a mortgage or loan foreclosed)” 
(Bruine de Bruin et al., 2007, p. 943). 
9 In statistics, the exploratory factor analysis examines correlating variables in terms of a hypothetical 
higher-level measure – the factor (Bortz & Döring, 2005). 
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the general construct of DMC. The following section explains the underlying research 
questions and specifies the research objectives and aims.  
1.2 RESEARCH QUESTIONS & OBJECTIVES  
This Ph.D. research uses a framework that is based on theoretical decision-analytical 
dimensions of a sound decision-making process, and aims to provide a valid and reliable 
psychometric performance test for individual DAC. It encompasses the following research 
questions and objectives (cf. Table 1-1):  
 
Table 1-1 Research questions and objectives 
Research quest ion Research object ive 
Q1: What do most advanced approaches of 
defining and measuring DMC neglect? 
O1: Identify the strengths and weaknesses of 
prevalent definitions and measurements of DMC 
and analyse gaps for improvement. 
Q2: How can DAC be defined as a psychological 
construct, consisting of a concrete number of 
measurable decision-analytical dimensions? 
O2: Conceptualise DAC as a psychological 
construct, consisting of a concrete number of 
measurable dimensions according to the theory 
of decision analysis. 
Q3: What are appropriate items to operationalize 
the different theoretical dimensions of DAC? 
O3: Develop items to operationalize the various 
theoretical dimensions of DAC and construct a 
psychometric performance test to measure 
DAC. 
Q4: How well does the psychometric DAC 
performance test perform in terms of statistical 
goodness criteria according to its empirical 
evidence for sound decision-making measured 
by a set of appropriate criteria for validation? 
O4: Examine the proposed psychometric DAC 
performance test in terms of its reliability and 
validity according to its empirical evidence for 
sound decision-making as measured by a set of 
appropriate criteria for validation. 
Note. Q = Research question; O = Research objective.  
 
In the present research, decision analysis builds the research context, DAC the 
research objective, and performance testing the research method (cf. Figure 1-2).  
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Figure 1-2 Three research-leading reasons for this Ph.D. research 
 
Besides the lack of public attention to the importance of DMC, there are three 
research-leading reasons, illustrated by the overlaps of context, objective, and method in 
Figure 1-2, and corresponding aims for undertaking the proposed study:  
First, the decision analysis literature provides a series of interrelated steps for making 
good decisions (Mellers & Locke, 2007). Researchers and practitioners from different 
traditions present similar dimensions of an analytical decision-making process (cf. section 
2.4). Following this, the present research aims to build on the prevalent knowledge and 
partial agreement on potential dimensions of a good analytical decision-making process 
as a theoretical basis for the development of a measuring and assessing instrument for 
DAC10.  
Second, so far decision-analytical research has mostly concentrated on examining 
organisational decision-making processes in order to understand how desired decision 
outcomes, such as increasing revenue or market share, can be achieved in the long run 
(e.g. D. Matheson & Matheson, 1998). In comparison, little research effort has been 
undertaken to expose empirical evidence of the success factors for individual decision-
                                                
10 Within this thesis the abbreviation “DMC” refers to decision-making competence (research) in general. 
The abbreviation “DAC” refers to the research objective and therefore the main focus of this thesis. While 
the construct of DMC, used in the thesis, describes the general construct, which explains how well 
people are able to solve decision problems successfully, ranging from small every-day choices to rare 
and complex decisions, DAC refers to an aggregated composition of analytical abilities necessary to deal 
with complex decision problems. 
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making processes – even though it is possible that better DAC of individuals would also 
support the improvement of organisational decision-making processes over time due to 
more highly-skilled employees (Hoffman, Woehr, Maldagen-Youngjohn, & Lyons, 2011). 
Thus, this Ph.D. research aims to contribute to filling this gap by focusing on the DMC of 
the individual.  
Third, DMC has been examined in many studies, mostly in behavioural psychology 
and behavioural decision research. The literature presents several definitions of DMC and 
therefore several different testing procedures. The most common approach is the self-
rating procedure (e.g. Mann, Burnett, Radford, & Ford, 1997; Siebert & Kunz, 2016). 
Given their limited validity in comparison to performance tests (e.g. Nisbett & Wilson, 
1977), the current research aims to provide a psychometric performance test on DAC, 
which meets statistical properties such as validity and reliability. 
 
In general, there are three reasons, illustrated in Figure 1-3, why providing a 
measurement instrument for DAC would be of interest. First, it would allow an individual’s 
DAC to be measured on various dimensions. Hence, a person interested in their test 
score could receive detailed feedback about which dimensions of DAC are already well 
evolved and which dimensions need more training. Second, it would allow for 
differentiating between individuals based on their quality of DAC. So, if a company wants 
to recruit a new employee with good DMC, it could embed the test in an assessment 
centre and objectively choose the candidate with pertinent testing results11. Third, it would 
allow pre-post-tests to be conducted. Thus, class teachers or lecturers would be able to 
test students before and after a course in analytical decision-making or related subjects, 
compare the results of the two testing times and evaluate their impact.  
 
Figure 1-3 Why measuring DAC is of interest 
 
Summarising, this research aims to investigate the psychological construct of DAC 
by describing a higher-level measure, which consists of different measureable 
                                                
11 The example refers to a fictive situation, in which DMC is the only relevant criterion for the HR 
department.  
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dimensions. The main goal is to provide a valid and reliable psychometric performance 
test for assessing DAC on the basis of decision-analytical insights. Empirical evidence for 
the correlation with desired decision outcomes will be measured by an appropriate set of 
different variables reflecting, for instance, satisfaction with already-made decisions or a 
vigilant decision-making style. 
Gaining more insights on how to measure and assess DAC could help to define and 
establish DAC as a psychological construct. It could attract the public’s attention, as has 
happened before to the psychological construct of intelligence during its first 
psychometric tests (e.g. Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale, cf. Wechsler, 1939). In this 
respect, DAC deserves serious investigation. The next section presents the outline of this 
Ph.D. thesis. 
1.3 OUTLINE 
Following this introduction, chapter 2 presents the literature review on DMC. It 
delimits the research domain including relevant terms, and gives an overview of the status 
quo of defining and measuring DMC. Limitations of the existing research are pointed out, 
ideas for further research are described in greater detail, a decision-analytical 
consideration of the construct of DMC is introduced, and the theoretical compliance on 
DAC-dimensions is depicted.  
Chapter 3 gives a brief overview of the research methodology. It lists the research 
hypotheses, explains the procedure of psychometric test development and illustrates the 
arguments for the specific methodological choices that have been made. Furthermore, 
the chapter also presents the target group and outlines the strategy for data collection. 
Chapter 4 focuses on the development of the DAC-test. It presents the thoughts 
taken into account to construct and set up the test and explicates how each DAC-
dimension has been operationalized. Additionally, the chapter presents the socio-
demographics and the results of item and distributional analysis of the pre-testing. 
Chapter 5 introduces and argues the selected criteria for validation. Therefore, the 
psychological constructs are defined and the theoretical hypotheses about their 
relationship with DAC are presented. Furthermore, this chapter constitutes the results of 
the main testing according to reliability and validity of the DAC-test. The parameters for 
objectivity are also argued. 
Chapter 6 focuses on the interpretation and discussion of the results. It answers the 
research hypotheses and compares the present findings with one of the most advanced 
approaches to measure DMC. It addresses the scientific contribution of the work and its 
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potential for practical utilisation. Additionally, the limitations of the research results are 
addressed and potential avenues for further research illustrated. 
Chapter 7 concludes the Ph.D. research on DAC and its test development and 
highlights why this research approach should be of interest to the scientific field of 
decision science and also society.  
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2 DOMAIN DEFINITION AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
The first step in the process of answering the research questions and addressing the 
research objectives presented in section 1.2 is to theoretically capture the construct of 
DMC from different perspectives by giving an overview of its various definitions and 
diverse measurement approaches. This review of existing literature in the area of decision 
science is presented in order to allow a systematic deduction of the definition of DAC to 
take place.  
The following sections of this chapter outline a literature review for this Ph.D. 
research. While section 2.1 presents definitions and clarifications, section 2.2 reviews the 
current status of defining and measuring DMC in the decision science literature. Referring 
to this status quo, section 2.3 exposes the limitation of well-advanced measuring 
approaches and introduces potential for improvement. Section 2.4 argues how a 
decision-analytical avenue of research can help to fill the gap presented in the previous 
section. It presents an overview of the theoretical dimensions of DAC, and summarises 
the theoretical agreement on dimensions of DAC presented by the decision analysis 
literature. Closing the literature review, section 2.5 summarises the theoretical consensus 
on the concept of DAC over different decision scientific research groups. 
2.1 THE CONCEPT OF “DECIDING” 
At the beginning of this literature review, it is necessary to define what is meant by 
the term decision and the corresponding terms used in this research context, and to 
concretely specify which type of decision the current research is focusing on. 
The term decision used in this Ph.D. research refers to the definition of Mintzberg, 
Raisinghani, and Theoret (1976). They “define ... a decision as a specific commitment to 
action (usually a commitment of resources) and a decision process as a set of actions 
and dynamic factors that begins with the identification of a stimulus for action and ends 
with the specific commitment to action.” (p. 246) The definition of Mintzberg and 
colleagues emphasises that a decision not only defines a state, but also invokes a 
process with a set of cognitive performances, starting with the recognition of a decision 
problem and closing with a commitment to action. 
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Figure 2-1 Attributes of complex decisions  
 
The present research focus lies on complex and demanding decisions, which 
represent an intense cognitive challenge (e.g. Simon, 1978). Thaler and Sunstein (2008) 
describe five attributes (cf. Figure 2-1) that make complex decisions appear particularly 
challenging for decision-makers and explain why these kinds of decisions are so difficult 
to deal with.  
First of all, complex decisions do not occur often. They are rare. This circumstance 
harbours two challenges: In comparison to minor frequent decisions, as for instance what 
to get from the grocery, for which it is possible to quickly apply rules of thumb (e.g. 
Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 2011; Gigerenzer, Todd, & the ABC Research Group, 1999), 
decision-makers have no personal or just limited experiences with a particular complex 
decision type. In the latter case, decision-makers cannot compare the present situation 
with previous decisions and therefore have to develop new strategies, which takes time 
and might involve trial and error. Other people – potential role models – also experience a 
particular complex decision, such as deciding which vehicle to buy, only a few times in 
their lives. Thus, there are not as many chances to observe and learn from others. 
Observational learning (Bandura & Walters, 1963), the most common way of human 
learning, cannot take effect as it does for minor decisions, which take place every day.  
Second, due to their intricacy complex decisions are difficult to handle. To 
appropriately deal with them, it is practical “to simplify a complex decision environment to 
a manageable size for analysis.” (W. Edwards et al., 2007, p. 5) Decision-makers need 
information on the decision’s details such as circumstances, alternatives, corresponding 
probabilities, potential consequences, etc. (e.g. Howard, 2007; von Winterfeld & 
Edwards, 2007). Particularly for complex and rare decisions, people often do not have 
access to all the required information that is needed to make a good decision. As a result, 
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missing information and uncertainty lead to a fragmentary picture of the real world 
problem and bedevil the problem analysis. 
Third, in many situations humans are not able to envision their preferences 
adequately (e.g. Hsee & Hastie, 2006). “Decision-makers are considerably deficient in 
utilizing personal knowledge and values to form objectives for the decisions they face” 
(Bond et al., 2008, p. 56). As each of the objectives can be seen as a desire that the 
decision-maker wants to be fulfilled, the articulation of one’s individual definite and 
exhaustive set of objectives is indispensable to achieve one’s desirable decision outcome.  
Fourth, feedback on a particular decision process and its outcome, from which 
decision-makers could learn, usually does not appear immediately after the complex 
decision has been made. Especially, the achievement or realisation of fundamental 
objectives in comparison to means objectives (Keeney, 1992)12 can take several years for 
this kind of decision. This circumstance makes it difficult to improve one’s decision-
making process by learning from previous decision-making experiences. Failures in the 
decision-making process might not be identified and corrected, which reduces the 
learning effect to improve the quality of decision-makers’ way of dealing with complex 
decision problems.  
Fifth, the costs of some decisions, such as time, rational thought, or money do 
immediately incur, while the benefits of those decisions take much longer to appear. In 
this sense, decision-makers are confronted with conflicting facts such as immediate costs 
on the one hand and mid- and long-term benefits on the other. Thus, in comparison to 
minor decisions it is more challenging for decision-makers to cognitively balance the costs 
or effort of a decision in relation to its benefit. In other words, decision-makers experience 
problems by making trade-offs when no alternative is dominant over all other alternatives 
on all objectives. “The most difficult choices occur when there are negative correlations 
among the values of the attributes across the alternatives, forcing us to make difficult 
trade-offs” (Hastie & Dawes, 2010, p. 218). So for instance in the case of choosing the 
fitting education for one’s future, objectives like attractiveness to potential employers, 
costs and duration, depth of education may conflict. Consequently, this occurrence 
makes it harder to follow through with tough decisions and transfer the cognitive decision 
into corresponding action.  
                                                
12 Decision objectives can be divided into two categories: fundamental objectives and means objectives. 
Whereas fundamental objectives describe “desires, which are an end in themselves for the situation at 
hand, and accomplishment of a fundamental objective provides direct utility to the individual. Conversely, 
means objectives provide utility by facilitating the achievement of other objectives. In general, the set of 
fundamental objectives provides the basis to evaluate various alternatives, whereas means objectives 
help to stimulate the generation of alternatives.” (Bond et al., 2008, p. 58/59)  
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In summary, complex decisions are especially challenging as the decision-makers 
have limited experience with similar situations that they can draw upon and less 
information to base their arguments upon. In this context, it is difficult for decision-makers 
to envision one’s different, partly conflicting objectives and make trade-offs. Also, 
feedback on how well a decision was made comes at a later time, which hinders the 
following-through with the decisions. 
 
To support people dealing with those complex and demanding decisions, 
behavioural psychologists and decision scientists have studied human decision-making 
behaviour in different decision situations for decades. Consequently, they have developed 
strategies to cope with decision complexity.  
As mentioned earlier, one approach created in the late 1960s (Howard, 1966; Raiffa, 
1968) to improve decision-making processes is called decision analysis. “It is ... a logical 
balancing of the factors that influence a decision. ... discipline has two interesting 
aspects. First, it is a language and philosophy for decision-making. It is a way to talk 
about the decision-making process ... [and second,] it is a logical and quantitative 
procedure”. (Howard, 1973, p. 64) Being aware of human cognitive limitations, which are 
addressed by behavioural decision research, decision analysis makes use of normative 
models (D. E. Bell et al., 1988). This research field aims to enhance the decision-making 
processes of decision-makers by “[c]losing critical gaps between the normative ideal and 
the descriptive reality.” (Fischhoff, 2008, p. 14) Decision-analytical scientists and 
practitioners see the additional benefit of decision analysis in presenting and 
communicating uncertainty in a decision as one of the most important advantages (e.g. 
Howard, 1980; Matheson & Howard, 1968), as well as modelling multiple objectives 
(Keeney & Raiffa, 1993). “The strength of decision analysis ... lies in increasing the logical 
quality of decision-making.” (J. E. Matheson & Howard, 1968, p. 4) It means dividing the 
elements of a decision into smaller dimensions, analysing the situation and assembling 
those smaller problems back to a manageable decision problem. Decision analysis 
presents a decision problem in an appropriate way, which is easier to comprehend for 
decision-makers (W. Edwards, Miles Jr., et al., 2007). Bazerman and Moore (2009, p. 
181) state: “Since we do not make optimal decisions intuitively or automatically, when 
decision quality really matters, it makes sense to rely on procedures that can help direct 
us toward more optimal decisions”. Consequently, the discipline of decision analysis aims 
to support people in making better decisions and thereby, helps to improve the quality of 
the decision-making process (e.g. Schilling, Oeser, & Schaub, 2007). 
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In this context, it is important to point out the distinction between a good decision or 
decision process and a good decision outcome.  
“A good decision is a logical decision – one that is based on the uncertainties 
confronted by and on the values and preferences of decision-makers. But a good 
decision must not inevitably in any case lead to a good decision outcome. A good 
decision outcome is one that is profitable or otherwise highly valued” (Howard, 2008, p. 
98). For example, parents teach their children that when standing in front of a pedestrian 
light one should walk while green and wait while red. This rule is supposed to be a good 
decision, as the chance of getting safely to the other side is much higher when walking 
when green. However, quite a lot of people decide to cross the street when red and 
reach the opposite pavement safely. From a decision-analytical point of view one would 
call this choice a poor decision even though the outcome has turned out well. In contrast, 
it is also possible to cross the road while green and be hit by a car. In this case, decision 
science would talk about a sound decision with a bad outcome.  
Consequently, “[g]ood outcomes are what we desire, whereas good decisions are 
what we can do to maximize the likelihood of having good outcomes” (McNamee & 
Celona, 2005, p. 2). Ward Edwards (1954, p. 7) explains: “[a]ll real decisions are made 
under uncertainty. A decision is therefore a bet, and evaluating it as good or not must 
depend on the stakes and the odds, not on the outcome.” Thus, the quality of a decision 
cannot be measured by its outcome (e.g. Hastie & Dawes, 2010; Keelin, Schoemaker, & 
Spetzler, 2009), since we cannot control all factors that influence the decision’s outcome. 
“[I]t is the potential outcomes, their probabilities, and their values to the decision-maker at 
the time the decision is made that lead us to judge a particular choice to be wise or 
foolish.” (Hastie & Dawes, 2010, p. 16) This conceptualisation emphasises the importance 
of a sound decision-making process and why it is crucial to examine an individual’s DAC.  
 
After elucidating the decision concept by defining research relevant terms such as 
complex decisions, decision analysis, good decision, and good decision outcome, the 
following section serves to theoretically define the domain of this Ph.D. research in detail 
by a literature review of DMC. It presents a distinct definition of DMC as a psychological 
construct and outlines how it is measured up to this point.  
2.2 CURRENT STATUS OF DEFINING & MEASURING DECISION-MAKING COMPETENCE 
In general, the term measurement describes “the process by which numbers or 
symbols are assigned to attributes of entities in the real world in such a way as to 
characterize the attributes by clearly defined rules.” (Fenton & Whitty, 1995, p. 6) In social 
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research - the methodological background of this research - the main “goals ... are to 
understand, explain, and make inferences about social phenomena” (Agresti & Finlay, 
1997, p. 12). Therefore, data has to be gathered. In psychology the researcher has to 
translate their imaginary idea of a psychological construct into useful data through 
measurement. A construct – the object to be examined - is not empirically recognisable 
and not an observable issue of a scientific theory. Hence, the researcher needs indicators 
to make such a construct measurable. That is why constructs are also called latent 
constructs13. The process of making latent constructs measurable is called 
operationalization (Cronbach & Meehl, 1955; cf. section 4.1).  
 
When referring to the term competence in this research the “capacity to make a 
rational or intelligent judgment” is meant (Tancredi, 1982, p. 53). Finucane and Lees 
(2005, p. 6) explain: “the term ‘competence’ has most commonly referred to diagnostic 
criteria for determining an individual’s ability to make important life decisions”. Thus, within 
this Ph.D. research the term competence per se is understood as the possession of a 
combination of different abilities or capabilities of an individual, which can be learned, 
trained, and improved.  
 
Before introducing a decision-analytical avenue to this field of research in section 2.4, 
the construct of DMC is defined and its measures reviewed. As Appelt et al. (2011) and 
their widespread and continuously evolving online database14 “highlight[s] … the most 
common categories of individual difference measures used in judgment and decision-
making research” (p. 253), this research does not intend to give an all-embracing review 
of the complete set of different approaches to define and measure DMC. Moreover, this 
research aims to examine the most advanced approach of defining and measuring DMC 
from a methodological background, to analyse its strengths and weaknesses, and to 
make suggestions for improvement by not only presenting a theoretical decision-analytical 
avenue to DMC, but also an evidence-based testing instrument to measure it. Following, 
it is indented to theoretically define and practically measure DAC.  
 
To suggest a definition for the construct (DMC) and present a testing instrument, 
several studies of DMC and its dimensions have been undertaken. While some studies 
                                                
13 One well-known example for a psychological latent construct is the intelligence and its indicator IQ, 
which is measured by psychometric tests such as the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale-Revised 
(Wechsler, 2008). 
14 Decision Making Individual Differences Inventory (www.sjdm.org/dmidi/) 
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provide a literature overview of prevalent approaches to define and measure the construct 
according to different content foci and measurement tools (e.g. Appelt et al., 2011; 
Finucane & Lees, 2005; Mann, Harmoni, & Power, 1989), other studies present one 
concrete definition in combination with a testing instrument (e.g. Bruine de Bruin et al., 
2007; Mann, Burnett, Radford, & Ford, 1997; Parker & Fischhoff, 2005). However, so far 
“[n]o single set of criteria has been agreed on for determining DMC.” (Finucane & Gullion, 
2010, p. 20) The multiplicity of research avenues related to the construct results in DMC 
appearing as a multidimensional concept (Finucane & Gullion, 2010), requiring several, 
mostly cognitive, competences.  
 
In this respect, several studies make suggestions for a set of required skills to define 
DMC: In 1977) Janis and Mann presented the vigilant decision-maker “as a highly 
competent person who thoroughly canvasses a wide range of alternative courses of 
action, surveys a full range of objectives and values implicated by the choice, carefully 
weighs the positive and negative consequences that could flow from each alternative, 
intensively searches for new information, incorporates new information even when it is 
unpleasant, and plans for the implementation of the decision.” (Mann et al., 1989, p. 
266/267) In comparison, the analysis of important aspects of good decision-making of 
Mann et al. (1989) resulted in a list of nine relevant dimensions: choice, comprehension, 
creativity, compromise, consequentiality, correctness, credibility, consistency, and 
commitment. With this approach, the authors extend Janis’ and Mann’s concept of 
vigilance in decision-making and Ross' (1981) five skills of information processing15. They 
describe a set of cognitive processes including the search for and the process of 
information, problem solving, judgement, learning and memory. Furthermore, a 
respectable number of approaches from different decision science groups (cf. section 2.4) 
introduce concrete decision-analytical skills for making sound decisions (e.g. Hammond 
et al., 1999; Howard, 2007; Keelin et al., 2009).  
All of those approaches describe cognitive skills or steps of action for good decision-
making. To date, none of those approaches have been translated into a psychometric 
test instrument that assesses a person’s current performance capabilities according to 
the decision analytic dimensions. 
 
Historically, two methods have been used to measure different decision relevant 
                                                
15 Five skills of information processing: identifying alternative courses of action, identifying appropriate 
objectives to assess options, assessing options by objectives, summarising information on options, and 
checking the results of one’s analysis 
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constructs, such as decision-making processes, behaviour, attitude, or competence 
(Finucane & Gullion, 2010). The first method, using verbal as well as written assessment, 
is the questionnaire. The second method, observing a decision-making process by 
measuring performance, is the performance test. In a narrow sense, a test16 describes a 
procedure that measures a specific performance (e.g. Zimbardo & Gerrig, 1996). In 
comparison, a questionnaire is a self-report of a subject, in which the subject explains 
their opinion, attitude, and interests or gives information about their personality traits or 
background information (e.g. Zimbardo & Gerrig, 1996). In contrast to self-reports, 
performance tests provide several advantages (cf. section 3.2). Nevertheless, the most 
common way to measure DMC so far is the procedure of self-rating. This approach 
requires decision-makers to self-report their own decision-making behaviour. Well-known 
examples of questionnaires used for assessing individuals’ DMC are: the Flinders 
Adolescents Decision Making Questionnaire assessing decision self-esteem, decision 
vigilance, tendency for hasty and impulsive choice, tendency of decision avoidance, 
tendency to apathy and non-involvement (Mann, Harmoni, Power, Beswick, & Ormond, 
1988), the Virgil Questionnaire assessing “goals clarification, generation of options, 
search for facts, consideration of effects and review of action” (Mann, Harmoni, Power, et 
al., 1988, p. 163), and the Melbourne Decision Making Questionnaire assessing 
tendency of unconflicted adherence, tendency of unconflicted change, tendency of 
defence avoidance, tendency for hypervigilance, and the tendency for decision vigilance 
(Mann et al., 1997).  
A more recent way to assess DMC17 is the ability test, which assesses a person’s 
maximum performance of decision-making in a concrete situation. Often “developed and 
tested on impaired or ill/hospitalized persons” (Finucane & Gullion, 2010, p. 19), these 
ability tests measure the competence to decide about medical treatments or medication. 
Only a few studies focus on everyday DMC. In this respect, one very advanced approach 
to measuring DMC is the Adult Decision-Making Competence index score of Bruine de 
Bruin, Parker and Fischhoff (2007). For developing the A-DMC, the authors selected 
seven decision-making tasks with a pedigree in the experimental literature to “reflect the 
                                                
16 Even in psychological literature, often the term “test“ is used for any measurement instrument, 
independent of talking about a questionnaire (=self-rating procedure) or a performance test. Within this 
Ph.D. research, the term “test” is only used to describe a psychometric performance test. 
17 Existing research usually uses the term decision-making competence for designed measures mostly 
referring to behavioural aspects of decision-making. This ascription might be misleading as one could 
assume that the construct of decision-making competence is all-embracing, e.g. behavioural and 
decision-analytical facets of the constructs.  
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traditional normative approach to decision-making competence” (p.949). Participants’ 
performances across the seven tasks are aggregated into the A-DMC index score. The 
seven decision-making tasks are: resistance to framing, recognising social norms, 
under/overconfidence, applying decision rules, consistency in risk perception, 
resistance to sunk costs, and path independence. Table 2-1 gives an overview of what 
each A-DMC index score task aims to measure. 
The A-DMC is based on the work of Parker & Fischhoff (2005), who introduced the 
Youth Decision-Making Competence index score (henceforth: Y-DMC). The Y-DMC 
applied the same decision-making tasks as the A-DMC, but aligned and presented them 
to adolescents in a long-term study. Bruine de Bruin et al. (2007) adapted their decision-
making test in order to fit adults’ background and intended to increase its statistical 
quality criteria. However, the Y-DMC is now seen as a prototype (A. M. Parker personal 
communication, September 1, 2012), since the psychometric properties of the A-DMC 
are better than the properties of the Y-DMC. In comparison to the results of the Y-DMC 
with 25.1% of explained variance, Bruine de Bruin and colleagues were able to increase 
the explained variance. An exploratory factor analysis of the performance test A-DMC 
(Bruine de Bruin et al., 2007) provided a one-factor model, which explains 30.1%18 of the 
total variance (p. 944). Additionally, the A-DMC showed acceptable to good statistical 
properties for significant test-retest reliability19 at the p < .001-level. Furthermore, four out 
of its seven dimensions met the threshold of Cronbach’s alpha (Cronbach, 1951) with α ≥ 
.70 (e.g. Bland & Altman, 1997) – a theoretical equivalent to the mean of all split-half 
correlations measuring internal consistencies20.  
 
Bruine de Bruin et al. (2007) were able to prove that the tasks show “good internal 
consistency, test-retest reliability, and validity – as seen in significant, predicted 
correlations with real-world decision outcomes” (p. 949) by asking for self-reported 
experiences of real-world outcomes measured by the developed and parallel tested 
Decision Outcome Inventory (henceforth: DOI). The DOI measures success of individual 
decision-making by self-reporting in terms of avoiding specific negative decision 
                                                
18 30.1% of variance explanation means that almost one third of the shown and measured behaviour 
(good decision outcomes measured by the Decision Outcome Inventory (Bruine de Bruin et al., 2007)) 
could be explained/predicted by the measured dimensions/items. 
19 To estimate the retest reliability the same sample group of examinees gets tested two times and the 
correlation of both test scores gets calculated. The retest reliability of a test is high, if two testings with the 
same test at different time points highly correlate (Bortz & Döring, 2005). 
20 If a test contains homogeneous items, each item can be seen as part of the test to measure the trait. To 
calculate the internal consistency Cronbach’s alpha gets calculated. The higher the correlation of the 
items on average, the higher the internal consistency (Bortz & Döring, 2005). 
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outcomes; for instance, “[i]n the last 10 years, have you ever... missed a flight [item 10b]” 
or “[b]een in a jail cell overnight for any reason [item 29]” (Bruine de Bruin et al., 2007, p. 
956). Reduced from a much longer list of negative decision outcomes, 41 negative 
decision outcomes with good internal consistency have been selected for their scale. By 
creating the DOI it was assumed that individuals with poor DMC perform worse on the A-
DMC and experience more negative life events, assessed by the DOI, in comparison to 
those who show good DMC.  
 
Table 2-1 The seven A-DMC index score tasks 
A-DMC Task Issue of measurement 
Resistance to framing Assessing the tendency to be affected by irrelevant variations in problem description 
Recognis ing social norms Assessing participants’ identification of values by their attention to a common value 
Under/overconf idence Assessing peoples’ ability to recognise the extent of their knowledge 
Apply ing decis ion rules Assessing peoples’ ability to follow given decision instructions 
Consistency in r isk 
perception Assessing individuals’ ability to follow probability rules 
Resistance to sunk costs Assessing the ability to ignore prior investments when making decisions 
Path independence Assessing peoples’ consistency of participants’ choices in games of chance 
Note. A-DMC = Adult Decision-Making Competence index score (Bruine de Bruin et al., 2007).  
 
In summary, over the last decades the literature has presented a variety of 
approaches defining and assessing DMC and decision-making behaviour. So far, no 
overall agreement exists, neither on the various dimensions of DMC nor on its 
measurement instrument. More recent research focuses on procedures of performance 
measurement. The most advanced approach, in terms of good statistical properties, 
seems to be the A-DMC index score (Bruine de Bruin et al., 2007) – a test that focuses on 
insights from behavioural and normative decision science. Concentrating on the A-DMC 
index score and its forerunner the Y-DMC (Parker & Fischhoff, 2005), section 2.3 
describes the limitations of common instruments and potential for improvement. 
2.3 LIMITATIONS & POTENTIAL FOR IMPROVEMENT OF EXISTING MEASUREMENTS 
As outlined above (cf. section 2.2), the two most advanced approaches in the 
research field of decision theory are the Y-DMC and the A-DMC index scores. In 
developing these psychometric performance tests, Parker & Fischhoff (2005) and Bruine 
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de Bruin et al. (2007) followed the suggestions of various scientists (e.g. Milkman et al., 
2009; Stanovich & West, 2000) and examined DMC as a higher-level measure by dividing 
it into several correlated dimensions. Especially the more evolved A-DMC test presents 
multiple advantages compared with former approaches of measuring DMC by self-
reporting procedures. It is performance-based and represents DMC as an underlying 
construct or competence with sub-scales or abilities. Additionally, the A-DMC provides 
acceptable to good psychometric properties in terms of its validity and reliability. Its tasks 
are based on existing studies, which proves their internal consistency. The A-DMC has 
been applied in several studies (e.g. Bruine de Bruin, Parker, & Fischhoff, 2012; Jacobson 
et al., 2012; Parker, Bruine de Bruin, & Fischhoff, 2015; Szanto et al., 2015) and holds the 
potential to become a standard test instrument for DMC.  
 
Nevertheless, the A-DMC shows limitations, which the present research intends to 
address partially.  
 
First, paying attention to the A-DMC and its sub-scales, it becomes apparent that for 
the Y-DMC and A-DMC the authors selected seven sub-scales to “fit the theoretical 
categorization of normative decision-making skills” (Bruine de Bruin et al., 2012, p. 940)21. 
Thus, both tests focus on insights from behavioural decision research and decision 
theory. Out of the seven sub-scales of the A-DMC (cf. Table 2-1) none of them are 
dedicated to the application of decision-analytical rules. Hence, the A-DMC measures the 
quality of a person’s DMC by primarily testing for decision-makers’ resistance to decision 
biases. It is proven that biases have a great influence on human decision-making and 
judgement (e.g. M. Weber & Borcherding, 1993) and it is assumed that the better the 
decision-maker’s competence to deal with decision biases, the better their decision-
making behaviour (Larrick, 2004). Nevertheless, for making sound decisions and, hence, 
potentially achieving desired decision outcomes in the long term (e.g. W. Edwards, 1984; 
Howard, 1973; Keeney, 2008; Keren & Bruine de Bruin, 2003; Larrick et al., 1993) or 
increasing the likelihood of experiencing sound decision outcomes (W. Edwards, 1984; 
Keren & Bruine de Bruin, 2003), the decision process has to be more than just free of 
decision biases (e.g. Baron, 2008). For sound decision-making in complex decision 
situations, decision-makers have to complete several decision-analytical steps in a 
                                                
21 For the Y-DMC Parker and Fischhoff (2005) have selected tasks capturing each of the four fundamental 
decision-making skills presented by Edwards (1954) or Raiffa (1968): assessing beliefs, assessing 
values, combining beliefs and values in order to identify choices, and having a meta-cognitive 
understanding of one’s abilities. 
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decision process (cf. section 2.4). The A-DMC defines DMC mostly by the absence of the 
biases’ influence. It is developed from a behavioural avenue of decision research and 
thus, does not aim to cover decision-analytical insights or the execution of concrete 
decision-analytical steps.  
 
Second, the sub-scale applying decision rules of the A-DMC is characterised by a 
certain degree of impreciseness, giving the impression, according to its name, that it 
refers to an analytical decision-making process but instead aims to capture people’s 
ability to follow given instructions. Thus, it rather measures test-taking skills as for instance 
following the instructions precisely (cf. Pike, 1973; Rogers & Harley, 1999). Besides “the 
[actual] cognitive ability or basic skill the test is designed to measure ... [the test-taking 
skill describes] the ability to demonstrate cognitive ability or basic skill within the test 
situation” (Sabers, 1975, p. 7). Kettler, Braden, & Beddow (2011) define this kind of “test-
wiseness [as] an access22 skill for tests designed to measure academic achievement in a 
variety of content areas” (p. 148). In the context of performance testing, access is related 
to the opportunity of test participants to show their actual ability postulated by the test. 
The A-DMC sub-scale applying decision rules is operationalized by seven cases, for 
instance presenting a decision-maker who has to select a DVD player among five options 
according to decision-rule constraints (cf. Figure 2-2). Bruine de Bruin, et al. (2007) 
measure the quality of performance by the percentage of items for which the correct DVD 
players were chosen, based on the applicable decision rule. From a test developmental 
point of view, the main criticism for this A-DMC sub-scale is that the instruction (cf. Figure 
2-2) already includes the solution to the tasks (Kline, 2015): By reading, understanding, 
and then precisely following the instructions, test participants can solve this kind of item. 
Hence, the A-DMC sub-scale applying decision rules could be seen as a proxy variable 
for test-taking skill or test wiseness.  
                                                
22 The better its access the greater the test’s reliability and construct validity as “[b]oth reliability and 
construct validity are higher when the proportion of variance within a set of test scores that is construct 
relevant is maximized” (Kettler et al., 2011, p. 147). 
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Figure 2-2 Example item for “applying decision rules” (A-DMC; Bruine de Bruin, et al., 2007, p.954) 
 
Third, even though the authors indicate that the Y-DMC as the first version of the A-
DMC “capture[s] an overall picture of decision-making competence” (Parker & Fischhoff, 
2005, p. 3) it does not become apparent to which decision type Y-DMC and A-DMC are 
tailored. When examining the chosen items of the tests, it is not clear whether the tests 
aim to focus more on fast and frugal decisions, or more on complex decision situations. 
This specification appears necessary, as it requires different strategies to effectively solve 
either type of decision. While successfully coping with minor or daily decisions calls for 
heuristic techniques (e.g. Todd & Gigerenzer, 2000), a sound analytical decision-making 
process is needed to deal with demanding and influential choices (e.g. Matheson & 
Howard, 1968).  
Additionally, it is debatable whether content-disconnected tasks23, (e.g. cf. Figure 
2-3), which are picked to “fit the theoretical categorization of normative decision-making 
skills” (Bruine de Bruin et al., 2007, p. 940) from existing literature, provide testing data 
that is comparable and predictive to actual decision behaviour in real-life. A test is always 
just an attempt to reconstruct a real-world issue and create a measurement environment 
that is as close as possible to reality. However, in due consideration of test theoretical 
standards (e.g. Crocker & Algina, 2006) a test should aim to be the best approximation of 
the real-life issue it is referring to. The items chosen for the A-DMC do not represent 
problems decision makers usually face consecutively in their daily life. That is why the face 
validity for the measure does appear relatively low. The biggest challenge seems to be the 
                                                
23 With disconnected tasks items are meant that do not refer to one decision. To solve a real-life decision 
more than one skill would be needed at a time. 
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content validity of the A-DMC index, as it does not become clear how the authors have 
selected this specific set of decision tasks to capture the behavioural aspect of DMC.  
 
Figure 2-3 Example items for disconnected items of the A-DMC (Bruine de Bruin, et al., 2007, pp. 
953-955 
 
Fourth, even if the A-DMC and the DOI are significantly correlated with rp = .29 (p < 
0.001, Bruine de Bruin et al., 2007, p. 946), regarding some of the items (cf. Figure 2-4) of 
the DOI it is questionable whether the quality of DMC is linked with the tendency of 
decision outcomes. The criterion for validation – the DOI - aims to measure the success 
of individual decision-making in terms of avoiding specific negative decision outcomes 
(Bruine de Bruin et al., 2007). Reduced from an extensive list, 41 negative decision 
outcomes with good internal consistency have been selected by the authors. While some 
of the DOI items (cf. left column in Figure 2-4) plausibly ask for decision outcomes, which 
could have been influenced by a poor decision-making process, other items (cf. right 
column in Figure 2-4) are criticisable, as the connection between the appearance of the 
outcomes and the poor decision-making appears to be loose. Thus, it seems inexplicable 
why certain outcomes, such as condom break, tear, or slip off (cf. Figure 2-4), should be 
linked to poor decision-making as nowadays in the modern western world, people are 
obligated to have safe sex to protect themselves and others against sexually transmitted 
diseases. In other words, the evaluation of decision outcomes depends either on the 
perspective of the evaluator or on the situational context of the decision maker. This kind 
of subjectivity leads to a justifiable reservation towards the DOI as an appropriate and 
rigorous validation criterion. It is therefore desirable to find other criteria for validation to 
connect sound DMC to worthwhile decision outcomes. 
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Figure 2-4 Two example items of the Decision Outcome Inventory (Bruine de Bruin et al., 2007, p. 
956) 
 
In conclusion, the research on defining and operationalizing DMC has been 
broadened and improved within the past decades. More recent approaches have moved 
from self-rating procedures to psychometric performance tests, and so provide better 
psychometric properties. So far, these new approaches have focused mainly on insights 
from behavioural decision research and decision theory. However, these avenues do not 
consider decision-analytical knowledge.  
For this reason, this Ph.D. research intends to capitalise on the strengths of two 
research directions and merge them. First, it proposes to build on the insights of decision 
analysis about analytical steps of sound individual decision-making. Second, it proposes 
to deploy the prevalent research on psychometric performance measures to guide the 
methodological considerations to reach better statistical properties, as valid and reliable 
performance-based measures of DMC are rare. In this respect, this research aims to 
present a new definition and a novel instrument to operationalize DMC, which presents 
the construct as a higher-level measure with several decision-analytical dimensions that 
correlate with each other. 
2.4 DIMENSIONS OF DECISION-ANALYTICAL COMPETENCE  
In this section, a decision-analytical avenue of research is considered to address the 
research gap presented in section 2.3. To give a visualised overview of the theoretical 
dimensions of DAC presented by decision-analytical literature a graphical representation, 
the Process Cycle of Decision-Analytical Competence (cf. Figure 2-5) is conceived. On 
this basis, a literature review of DAC is outlined. 
The Process Cycle of Decision-Analytical Competence intends to illustrate 
cognitive motivational dimensions24 of DAC25. The framework represents an individual’s 
                                                
24 The framework does not claim to present a perfect and complete set of factors influencing a decision-
making process. In fact it maps the cognitive and motivational components of decision-making. It omits 
the ability to deal with biases or volitional behavioural components necessary to transfer a decision into 
action.  
MEASURING DECISION-ANALYTICAL COMPETENCE - A PSYCHOMETRIC ONLINE PERFORMANCE TEST 
 
 43 
decision-making process by a cycle, as decision-making can be seen as an on-going 
process, in which decision-makers try to find the best solution for their decision problem 
and think about the different facets of a decision. The consecutive nature of a decision-
making process is that the cycle does not provide a starting or an ending point. Also, the 
literature does not clearly define where a decision-making process begins. The following 
remarks are ordered corresponding to a succession, which seemed reasonable for 
describing such a process.  
The cycle consists of eight dimensions. All dimensions are drawn equally sized, as no 
dimension has a higher set value than another. In fact, Hammond et al. (1999) describe 
that a sound decision-making process can only be carried out if all dimensions have been 
addressed. To skip one of the steps could negatively affect the other dimensions and 
hence lower the chance of reaching the desired output and/or outcome (Mellers & Locke, 
2007).  
 
The eight dimensions of the Process Cycle of Decision-Analytical Competence are 
presented in three different colours to illustrate three phases of a decision-making 
process: decision recognition, decision reasoning, and decision intention. All three 
phases and their underlying facets represent cognitive abilities. From an action theoretical 
point of view they can be seen as motivational elements. In action theory, for instance 
Heckhausen (1989), there is differentiation between motivation and volition. Everything 
that contributes to forming an intention is called motivational. The volitional phase 
describes the momentum when the intention becomes implemented. In the context of the 
present research, the Process Cycle of Decision-Analytical Competence intends to 
capture the cognitive motivational phases of analytical decision-making26 as the testing of 
volitional aspects in the context of complex decision-making requires action not 
reasoning, which would have exceeded the manageable frame conditions of the research 
project.   
                                                                                                                                          
25 Referring to decision-making competence in this research, a multi-dimensional concept is meant as 
various cognitive abilities for good decision-making are required (e.g. Baron, 2008). Comparable to 
similar studies in the research field of decision science, DMC is understood as an aggregated measure of 
a battery of different decision skills (e.g. Bruine de Bruin et al., 2007; Finucane & Gullion, 2010; Parker & 
Fischhoff, 2005). The DAC-dimensions are seen as some of those skills chosen to present the decision-
analytical side of decision-making. Correspondingly, DAC can be understood as a “formative measure” 
(J. R. Edwards & Bagozzi, 2000) or an “index” (Streiner, 2003) specified by its separate dimensions. 
26 In section 2.4.3 it is explained why the present research omits the volitional phase of analytical 
decision-making.  
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Figure 2-5 Process Cycle of Decision-Analytical Competence 
 
To summarise, the research framework Process Cycle of Decision-Analytical 
Competence in Figure 2-5 focuses on cognitive motivational decision-analytical 
dimensions of a decision-making process. The framework presents the insights of the 
prevalent decision analysis literature. The dimensions of the Process Cycle of Decision-
Analytical Competence define the construct of DAC and have to be examined empirically 
by this Ph.D. research (cf. chapter 5). The following sub-sections 2.4.1 - 2.4.3 give a 
theoretical overview of the three process phases and their corresponding dimensions.  
2.4.1 Decision Recognition 
According to the first phase of an individual decision-making process, the decision 
recognition, good decision-makers have to be able to recognise decision 
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opportunities27. Keeney (1992) explains: “instead of sitting and waiting [which could be an 
explicit choice], it may be preferable to identify decision opportunities, that is, 
opportunities to better achieve our overall values by formulating a decision situation.” (p. 
27) Keelin, Schoemaker, and Spetzler (2009)28 explain that decision-makers have to 
declare a decision and be aware of the possibility to configure their future. They must be 
able to decide whether a particular decision situation needs more attention and is worth 
further reflection. In this context, decision-makers can decide to “go ... with the flow” (p. 
3) and not to decide, or they can decide to make a conscious and explicit choice and 
take control and responsibility for their decision. Furthermore, good decision-makers are 
able to assess the potential impact of a decision on their life - whether they face a 
significant major decision or a routine minor one: therefore, they are also able to balance 
the effort they should put into making a decision. 
Another very important aspect of the first phase of the Process Cycle of Decision-
Analytical Competence is the ability to assess one’s degree of decision fitness. 
Decision fitness describes a state in which decision-makers are aware of their emotional 
status and in control of their emotions (Keelin et al., 2009; Thaler & Sunstein, 2008). This 
state enables decision-makers to focus on the decision, to proceed analytically with the 
decision-making process, and to make a conscious choice among a useful set of 
alternatives. Good decision-makers have the ability to know the extent of their 
competence or decision fitness. Thus, they are able to realise when they need external 
help or more resources (Keelin et al., 2009). Edwards (1954) and Raiffa (1968) call this 
ability metacognition.  
2.4.2 Decision Reasoning 
In the second phase, the decision reasoning, good decision-makers show the ability 
to apply decision-analytical rules correctly to implement a sound decision (e.g. Hammond 
et al., 1999; Keelin et al., 2009). The research field of decision analysis devotes itself to 
this topic, including belief assessment, value assessment, and integration of beliefs and 
values (W. Edwards, 1954; Finucane & Gullion, 2010; Raiffa, 1968b). In its second phase, 
the Process Cycle of Decision-Analytical Competence covers five decision-analytical 
dimensions of good individual decision-making.  
                                                
27 In comparison to Keeney’s (cf. 1992) proactive definition of decision opportunities, in the present 
research the term decision opportunities refers more to the recognition of a concrete decision situation 
rather than creating a situation which enables a decision.  
28 Peer reviewed literature on decision-analytical dimensions of DMC is rare. Even though the work of 
Keelin et al. (2009) is not peer reviewed and lacks empirical evidence, it is a good theoretical source for 
this research. The insights of the authors stem from years of practical experiences in teaching young 
people good decision-making.  
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First, good decision-makers have to be able to frame a decision (e.g. Howard, 2007; 
Mellers & Locke, 2007). To grasp and understand a decision it is crucial “to answer 
difficult questions about what to include and, more difficult, what to exclude” (Hastie & 
Dawes, 2010, p. 31) by drawing a summarising decision tree chart. While considering the 
context of the decision situation, decision-makers define their decision problem clearly 
and identify other persons who should get involved as they are somehow affected by the 
decision and/or its potential output/outcome (e.g. Bazerman & Moore, 2009; Hammond 
et al., 1999). In addition good decision-makers have to comprehend the decision problem 
accurately, taking into account what they hope to accomplish by a decision, what is 
important for making the decision, and which other perspectives of the decision problem 
they have to consider (Keelin et al., 2009). In this context a good decision-maker has to 
be able to distinguish between different components of a decision such as uncertainties, 
alternatives, and (possibly conflicting) objectives.  
Second, good decision-makers have to be able to envision their own objectives 
(e.g. Edwards, 1954; Hastie, 2001; Keeney, 1996; Larrick, 2004; Mellers & Locke, 
2007; Raiffa, 1968) because these define why the decision-maker is concerned about 
that particular decision. If decision-makers do not have preferences for what will happen 
resulting from the decision alternative they choose, they would be satisfied with any 
decision they make (e.g. Howard, 2000). Hence, decision-makers have to be aware of 
their individual preferences (Howard, 2007). The more complex the decision, the more 
carefully decision-makers have to ponder over their objectives. To consider a good list of 
objectives decision-makers should be creative and intensively thinking at the same time 
(Keeney, 2007). They have to list and prioritise their short-, mid-, and long-term values 
(Keelin et al., 2009), articulate what they want and select the most relevant objectives to 
achieve their goals (Hammond et al., 1999). The literature presents various ways to 
support decision-makers from generating a comprehensive set of objectives; from simple 
wish lists (e.g. Keeney, 1992, p. 57), taking another person’s perspective to think about 
the decision and creating potential objectives (Keller & Ho, 1988), to structuring one’s 
objectives in terms of separating fundamental from means objectives (Keeney, 1996). 
Thus, objectives build an important basis to create alternatives systematically, to guide the 
methodical search for information, and to plan one’s decisions. Using objectives to 
identify relevant alternatives enhances the likelihood that the decision-maker effectively 
achieves their desired objectives (e.g. Gollwitzer & Brandstätter, 1997; Gollwitzer & 
Oettingen, 1998). Furthermore, good decision-makers have to be able to make value 
trade-offs (Keeney, 1992), which means finding the right relation of costs, such as time, 
effort and money, to benefits (e.g. Spetzler & Staël von Holstein, 1975). This implies 
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weighting the criteria according to their relative importance in relation to the present 
alternatives (e.g. Bazerman & Moore, 2009).  
Third, good decision-makers are able to identify relevant alternatives (e.g. Goodwin 
& Wright, 2014; Keller & Ho, 1988; Larrick, 2004), i.e. the capability to create and list 
sound alternatives (Keelin et al., 2009) and to consider almost all desirable alternatives 
(Hammond et al., 1999) is needed. In this context it is important that the created 
alternatives fit one’s objectives (Keeney, 1992). Several studies have shown that a better 
and more comprehensive list of alternatives is generated when taking objectives into 
account to systematically identify alternatives (e.g. Butler & Scherer, 1997; Jungermann, 
von Ulardt, & Hausmann, 1983; Siebert & Keeney, 2015). Several ways to generate a 
good list of alternatives are recommended by the literature, for instance thinking about 
potential win-win situations for decision-involved people and the decision-maker. By trying 
to achieve one’s desires and simultaneously improve the other’s situation, thinking of 
different values could lead to more creativity (Keeney, 1996). Another approach to create 
a sound list of alternatives is to identify mechanisms that help reach the fundamental 
objectives of the decision and formulate an alternative for each mechanism (Siebert & 
Keeney, 2015).  
Fourth, good decision-makers have to be able to deal with uncertainty (e.g. 
Edwards, 1954; Matheson & Howard, 1968; Raiffa, 1968). This skill includes the correct 
comprehension, interpretation, and calculation of probabilities presented in various ways 
(e.g. G. Gigerenzer, 1996; Grisso & Tomkins, 1996). Making sound decisions implies 
judging the likelihood of different outcomes and assessing their possible impact 
(Hammond et al., 1999). Good decision-makers are able to think distributionally and 
probabilistically by taking an outsider’s perspective and perceive a problem not as a one-
of-a-kind situation, but rather as a one-case-out-of-hundreds of comparable cases and 
base their judgements on systematically collected data (e.g. Hastie & Dawes, 2010; 
Kahneman & Lovallo, 1993). Drawing decision tree charts helps decision-makers to 
“calculate the decision that leads to the highest expected outcome by applying a rule that 
follows from decision theory“ (Hastie & Dawes, 2010, p. 31). 
Fifth, good decision-makers have to be able to integrate information within the 
decision-making process. This implies the ability to consciously consider information 
needs and gather useful information from the past, present or future to anticipate the 
consequences of alternatives. “Useful information should come from a credible and 
unbiased source, be timely, and acknowledge uncertainty. Information about uncertainty 
... should recognize the upside and downside risks and their associated probabilities.” 
(Keelin et al., 2009, p. 9) This dimension of a decision-making process also includes the 
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ability to combine assessment of uncertainties and values coherently (e.g. Edwards, 
1954; Raiffa, 1968) and make various alternatives and objectives comparable, i.e. 
“assess[ing] the potential consequences on each of the identified criteria of selecting each 
of the alternative solutions” (Bazerman & Moore, 2009, p. 3). “For each alternative, 
[decision-makers have to be able to] take a weighted average of the values assigned to 
that alternative” (Goodwin & Wright, 2014, p. 34). Therefore, different scales assessing 
how well the alternatives fit the generated objectives have to be transformed to ease the 
comparison of assessed alternatives.  
2.4.3 Decision Intention 
Without the decision intention, all prior steps are useless (Mellers & Locke, 2007): In 
the third phase of the Process Cycle of Decision-Analytical Competence, good 
decision-makers plan to implement a decision in order to transfer a decision into action 
(e.g. Hammond et al., 1999; Howard, 2007; Keelin et al., 2009). Decision-makers have to 
commit to follow through with their decision (Keelin et al., 2009) as it is “[t]he purpose of 
decision analysis to achieve clarity of action” (Howard, 2007, p. 43). In this respect, 
coming to a conclusion of which option to choose does not complete the decision 
process. A commitment to action has to be made and the choice has to be actively 
implemented. Decision-makers do this by initiating the first steps of action, thereby 
executing a decision purposefully. To successfully follow through, decision-makers need 
“resources such as time, effort, money, or help from others. It also requires being 
prepared to overcome obstacles” (Keelin et al., 2009, p. 11). Within this phase of the 
decision-making process the motivational and volitional phases of decision-making 
merge. According to Heckhausen and Gollwitzer’s Rubicon model (1987), in moving from 
the motivational to the volitional phase decision-makers have to exceed the imaginary 
Rubicon29 and transfer their intention into action30. Even though in the literature intention is 
seen as one of the main predictors for behaviour, it often explains just 20% to 30% of the 
variance in behaviour (e.g. Sheeran, 2002). Intention-behaviour-gap is what this 
discrepancy between intention and behaviour is called. It can be observed in people who 
                                                
29The model is based on the metaphor of the Robicon (ital. Rubicone), which is a small river in Italy. When 
49 B.C. Julius Caesar finally decided to cross the river, the decision for civil war was made and the point 
of no return was reached. 
30 As described, the ability to plan to implement a decision builds the transition from motivational to the 
volitional phase (Heckhausen & Gollwitzer, 1987). So there is a second non-cognitive part to this 
dimension of a decision-making process, which can be simply called action (e.g. Keelin et al., 2009). This 
step is not captured by these theoretical remarks, not represented in the Process Cycle of Decision-
Analytical Competence, and also not an object of the present Ph.D. research.  
 
MEASURING DECISION-ANALYTICAL COMPETENCE - A PSYCHOMETRIC ONLINE PERFORMANCE TEST 
 
 49 
have positive intentions but yet do not act in that way, even though they show 
comparable motivation to people who act (Orbell & Sheeran, 1998). Examined by 
Leventhal, Singer, and Jones (1965), the concept of action planning (original term of 
Leventhal and colleagues) gained publicity from Gollwitzer in the 1990s. Action planning 
describes common when-where-how plans. It cognitively links a specific behaviour with a 
specific situation. Thereby, behaviour is connected to situation-specific clues and gets 
activated almost automatically once the clue(s) appear(s) (Gollwitzer, 1999). As a 
consequence people with good action planning ability act faster (Gollwitzer & Sheeran, 
2006) and more often according to their intended aim (Gollwitzer & Brandstätter, 1997). 
Another concept that seems to play an important role in terms of planning to implement a 
decision is coping planning (Sniehotta, Scholz, & Schwarzer, 2006; Sniehotta, 
Schwarzer, Scholz, & Schüz, 2005), when a decision-maker should be able to anticipate 
potential difficulties during the implementation process and has to be able to precisely 
plan how to overcome those obstacles. Studies have demonstrated that people show 
more activity according to their intentions if they had made concrete coping plans in 
advance (e.g. Sniehotta et al., 2006; Ziegelmann, Lippke, & Schwarzer, 2006).  
2.5 THEORETICAL COMPLIANCE ON DECISION-ANALYTICAL COMPETENCE  
Even if decision analysis does not exhibit empirical evidence for the individual on all 
theoretical dimensions of DAC so far (cf. sections 2.4.1 - 2.4.3), some research groups 
have theoretically analysed the construct of DAC, describing the necessary steps of a 
decision-making process and thereby showing a theoretical agreement on the dimensions 
of DAC. In the following, four common decision-analytical approaches are representatively 
outlined:  
On the basis of Janis’ and Mann’s conflict theory of decision-making and the 
corresponding seven criteria of a vigilant decision-maker (1977; cf. section 2.2) Mann, 
Harmoni, and Power, (1988a, 1988b) developed the GOFER process for a decision-
making course for adolescents. It was their purpose to simplify the criteria for a good 
decision-making process and translate them into understandable and acceptable 
concepts for high schoolers. In this context, GOFER is an acronym for goals - envision 
objectives and values; options - taking into account a wide range of alternatives; facts - 
searching for information and collecting data; effects – “weighting the negative and 
positive consequences” of options (Baron & Brown, 1991, p. 64); and review – planning 
to implement the made decision. Later on a sixth step of good decision-making - putting 
a decision into action - was added to the process.  
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About 10 years after the GOFER approach, in 1999 Hammond, Keeney, and Raiffa 
published their book Smart Choices, which introduces the decision-analytical approach 
of PrOACT31 to decision laymen. Corresponding to their approach, good decision-makers 
have to precisely define their values, identify relevant alternatives, create new options and 
determine the consequences of each alternative by considering the advantages and 
disadvantages of each consequence. In this sense, good decision-makers are able to 
make trade-offs. They clearly evaluate the consequences and how these match the 
objectives. PrOACT also requests the decision-maker to assess uncertainties, identify 
one’s risk tolerance and think about linked decisions. 
Similar to the approach of Hammond et al., Howard (2000) explains that the basis of 
each decision contains three elements: alternatives to decide among, information about 
what is likely to occur, and individual preferences on resulting outcomes. In addition, the 
decision-maker has to choose the appropriate frame (e.g. involved people, time point, 
location, etc.) for their decision. This frame influences every element of the decision. The 
elements of a decision are presented by the six elements of a quality decision (Keelin & 
Spetzler, 1992). Keelin and Spetzler’s model of decision elements contains the following 
dimensions: helpful frame, clear values, creative alternatives, useful information, sound 
reasoning, and commitment to follow through. 
In comparison to the six elements of a quality decision, the Socio-Technical 
Decision Analysis of Phillips and colleagues (e.g. Phillips & Bana e Costa, 2007; Phillips & 
Phillips, 1993; Phillips, 2007) serves first of all group decisions, but is also applicable to 
individual decisions. Comparable to the presented approaches of Hammond et al. (1999) 
and Keelin et al. (2009), at the beginning of Socio-Technical Decision Analysis decision-
makers have to recognise a need for decision-making and the decision problem has to be 
defined and structured. Subsequently, all existing and potential alternatives and criteria, 
which seem to be relevant or attractive to the decision-maker, have to be collected and 
listed. By building a criteria-tree, the decision criteria are analysed and the options are 
scored. The process of judging the weights of the criteria across and within each other is 
called swing weighting. The main aim is to estimate the importance of the criteria in 
relation to each other. The final data analysis also includes a sensitivity analysis.  
 
It is important to remark that the approaches from different research groups offer a 
similar process with similar elements despite using different terms for these elements. 
                                                
31 The acronym stands for problem, objectives, alternatives, consequences and trade-offs, which 
represent the steps of a rational decision-making process.  
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Mellers and Locke (2007) emphasise this impression in their literature review of decision 
analysis by identifying five interrelated steps suggested by decision analysts to make good 
decisions: “[d]efine the problem and set the goals, gather information and identify options, 
evaluate the information and the options, make a choice and implement the choice and 
monitor the results.” (p. 351-352) In general, all approaches define the decision problem, 
determine objectives, create alternatives, and gather information. In this sense, a common 
theoretical signification of what is meant by a sound individual decision making process is 
available.  
 
To summarise, more than 50 years of research in the field of decision analysis has 
created a well-established basis of decision-making insights and understanding. Different 
approaches of various research groups from decision analysis provide similar steps for a 
good individual decision-making process. Thereby, the different research groups show a 
shared knowledge and partial agreement of what a sound analytical decision-making 
process of an individual should look like and build the theoretical basis for the presented 
Ph.D. research. From the existing literature in decision analysis, the term DAC, used in the 
present research, refers to the association of eight motivational cognitive abilities. The 
following sub-section is intended to provide an overview of the eight cognitive dimensions 
of the construct DAC. 
2.6 THE DIMENSIONS OF DECISION-ANALYTICAL COMPETENCE  
On the theoretical basis described above, the construct of DAC is defined with its 
eight cognitive motivational abilities listed in Table 2-2.  
Table 2-2 The eight cognitive dimensions of DAC 
Phase of the  
Process Cycle of DAC  # Cognit ive DAC-dimension 
Decis ion recognit ion 
1 Ability to recognise decision opportunities 
2 Ability to assess decision fitness 
Decis ion reasoning 
3 Ability to frame a decision 
4 Ability to envision one’s objectives  
5 Ability to identify relevant alternatives 
6 Ability to deal with uncertainty 
7 Ability to integrate information  
Decis ion intent ion 8 Ability to plan to implement a decision 
Note. DAC = Decision-analytical competence.  
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Consolidated in the phase of decision recognition, the ability to recognise decision 
opportunities and the ability to assess decision fitness are displayed, followed by the 
phase of decision reasoning consisting of the abilities to frame a decision, to envision 
one’s objectives, identify relevant alternatives, deal with uncertainty and integrate 
information. The eight skills are completed by the ability to plan to implement a decision 
in the phase of decision intention. Based on this definition, the present research aims to 
examine how the construct of DAC can be operationalized and measured.  
  
The next chapter explains the chosen research methods for designing a psychometric 
performance test and presents the research hypotheses. By introducing a strategy for 
data gathering and the corresponding target group, it illustrates how empirical data was 
collected.   
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3 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY  
As mentioned before, the main target of the present research is to provide a reliable 
and valid psychometric performance test, which captures the construct of DAC with its 
cognitive motivational dimensions (cf. Table 2-2). After theoretically defining the DAC-
dimensions (cf. section 2.4) a psychological standard procedure was used to develop the 
test (cf. section 4.1). Before presenting the operationalization of DAC, the subsequent 
sections serve to give a compact overview of the chosen research method for creating a 
psychometric performance test. Thus, the general purpose of this chapter is to introduce 
the research hypotheses, the research methodology and its corresponding 
methodological decisions, as well as the strategy of data collection and the target group 
(cf. section 3.3).  
 
In psychology a psychometric test, is “any standardized instrument, including scales 
and selfreport inventories, used to measure behavior or ... cognitive abilities (reasoning, 
comprehension, abstraction, etc.), ... and personality characteristics.” (Zedec, 2014, p. 
278) While the items of a test represent the independent variable(s)32, the test response 
set suggests the dependent variable33. Figure 3-1 gives an example and shows a cutting 
of the non-verbal multiple-choice measure called Raven Progressive Matrices test 
(Raven, Raven, & Court, 1962), which aims to capture analytical intelligence, that “refers 
to the ability to deal with novelty, to adapt one's thinking to a new cognitive problem” 
(Carpenter, Just, & Shell, 1990, p. 2): An indicator represented by item 1 constitutes the 
independent variable. The response options (a – h) represent the dependent variable. To 
answer the item, the test participant has to choose between eight options - the response 
set. According to the test construction, selecting option b would be interpreted as high 
occurrence of the dependent variable – a high parameter for analytical intelligence – as b 
is the correct answer offering the correct requested geometric form in combination with 
the fitting line texture and orientation. Selecting any of the other options would lead to the 
assumption of a low occurrence of the dependent variable – a low parameter for analytical 
intelligence – as those options are incorrect.  
                                                
32 Independent variables represent inputs or causes of a phenomenon. 
33 Dependent variables represent outputs or effects of a phenomenon. 
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Figure 3-1 Independent and dependent variable exemplified by an item of a performance test 
 
The classical test theory (cf. for instance Guliksen, 1950; Novick, 1966) assumes 
that a person’s behaviour can be explained by individual traits or characteristics (cf. 
psychological constructs; Cronbach & Meehl, 1955). Consequently, those traits or 
characteristics can be measured by a test, which consists of several items or so-called 
indicators (e.g. Moosbrugger & Kelava, 2012). In the case of the present research 
objective, indicators are chosen as they rely on test data (cf. Cattell, 1965). If the scientific 
literature gives reason to assume that a latent construct encompasses several 
dimensions, a corresponding psychometric test should capture all of these dimensions.  
In the framework of the present research it is assumed that DAC is a higher-order 
factor, which underlies various dimensions (Law & Mobley, 1998) as presented in section 
2.4. All cognitive DAC-dimensions build the dependent variables, which are 
operationalized by a set of items/indicators. Before the operationalization of each 
dimension is introduced in section 4.1, the research hypotheses (cf. section 3.1), the 
process of psychometric test development (cf. section 3.2), and the strategy for data 
collection (cf. section 3.3) are introduced in the following sections and sub-sections.  
3.1 RESEARCH HYPOTHESES 
By developing a set of decision tasks that capture decision-analytical approaches to 
deal with complex decision-making, which are widely recognised in the corresponding 
literature, the main aim of this research is to successfully operationalize and validate a 
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performance test for DAC. Whether these expectations are met and thereby whether it 
can be claimed that DAC can be measured by a set of decision-analytical tasks, is 
examined by the following hypotheses (cf. Table 3-1). Hypotheses H1 – H3 are statistical-
methodical hypotheses and hypothesis H4 is a content-valid hypothesis, which is further 
specified in sub-sections 5.1.1 to 5.1.7 of this thesis. 
Table 3-1 Research hypotheses  
Type  # Hypothesis Comment 
St
at
ist
ica
l-m
et
ho
di
ca
l 
H1 
Each dimension of the 
DAC-test is reliable and 
thus shows internal 
consistency.  
Internal consistency is a measure based on the 
correlation between various items of a homogenous test 
(capturing only one dimension, cf. section 3.1.1) or items 
of a sub-scale of a test of a higher-level measure (e.g. 
Lienert & Raatz, 1998, p. 192). It shows whether different 
items produce similar scores.  
H2 
The DAC-test is reliable 
and shows internal 
consistency. 
Reliability can be defined as the degree of consistency 
with which a test measures a specific trait, independently 
of whether the test aims to measure this specific trait or 
not (e.g. Zedec, 2014, p. 307). There are different 
approaches to measure the reliability of a test. In the 
context of this research, the internal consistency of the 
constructed DAC-test is investigated by Cronbach’s 
alpha. 
H3 
The DAC-dimensions 
refer to one general 
factor. 
According to the literature, the various DAC-dimensions 
reflect one common concept of decision-making. The 
current research intends to examine this assumption by 
both an exploratory and a confirmatory factor analysis.  
The statistical procedure of an exploratory factor 
analysis describes the variability among observed 
correlated variables in terms of a potentially smaller 
number of unobserved latent variables (Bortz & Döring, 
2005, p. 355). These latent variables are called factors. 
Confirmatory factor analysis describes “any method of 
testing a priori hypotheses to the effect that the 
relationships among a set of observed variables are due 
to a particular set of unobserved variables.” (Zedec, 
2014, p. 58). 
Co
nt
en
t-v
ali
d 
H4 
The DAC-test score 
correlates significantly 
with suitable criteria for 
validation.  
Validity can be defined as the degree of accuracy with 
which the test measures the specific construct it is 
supposed to measure (Lienert & Raatz, 1998, p. 10). To 
prove the validity of a test, the correlation of the test with 
suitable criteria for validation has to be examined, such 
as decision self-esteem or vigilant decision-making style.  
Note. H = Research hypothesis; DAC = Decision-analytical competence.  
 
Whether the hypotheses are corroborated or have to be rejected, is discussed in 
section 6.2.  
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3.2 PSYCHOMETRIC TEST DEVELOPMENT  
For the following compact overview34 of a standard procedure of psychometric test 
development, the present information, explanations, and statements delve into the area of 
psychometric test design. 
 
According to Lienert and Raatz (1998), the psychometric procedure of test 
development can be divided into six phases as displayed in Table 3-2, which serve to 
structure the following sub-sections. The first phase is called test design (cf. sub-section 
3.2.1), in which the test concept and test form are chosen, and the scope of application 
and the target group are defined. Additionally, a decision about the homogeneity or 
heterogeneity of a test is made. In the phase of item development (cf. sub-section 3.2.2) 
decisions on the item types and response sets have to be made, the items have to be 
phrased, and the item goodness criteria have to be considered.  
 
Table 3-2 Standard procedure of psychometric test development (cf. Lienert & Raatz, 1998) 
# Phase of test 
development Elements of test development phase 
Sub-
sect ion 
1 Test design 
Generating the test concept, deciding about test 
homogeneity or heterogeneity, defining the scope of 
application, choosing the test form and the target 
group 
3.2.1 
2 Item development Choosing item types and response sets, item phrasing, considering item quality criteria 
3.2.2 
3 Item analysis Pretesting the items 
3.2.3 
4 Distr ibut ional analysis 
Selecting items, revising items, calculating the test 
score, analysing the test distribution, standardisation, 
developing the final test 
5 Empir ical control Analysing the reliability, analysing the validity  
3.2.4. 
6 Test cal ibrat ion Interpreting the test results, defining norm values, test calibration 
 
The pre-testing of items in a first test trial is called item analysis, followed by the 
distributional analysis (cf. subsection 3.2.3), in which the best items are selected by their 
quality criteria. Where necessary items are revised, the test score is calculated, and the 
test distribution is analysed. After the standardisation, the final test has to be developed. 
                                                
34 As scientists have published books on the topic of psychometric test development, the present chapter 
gives just a compact overview of the most important methodological steps/decisions to provide the 
reader with the necessary information to understand the thoughts and considerations on the chosen 
research method.  
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In the phase of empirical control, the test’s reliability and validity are analysed. The test 
result interpretation, definition of norm values, and the calibration are called test 
calibration. Standardisation and test calibration are presented in sub-section 3.2.4.  
 
For developing the DAC-test, the first five35 of these six phases were executed. 
Several decisions on methodical issues were included within this process. The following 
sub-sections explain the development of the DAC-test and justify the choices made.  
3.2.1 Test Design 
At the beginning of any research project, the object of research has to be defined. 
For the present research this step is executed in chapter 2, in which the research domain 
is presented by the literature review and the object of research is captured – here DAC.  
 
The main aim of the test construction strategy for this research was to capture the 
competence of analytical individual decision-making and thus to create a pool of content 
valid items. To pursue this aim, a combination of rational/deductive and criterion 
oriented/external test concept (e.g. Bühner, pp. 93-94, 2010; Eid & Schmidt, 2014, pp. 
57-60) was chosen. Therefore, the decision-analytical literature was searched for either 
empirical studies that examine group differences in decision-making (criterion 
oriented/external approach), or for well-founded theories about the to be measured 
construct – DAC (rational/deductive approach). If prevalent studies did not provide a full 
set of appropriate items to operationalize a cognitive dimension of DAC as, for example, 
the work of Bond et al. (2008, 2010) does for the dimension ability to envision one’s 
objectives, new items had to be generated.  
 
According to the theoretical concept of DAC, it is seen as a multidimensional 
construct that underlies eight dimensions (cf. Table 2-2). Parker and Fischhoff argue "In 
principle, these decision-making skills could be independet of one other. However, the 
cluster identified in previous studies of individual differences overlap one another (2005, p. 
8). Consequently, a corresponding psychometric performance test had to be 
heterogeneous36 to capture all of its dimensions and enable a broader scope of 
                                                
35 The present research provides a first attempt to psychometrically assess DAC. As the corresponding 
empirical results have to be treated more as descriptive than as normative, it is not intended to execute 
the final phase of psychological test development, the so-called calibration, which would demand a pre-
defined standard of comparison. 
36 The tighter the scope of application, the more homogeneous the test. The broader the scope of 
application, the more heterogeneous the test (Lienert & Raatz, 1998). 
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application. The scope of application of the DAC-test relies on a specific decision type 
that individuals are facing. The characteristics of this decision type refer to the kind of 
decisions, for which decision analysis can be instrumental. In this sense, based on 
Matheson and Howard (1968, p. 3), the DAC-test is supposed to measure the ability to 
make decisions that show the following characteristics:  
! Complex preferences: The desires of the decision-maker are not clearly 
formulated and might be conflicting.  
! Costly: Many resources (time, effort, money) are involved in the decision 
process.  
! General: The decision situation refers to decisions normally appearing in every 
person’s life, not only to a specific type or topic of decision.  
! Important: The life of the individual will be affected by the results of the 
decision for many years.  
! Personal: The decision-maker makes a private decision for himself or herself, 
not on behalf of an organisation or another person. 
! Rare: The decision problem appears merely a few times or even only once in a 
lifetime.  
! Uncertain: Many key factors of the decision are imperfectly known by the 
decision-maker. 
 
To operationalize DAC, a performance test as a measuring procedure was chosen. 
As explained in section 2.2, a performance test measures the actual performance of a 
specific motor, sensorial, or cognitive ability in contrast to a questionnaire, which contains 
self-reported opinions, attitudes, and interests and/or assesses a person’s personality 
traits (e.g. Zimbardo & Gerrig, 1996). Performance testing addresses several challenges 
that questionnaires/self-assessments raise:  
In a self-assessment the subjects can influence the questionnaire results in their 
favour. Such manipulation can happen in two ways: due to impression management – a 
conscious manipulation of the test results in order to draw a positive picture of oneself 
(e.g. Goffman, 1956), or due to self-deception – a “positively biased response that the 
respondent actually believes to be true” (Paulhus, 1986, p. 144). A common and well-
examined example for the first way is the social desirability bias (e.g. A. L. Edwards, 
1982; Ellis, 1946). In this case, test participants answer items in a manner that will be 
seen as beneficial by others. It appears in the form of underreporting or overemphasising 
undesirable traits or concrete behaviour. When self-deceiving, examinees’ answers in a 
questionnaire are guided by underlying unconscious and situational consistent self-
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images (e.g. Cheek & Hogan, 1983). “Although organized for a positive self-presentation, 
these images do not involve conscious dissimulation” (Paulhus, 1986, p. 144).  
Influencing a performance test in either way is only possible in terms of 
underperforming. People cannot show better skills than they actually have37. In addition to 
the challenge of impression management and self-deception, self-reports run a higher risk 
of becoming unreliable and invalid due to lacking insights or sensitivity to the demanded 
topic (e.g. Finucane & Lees, 2005; Nisbett & Wilson, 1977). In contrast, self-reports are 
often not as strenuous for the examinee as they usually require “first thing that comes up 
your mind” answers in comparison to performance tests’ mostly postulated “well-thought” 
responses. However, for this research a performance test was chosen, also since a 
performance test showing good statistical properties is absent in this research area.  
 
Additionally, it was decided that the test should be provided as an online test. 
Besides its obvious advantage of allowing “access to much wider populations ... in an 
inexpensive, fast, and convenient way” (Dandurand, Shultz, & Onishi, 2008, p. 428), 
online testing can also be done in diverse settings – location- and time-wise (Reips, 2001, 
2002a) and thus, it enhances the participation comfort for examinees (Salgado, Anderson, 
Moscoso, Bertua, & de Fruyt, 2003). So far, only a few studies have been undertaken to 
compare online and paper-pencil versions of ability tests. In this respect, the research of 
Preckel and Thiemann has verified that “valid and reliable data can be gained through 
online ability assessment” (2003, p. 137). The disadvantage of risking multiple 
submissions (Reips, 2001) was antagonised by using IP address verification (Reips, 
2002b) in the present study. Monetary incentives (Bosnjak & Tuten, 2003) and direct 
feedback were applied to counteract potentially high dropout rates. Furthermore, in 
contrast to paper-pencil test, studies have shown that online tests provide fewer missing 
data (Stanton, 1998) and they are not that susceptible to socially desirable responding 
(Rietz & Wahl, 1999).  
 
Young adults from the age of 18 to 30 years were selected as a target group for 
this Ph.D. research. The criteria for choosing this group are presented in sub-section 
3.3.1.  
                                                
37 Thus, for instance, the researcher can ask a small man how tall he is and probably gets an answer in 
which the man adjusts a little upwards, since in society men are supposed to be taller than women. The 
researcher can also measure/test his body height. If the man does not trick the researcher by standing on 
his tiptoes, the result cannot be influenced by the test participant.  
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After generating the test concept, deciding about test homogeneity and 
heterogeneity, defining the scope of application, and choosing the test form and the 
target group, the items had to be developed. The following sub-section presents the 
various considerations and decisions for the item development. The actual item 
generation is presented in section 4.1.  
3.2.2 Item Development 
Following the phase of test design, the items for the DAC-test had to be developed. 
According to the theoretical concept of DAC (cf. section 2.4), the corresponding test had 
to be heterogeneous to capture each cognitive dimension. In comparison to existing tests 
such as the A-DMC (Bruine de Bruin et al., 2007) or the Y-DMC (Parker & Fischhoff, 
2005), which with regard to content contain disconnected tasks (cf. Figure 2-3), the DAC-
test presents a set of content-wise connected items (cf. section 4.1). The underlying aim 
of this decision was to approach the representation of a complex real world decision 
situation, which requires the performance of all cognitive abilities, i.e. DAC-dimensions, as 
closely as possible.  
Figure 3-2 presents a schematic picture of the DAC-test’s intended structure. As 
illustrated here, it was intended that each block of tasks demands only the performance 
of one DAC-dimension at a time, and therefore allows for analysing each dimension 
independent of the other dimensions. For those cases in which the decision science 
literature provides an approach for measuring a DAC-dimension that conforms to the 
theoretical assumptions underlying this research, the existing approach was used to 
operationalize this particular DAC-dimension (cf. sub-section 4.1.1). If prevalent studies 
did not provide a theory appropriate set of items to operationalize a DAC-dimension, new 
items had to be generated. 
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Figure 3-2 Schematic picture of the structure of the DAC-test 
 
Figure 3-2 shows on the left the test with its eight cognitive dimensions, of which 
each consists of a set of indicators, i.e. items. One of the most important aspects of test 
development is the conjunction between its items and the underlying theoretical 
construct(s) (Porst, 2011). To quantitatively and qualitatively fit the purpose of research, 
items were chosen to content-adequately operationalize and exhaustively capture the 
construct of DAC. In terms of the item type(s) and response set(s), items with bounded 
responses and single referencing, i.e. only one possible correct answer at a time, were 
chosen, which are characterised by a limited, predefined and exhaustive response set. 
For each response set distractors had to be defined, which describe the incorrect answer 
options of response sets that aim to build potential alternatives to the correct answer. “[I]n 
item trials, ideally, each distractor should be equally used by subjects failing the item. 
Obviously, as distractors in the options become useless, so an item becomes easier and 
easier.” (Kline, 2015, p. 36) The great advantage of bounded items is their efficiency and 
objectivity in the phase of questionnaire completion as well as in the phase of data 
handling and analysis (e.g. Kline, 2015; Mossbrugger & Kelava, 2012). Its disadvantage 
lies in running the risk of non-responses for some items as examinees cannot fit their 
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answer into the response set and therefore skip the answer or just select randomly. To 
minimise this effect, responding to each item was forced, i.e. it was impossible for the 
examinees to proceed with the test without answering the missing item. Additionally, 
some selected items used formula scoring in comparison to number right scoring, which 
“attempts to reduce the influence of random guessing on the test score. With this scoring 
method a ‘don’t know’ answering option was added to the true-false items, and the 
number of correct minus incorrect answers ... is used as the test score.” (Muijtjens, van 
Mameren, Hoogenboom, Evers, & van der Vleuten, 1999, p. 267). Formula scoring 
advises test participants to skip an item if they are persuaded that their response would 
be equal to a haphazard guess, as true-false items have a 50% probability of choosing 
the correct answer just by guessing (e.g. Kline, 2015). In comparison to number-right 
scoring formula scoring has higher test reliability (Muijtjens et al., 1999).  
 
In terms of item phrasing, special attention was paid to ensure that each item (block) 
requires just one of the cognitive decision-analytical abilities to be deterministic. 
Additionally, items were constructed so that they were as short and intelligible as 
possible, avoided foreign words and addressed critical ethical issues (e.g. Payne, 1951; 
Schnell, Hill, & Esser, 2008). 
Regarding the issue of which specific item scale was chosen (whether nominal, 
ordinal, interval and ratio scale level (Stevens, 1946) for each DAC-dimension, cf. 
sections 4.1.1 - 4.1.8. As the literature does not claim one scale type being better than 
any other (e.g. Porst, 2011), each single item type had to be inspected in order to choose 
the best fitting scale type. Independent of the scale types, care was taken that the 
response set(s) were clearly laid out, adequate to the complexity of the items, and free of 
ambiguous quantifiers such as “sometimes” or “often” (Lienert & Raatz, 1998).  
 
A test can only be as good as its items. Consequently, for a well-designed test, the 
test and its items have to meet criteria of quality. In this context, an item can be assumed 
to be objective, if different examinees with the same extent of the DAC-dimension answer 
the item in the same way. An item is assumed to be valid if examinees with a strong DAC 
degree of occurrence answer the item more often according to the expectations of the 
researcher - “in key direction” - in comparison to examinees with a weak DAC degree of 
occurrence. A high correlation between an item and the overall score of the test is called 
discriminatory power, i.e. that the test “achieve[s] a good spread of scores” (Kline, 2015, 
p. 8).  
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Another item quality criterion considered is called item difficulty. Standardised tests, 
as for instance the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale-Revised (Wechsler, 2008), usually 
have a medium degree of difficulty. Therefore, the test consists of items with low (the 
majority of examinees can solve the item), medium, and high (only a few examinees can 
solve the item) difficulty.  
Regarding the test and data administration, several aspects were taken into account:  
First, the test instruction (cf. chapter 4) was written to be as comprehensible and 
transparent as possible to the examinees. Accordingly, on the welcoming page of the 
DAC-test the research object and its importance for research is briefly explained. 
Information on the researcher is given and details of privacy protection, in which 
confidentiality is ensured, are presented. Additionally examinees are informed about the 
advantages of taking the test (cf. section 3.3), and what to expect and which testing aids 
are allowed are clarified.  
Second, for the decision of how many items to choose per DAC-dimension for the 
first version of the DAC-test two criteria were considered: The duration of the test should 
be kept as short as possible as concentration and motivation of examinees decrease with 
increasing time (Wise & Kong, 2005). And, to be able to select the best compatible items 
for the final DAC-test, a sufficient variety of items should be tested.  
Third, the digital data storage was done on a MySQL38 open source database, which 
was chosen as it allows data export in various common data formats and conforms to the 
recent status quo of technical standards (Suehring, 2002).  
Fourth, in terms of statistical data analysis the free software environment for statistical 
computing and graphics named R was used. The programme contains a variety of 
possibilities to organise, transfer, or analyse data and generate corresponding graphics. 
Instead of providing a user interface with specified menu items, as found for instance in 
the popular statistics software SPSS (IBM Corp, 2012), R users have to actively produce 
commands.  
Closing the phase of item development, a first version of the DAC-test was designed. 
In order to analyse its items according to their statistical fit, the prototype had to be 
tested. By selecting the best fitting items, calculating the test score and analysing the test 
distribution the final DAC-test was developed. Sub-section 3.2.3 presents the procedure 
of these next two steps of the test design – the so-called item and distributional 
analysis. The statistical analyses and actual results are shown in section 4.2.  
                                                
38 MySQL “is the world’s most popular source database” (MySQL Editions, n.d.) 
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3.2.3 Item Analysis & Distributional Analysis  
Even though pre-testing belongs to the most common procedures for test 
improvement, the methodological literature does not provide one universal standard 
procedure (Prüfer & Rexroth, 1996). In the case of the present research, the prototype of 
the DAC-test was qualitatively pre-tested by eight subjects belonging to the target group 
before being quantitatively pre-tested, as described below. 
Qualitative pre-testing  
The main purpose of the qualitative pre-testing phase was to verify the intelligibility 
of item wording, sentence structure and response sets, as well as of the instructions. 
Therefore, a multi-method pre-testing procedure as suggested by Prüfer and Rexroth 
(1996) and illustrated in Figure 3-3 was applied.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the first phase of the qualitative pre-testing, the DAC-prototype was presented to a 
sample of eight people individually. Each of them took the test at home in the presence of 
the researcher. The examinees were told that a prototype is presented and that they have 
a special role helping to improve the test and its procedure. While the examinees were 
taking the DAC-test online on their own computer, survey protocols about spontaneous 
questions and comments of the test participants, behavioural observations, technical 
problems with the test, and the testing time were minuted.  
The second phase of qualitative pre-testing was performed immediately afterwards. 
An evaluation questionnaire (cf. appendix 9.2) was handed to each examinee aiming to 
gain more information on non-observable problems as well as motivational aspects of the 
test. According to Kuhnke (2007), the evaluation questionnaire measures the following 
parameters: degree of interest in the topic; degree of fun during the test completion; 
personal judgement about the length of the test, degree of understandability of the items, 
Figure 3-3 Procedure of the multi-method qualitative pre-testing phase  
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response sets and instructions; degree of difficulty of the various item tasks; occurrence 
of delicate39 items; general assessment of the test; and suggestions for improvement. 
In the third and last phase of the qualitative pre-testing, qualitative semi-structured 
interviews (for the interview guideline cf. appendix section 9.3) took place referring to the 
individual test results, the test protocol, and evaluation questionnaire. In comparison to 
the evaluation questionnaire, the interview allowed a higher degree of freedom and 
adaptability in terms of acquiring relevant information from the interviewee (e.g. Bortz & 
Döring, 2005). The interview also served to clarify comprehension questions.  
 
Based on the analyses of the feedback packages of the eight people - test results, 
test protocol, evaluation questionnaire, and interview – it was decided which items to 
adapt in terms of their content, wording, phrasing, response set and/or layout, substitute 
or cancel, and which items to keep in their initial form. Additionally, the test instruction 
was revised and minor technical problems with the online test were solved. At the end of 
the qualitative pre-testing, the first DAC-test prototype was blue-pencilled in order to start 
the quantitative pre-testing and the actual item analysis with the second DAC- test 
prototype. 
Quantitative pre-testing  
As the item analysis serves as a test trial, the quantitative pre-testing was operated 
under the same conditions as planned for the main study. Aiming to select those “items 
that form a homogeneous, discriminating scale” (Kline, 2015, p. 133), the second DAC-
test prototype was presented to a total sample of 196 subjects40 representative of the 
target group. Therefore, the correlation of each item with the total score of its scale and 
the proportion of the sample group answering according to keyed response was 
calculated. This step of the pre-testing – the actual item analysis - serves as descriptive-
statistic evaluation of the prototype. Its main aim is to increase the test’s reliability and 
validity by revising test items and proving the test point distribution. 
 
                                                
39 The adjective delicate describes items that cover either ethically controversial topics as for instance 
abortion, or topics that are in general perceived as being very personal such as for instance sexual 
preferences. 
40 According to Lienert and Raatz (1998), an appropriate sample size for the item analysis would be 200-
400 subjects. According to the dimensions of Ph.D. research – time- and money-wise - the lower 
boundary seemed to be more realistic to achieve.  
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Two essential criteria for assessing the item quality are the discriminatory power 
coefficient (rit) 41 that describes the correlational relation between the item scores and the 
test scores, and the item difficulty index (Pi)42 that defines the percentage frequency with 
which an item is answered correctly by the group of examinees (e.g. Kline, 2015; Lienert 
& Raatz, 1998). On the basis of these two essential statistics and according to Kline 
(2015) all items meeting both criteria were picked for the final test. Items that failed one 
criterion were examined for particular characteristics that could have caused this non-fit. 
Furthermore, it was ensured that all aspects of each DAC-dimension were covered and 
that all DAC-dimensions provided approximately/not less than eight items, as this enabled 
good-accessible comparability of scores between examinees. 
 
The item analysis also serves to test the sufficient distribution of test points and 
thereby whether the construct is normally distributed. As the composition of the sample 
group of examinees was compatible and the display of the frequency distribution justified 
the assumption of a normal distribution, it was assumed that the DAC-test scores are 
normally distributed.  
 
At the end of the item and distributional analysis the final version of the DAC-test was 
assembled. The next sub-section presents how reliability and validity of the final test were 
examined in the test construction phases of empirical control and test calibration.  
3.2.4 Empirical Control & Test Calibration 
The final version of the DAC-test was presented to a representative sample of several 
hundred young adults to empirically measure reliability and validity of the test.  
“There is virtual consensus among researchers that, for a scale to be valid and 
possess practical utility, it must be reliable.” (R. A. Peterson, 1994, p. 381) Thus, the 
items of a scale have to be consistent, i.e. the results have to be free of error and produce 
comparable results. As mentioned in sub-section 3.2.2, reliability can be defined as the 
degree of accuracy with which a test measures a specific trait, independently of whether 
                                                
41 A rit close to 1 (or -1 if the items are negatively poled) means that examinees with a strong trait 
occurrence solve the test with a high test score xv, and examinees with a weak trait occurrence solve the 
test with a low test score xv. A rit between .4 and .7 describes a “good” discriminatory power. In this case, 
the items seem to differentiate similarly to the test. A rit close to 0 means that the differentiation by an item 
does not correlate with the differentiation of the test. The item is not suitable to differentiate between 
examinees with a strong trait occurrence and examinees with a weak trait occurrence. 
42 The Pi lies between 0 and 1. The more examinee that solve an item the higher the Pi. This means, the 
higher the Pi the easier the item is to solve: A Pi of 0 means that no examinee solved the item. It is too 
difficult. A Pi of 1 means that all examinees solved the item. Thus, it is too easy. Ideal would be a pi of 50 
(e.g. Kline, 2015). 
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the test aims to measure this specific trait. In the framework of the classical test theory43, 
reliability44 is defined as the quotient of the variance of the true/ideal score and the 
variance of the observable score. Given that reliability relates to the consistency and 
stability of a test’s results, potential measurement errors were kept as low as possible 
(e.g., Homburg and Giering, 1996; Remenyi et al., 1998). Although online testing does not 
allow for the standardisation of test circumstances, such as the test environment and the 
time point of measurement, an attempt was made to standardise the test procedure and 
the test analysis to achieve a high reliability (Lienert & Raatz, 1998). In order to approach 
standardisation for the test procedure standardised invitations were sent, all necessary 
information was built in the test, and direct feedback was given right after submitting the 
test. Concerning the standardisation of the test analysis, one spreadsheet for editing the 
data was used and the analysis was run with the same previously generated R-script. 
 
Based on the established literature (e.g. Lienert & Raatz, 1998; Moosbrugger & 
Kelava, 2012), there are various approaches to test for reliability. The present research 
intended to test internal consistency by Cronbach’s alpha (Cronbach, 1951) and 
parallel-test reliability in comparison to retest reliability.  
Cronbach’s alpha is theoretically equivalent to the mean of all possible split-half 
reliabilities. If a test contains homogeneous items, each item can be seen as part of the 
test to measure the corresponding trait. The higher the correlation of the items with each 
other on average, the higher the internal consistency of the test. The advantage of 
Cronbach’s alpha is that neither a parallel test version nor two testing times per examinee 
are needed. Additionally, the overestimation of reliability due to trainings effects can be 
prevented. As examinees do not have to take the same test twice, learning or memory 
effects, which affect the performance of test takers, can be avoided.  
As a second indicator for reliability, parallel-test reliability should be measured. 
Therefore, two equivalent test forms, which are content-wise as equal as possible, have 
to be developed. Two tests can be seen as so-called twin tests, if their item sets show 
                                                
43 The classical test theory is the most common psychometric test theory. For the present research it was 
particularly interesting to examine the higher-order structure of the DAC-dimensions. This is not a 
particular strength of item response theory but of structural equation modelling. The item response theory 
focuses on estimating item parameters like item difficulty and item discriminatory power while structural 
equation modelling focuses on factor structure per se. Consequently, factor analyses and classical test 
theory were applied. 
44 As a theoretical variable, reliability is clearly defined and lies between 0 and 1. Ideally, the reliability of 
a test is as high as possible. Performing variables, for instance the Intelligence Quotient (Wechsler, 2008; 
as well as expected for DAC), are easier to measure precisely in comparison to trait variables, such as for 
instance openness to new experiences. Hence, well-established performance tests reach a reliability of 
.90 or even .95 in comparison to well-established trait tests which often merely attain a reliability of around 
.70. 
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comparable variances of the test scores, i.e. if they result in the same mean values. The 
parallel-test reliability is calculated by the correlation between the two test forms (e.g. 
Moosbrugger & Kelava, 2012).  
 
Besides reliability, validity is one of the key goodness criteria for psychometric tests. 
As mentioned in sub-section 3.2.2, validity can be defined as the degree of accuracy with 
which the test measures the specific trait/ability it claims to measure (e.g. Cronbach & 
Meehl, 1955). Different aspects of validity can be distinguished: criterion, content, and 
construct validity (e.g. Kane, 2001; Kline, 2015; Messick, 1995). In modern validity theory, 
construct validity45 builds the central aspect overarching all other types of validity evidence 
(e.g. Messick, 1995).  
To empirically measure the construct validity in the framework of the present 
research, a correlative approach was chosen. Therefore, the correlation of the test score 
with various manifest variables, such as another test for decision behaviour, is calculated 
based on a theoretical well-founded assumption about the direction and height of the 
correlation. If the empirical correlation is suitable for the theoretical interdependences, it 
can be assumed that the test results can be attributed to the latent construct. Cronbach 
and Meehl call this a hypothetical-deductive approach. The chosen manifest variables, the 
so-called validation criteria, with which the test score of the present research were 
correlated, are presented in sub-sections 5.1.1 - 5.1.6.  
According to the content validity of the DAC-model (cf. Figure 2-5), eight theoretical 
dimensions of the DAC have been addressed by the literature review of the present 
research. The DAC-dimensions have been selected to capture specific aspects of the 
analytical avenue to DMC. Even though there are more components, such as making 
trade-offs, account for risk attitude and time preferences, updating beliefs or inference, 
the DAC-dimensions have been selected on theoretical and methodological 
considerations. One of the main intentions of the developed performance test was to 
construct a coherent case study, which represents a complex decision case close to real 
life and whose successful solving requires a set of cognitive abilities. It could be assumed 
that each dimension measures a relatively distinct cognitive process of decision-making. 
 
Additionally, for the testing of the DAC-test’s quality criteria, the standard of 
comparison can be defined. When a subject takes a test, a numeric test result is received 
                                                
45 Construct validity is defined as the degree of accuracy with which interpretations of test results can be 
made as defined by explanatory concepts. 
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– the test score. To classify this individual test score and interpret it in accordance with 
the existing range of results, a norm value of the to be measured construct has to be 
determined. The assessment of an individual’s test result in relation to the performance of 
a sample group is called norm-oriented interpretation. It is common that at this point of 
test development no test score distribution of a norm sample is available. Another 
approach is to interpret the results in relation to ex-ante-defined norms, which are precise 
ideas about what a specific test score means in relation to a content-psychological 
defined specific criterion. This method is called criterion-oriented interpretation.  
As in the frame of the present research it is not yet intended to make statements 
about characteristic values of individuals or to interpret them with respect to a reference 
group, a calibration is not performed at this point. Thus, no rating scales to interpret the 
test scores were formed and no standard of comparison was defined.  
 
As illustrated in the preceding sub-sections, manifold methodological decisions had 
to be made to develop the DAC-test. The sub-sections are supposed to give an overview 
of the procedure and clarify corresponding psychological vocabulary. The results of 
reliability and validity calculation are shown in section 5.2.  
In addition to the six phases of psychometric test development, the next section 
contrasts the considerations for choosing the strategy of data collection with criteria for 
choosing the target group in sub-section 3.3.1, and the actual parameters of data 
gathering in sub-sections 3.3.2 and 3.3.3.  
3.3 DATA COLLECTION STRATEGY 
The data collection strategy was formed by two main objectives: achieving good 
quality data and receiving a great number of participants. Thus, the consideration around 
the data collection focused on how to get access to motivated test participants by 
thinking about tailoring the test design to the preferences of this group, communicating 
effectively with potential examinees, and providing an easily accessible and administered 
testing instrument – and consequently, reducing perceived barriers for test participants.  
 
In terms of the test design a single unrepeated online survey for individuals was 
chosen to gather performance data on decision-making abilities (cf. section 4.1), data on 
self-assessments of the validation criteria (cf. section 5.1) and, data on socio-
demographic variables (cf. appendix section 9.10). The mass survey was designed for 
self-completion. The main reason for choosing online testing was its advantage of 
gathering data from a large number of people within a short period of time, independent 
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of their geographical location with relatively low resources (also cf. sub-section 3.2.1). 
Another reason was that online testing results are available very quickly for subsequent 
analyses (e.g. Dillman, Smyth, & Melani Christian, 2014). Even though the test content 
can be seen as complex with its eight dimensions of DAC, and the test length with its 
more than 60 minutes processing time as long, which does not create the optimal 
condition for Internet surveys (e.g. Robson, 2011), due to the limited resources, online 
testing appeared as the most promising option for conducting the present research. 
 
In addition to the choice of online testing, a couple of other selection criteria for the 
target group appeared: Participating in the study was only possible if a person: (1) had 
access to the Internet and hence was able to receive the call for and the information 
about the study, and do the online test, (2) was familiar with operating a computer and, (3) 
was fluent in English.  
 
In terms of approaching and communicating with the target group effectively, 
personalised e-mail (cf. Barron & Yechiam, 2002) requests, which included all relevant 
information (Dillman et al., 2014), were sent out from an e-mail that was exclusively 
established for the acquisition and communication with test participants (cf. appendix 
sections 9.4, 9.5, 9.6, and 9.7). Interested subjects received a reply within one working 
day with further details on the test procedure.  
 
To better draw prospective examinees’ interest in participating in the study and 
potentially raise their external motivation, several incentives were applied: First, direct 
feedback on an individual’s test performance was provided right after finishing the test 
(e.g. Fitts & Posner, 1967) in the form of the achieved percentage test score for each 
DAC-dimension and the overall score. Second, participants were able to download a 
personalised certificate documenting their participation and their achieved test score. An 
example of the certificate with the test feedback is provided in appendix sub-section 9.9. 
Third, a monetary incentive (Bosnjak & Tuten, 2003) of €15.00 for participants of the main 
testing was offered. In general, it is assumed that the offered cash incentive effectively 
motivates participants to complete the test (Singer & Ye, 2013). 
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Transparency and discretion were a cornerstone of this study. So, before beginning 
the test, the following information was presented to all participants: 
! The present DAC-test is part of the Ph.D. research of Nadine Oeser at the 
London School of Economics and Political Science. 
! Participation is voluntary. 
! The aim of the research project is to provide a valid and reliable psychometric 
performance test to measure Individual Decision-Making Competence. 
! Participants will benefit in terms of individual feedback and a certificate with 
the test score.  
! The DAC-test involves a performance test with several components of 
decision-making, self-rating and socio-demographic items. 
! Refusal to participate may be given without reason. Participants may withdraw 
at any time without giving reasons46. 
! According to LSE’s data protection rules, an appropriate analysis and saving 
of the test data are affirmed. The test data will only be used for research 
purposes. 
! It is confirmed that every participant’s anonymity is protected. Personal data 
will be saved separately from test scores. Personal information will be treated 
as strictly confidential and will not be made publicly available or given to a 
third party. 
! Information generated by the study may be published. No details, from which 
participants could be identified, will be divulged, as only aggregated data 
(calculated over all test participants) will be used. 
 
Additionally, participants were asked to agree to the use of their data for scientific 
purposes by consenting to the following sentence:  
 
“By checking this box, I agree that my test results may be used for research purposes 
in the course of a PhD research at the London School of Economics and Political 
Science, UK”. 
 
The data collection strategies for pre-testing and main testing differed in terms of 
which channels were used to get access to potential examinees. The pre-testing (cf. sub-
section 3.3.2) served, besides the item analysis, the purpose of finding the appropriate 
way to gain access to data. The main testing (cf. sub-section 3.3.3) benefitted from the 
insights from the pre-testing and was supported by financial resources for data gathering, 
                                                
46 Test participants were able to withdraw at any time as the test data was not saved until the DAC-test 
was completed. After completing the DAC-test, test participants received an automatically generated 
unique 15-digits code, saved independently from their test results. Together with an email, which was 
provided at the end of the test, test participants were able to withdraw from the study later on. 
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which were proportionately provided by the London School of Economics and Political 
Science and proportionately by the researcher. 
Before sub-sections 3.3.2 and 3.3.3 illustrate the concrete procedures of data 
gathering in the pre- and main testing, the following section describes the arguments for 
choosing the target group. 
3.3.1 Target Group  
In order to define the target group for the present research, two selection criteria 
seemed to be relevant: Choosing a target group that... (1) is of social interest and 
therefore could help raise public attention to this research topic, and (2) goes along with a 
realistic chance, time- and moneywise, to gain access to the data of this group. 
Corresponding to the two selection criteria, the group of adolescents and young 
adults was chosen as:  
(1) Especially at this age the ability of making sound decisions can be seen as one of 
the key success factors of growing up. “Choices made in adolescence may have life-long 
consequences for the individual’s health, career, psychological well-being, and social 
acceptance.” (Mann et al., 1989, p. 265) Some studies characterise adolescents as poor 
decision-makers (e.g. Jacobs & Klaczynski, 2005): Eaton et al. (2010) have identified six 
risk factors in adolescence, including behaviours that contribute to unintentional injury and 
violence, alcohol and other drug use, or physical inactivity. Additionally, Slovic (2001) has 
shown that 80 out of 100 young smokers regret their decision to start smoking and would 
decide differently if they had the chance again. Also, career choices seem to lack careful 
consideration regarding long-term consequences leading to 6.0% of Germany’s 
teenagers leaving school before completing 9th grade (Berkemeyer et al., 2014). The rate 
of breaking off an apprenticeship is approximately 24.4% (Uhly, 2015). And, a quarter of 
Germany’s students leave universities or technical colleges without graduating (Heublein, 
Schmelzer, & Sommer, 2008). Targeting this group could raise the public attention for 
better educating young people in decision-making and preparing them for life (e.g. Baron 
& Brown, 1991; Jacobson et al., 2012; Weller, Moholy, Bossard, & Levin, 2014). 
(2) There is a reasonable assumption that adolescents and young adults have a 
natural exposure to computers and the Internet (e.g. ARD Forschungsdienst, 2014). In 
fact, more and more people have broadband Internet access and “become [in general] 
more accustomed to completing various daily activities online” (Dillman et al., 2014, p. 
301). This circumstance affects online testing positively (e.g. Couper, 2008) as people are 
increasingly completing online surveys. Additionally, studies show that on average 84% of 
people between 14 and 29 years own a computer or laptop and 95% access the Internet 
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at least once a day (Bertsch, Huth, & Arenz, 2011). Since the DAC-test is designed as an 
online test, it seemed worthwhile to choose a target group that is characterised by an 
experienced, almost natural handling of computers and webpages. As the majority of 
students age-wise belong to the target group and they are assumed to be a relatively 
easily-accessible group due to their flexibility in terms of time and their interest in 
research, it seems realistic to access data from this target group.  
Even though a target group for this research starting from early adolescence would 
be of great interest, the LSE Research Ethics Committee adjudges potential research 
participants under the age of 18 to be possibly vulnerable. Thus, this research does not 
include study participants who did not confirm that they were 18 years old or older at the 
time of participating in the study. 
According to definitions in developmental psychology (e.g. Zimbardo & Gerrig, 1996) 
older adolescents represent the age range from 18 to 21 years and young adults are 
approximately 20 to 30 years old. According to Jacobs and Klaczynski, (2005), Furby and 
Beyth-Marom (1992) and Reyna and Farley (2006), there are no concerns with significant 
age-related developmental differences in the decision-making of the two target groups, 
teenagers and young adults. “By mid adolescence, most individuals have approximately 
adults’ ... cognitive skills” (Fischhoff, 2008, p. 15). Consequently, people between 18 and 
30 years were invited to take part in the study. In further chapters the target group is 
entitled with young adults.  
3.3.2 Study Procedure of the Pre-testing 
To enable the item analysis approximately 200 data sets were aspired (cf. Lienert & 
Raatz, 1998. p. 60). Thus, in June, July, and August 2014, in order to find potential test 
participants a group of the London School of Economics and Political Science summer 
school students taking the “Judgement and Decision Making for Management” course 
and voluntary students of the psychological department at Free University of Berlin and 
the management department of the University of Bayreuth were contacted via e-mail and 
invited to participate within an overall time-frame of two months (cf. e-mails in appendix 
sections 9.3 and 9.5).  
People, who replied as willing to participate received an answer within one working 
day containing all necessary information about the duration of the study, privacy 
protection and the advantages of participation in advance.  
 
After the actual pre-testing, three further ways to access data were tested: 
distributing flyers in Berlin cafés and bars, posting at social media platforms, for instance 
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Facebook, and acquiring test participants via online labour markets such as Amazon 
Mechanical Turk. Unfortunately, none of these three alternative acquisition strategies 
complied with both main criteria for the data collection strategy - obtaining a good quality 
of data and receiving a great number of participants. That is why the general procedure of 
data gathering was retained.  
The following sub-section presents the strategy for data gathering for the main 
testing. The socio-demographics and results of the pre-testing are presented in section 
4.2. 
3.3.3  Study Procedure of the Main Testing 
From June to August 2015, study participants for the main testing were obtained via 
the London School of Economics and Political Science summer school course 
“Judgement and Decision Making for Management”, the course on “Management 
Systems Theory, Applications, and Design” from Virginia Tech, the Decision Analysis 
Society Newsletter, the Multi Criteria Decision Making mailing list, and the mailing lists of 
the Max Planck Institute for Human Development in Berlin, the Free University Berlin, and 
the University of Bayreuth. All potential participants were informed about the study details 
via e-mail, as was the case in the pre-testing (cf. e-mails in attachments 9.6 and 9.7). 
 
As in the pre-testing, all examinees were informed in advance about the duration of 
the study, privacy protection and the advantages of participating in the study, including 
the receipt of their individual test feedback and the personalised participation certificate.  
At the end of the planned period of one month for the main testing, only 34% of the 
intended 350 test participants had been acquired. Thus, a remuneration of €15.00 was 
offered as a financial incentive to acquire further test participants. Since the introduction 
of this external motivator may have an influence on the test results of the corresponding 
group of participants a variable to control for potential effects was included (for results cf. 
section 6.5.1). 
“When a mixed-mode strategy is not possible, and e-mail is the only contact option, 
an electronic incentive sent to all sample members with the survey request is likely the 
best option.” (Dillman et al., 2014, p. 331) Sending the remuneration via PayPal47 was 
offered (Birnholtz, Horn, Finholt, & Bae, 2004). To counteract that people might not 
participate in the study because they did not have a PayPal account or would not want or 
know how to create one, transferring money to their bank account was offered as well. 
                                                
47 Paypal.com is an online money transfer service.  
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Since the risk that people would be reluctant to reveal their account information needed 
to be considered, the PayPal option was the option of first choice. 
After completing the DAC-test test participants received automatically generated 
unique 15-digits code, saved independently from the test results to ensure confidentiality. 
To receive the €15.00 remuneration, test participants had to send the code to the 
conductor of the test and with it their PayPal or bank account information. The money 
was transferred within one working day.  
 
As this chapter has given an overview of the standard procedure of psychometric 
test development according to e.g. Lienert and Raatz (1998) or Moosbrugger and Kelava 
(2012), explicated the methodological choices which were made, and presented the data 
collection strategy, the following chapter illustrates how the DAC-test was precisely 
constructed. It shows how each DAC-dimension was operationalized (cf. section 4.1) and 
what the process and the results of the pre-testing look like (cf. section 4.2).  
The socio-demographics and results of the main testing are presented in section 5.2. 
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4 DEVELOPING THE DAC-TEST  
Providing a psychometric performance test for capturing the cognitive dimensions of 
DAC (cf. Table 2-2) constitutes the main aim of this research. The present chapter builds 
the core of this Ph.D. research as its sections and sub-sections give a detailed 
compilation of the various segments of the constructed DAC-test. The chapter starts with 
considerations about the test’s content and layout as well as subset information-
technological frame conditions (cf. section 4.1). The chapter continues with sub-sections 
4.1.1 - 4.1.8 demonstrating how each DAC-dimension was operationalized. Section 4.2 
and its corresponding sub-sections present the process and results of item and 
distributional analyses of the pre-testing.  
 
In the framework of the operationalization process of the eight cognitive DAC-
dimensions, it had to be decided in which content-context the DAC-test should be 
embedded. At this point it was important to take one essential test constructional 
consideration into account: To support the analysis of statistical properties, the plan was 
to assess the reliability of the DAC-test by parallel-forms reliability (cf. sub-section 3.2.4). 
Therefore, two cases of equal structure have to be tested and analysed in the phase of 
item analysis and distributional analysis (cf. section 3.2.3). In comparison to split-half 
reliability48, the advantage of parallel-forms reliability is that the two cases are considered 
as equivalent measures and therefore could be used independently. An additional 
practice-relevant benefit behind the idea of providing two cases was to enable pre-post-
testing for later applications of the DAC-test.  
Consequently, as the DAC-test aims to present a set of content-wise connected 
items, two complex real world decision cases, which require the performance of all 
cognitive DAC abilities, had to be designed. In discussions with experts from decision 
analysis, the topics of career choices and investments were identified as areas with 
major decision opportunities, which most young people and so the target group (cf. sub-
section 3.3.1) experience at least once in their adolescence and early adulthood. The 
topics were chosen as they both fit Matheson’s and Howard’s (1968) characteristics of a 
complex decision problem (cf. sub-section 3.2.1) and cover a concrete decision, which 
the target group had to handle not too far in the past, is facing right now, or will deal with 
very soon. Thus, building upon the decision characteristics of Matheson and Howard, two 
                                                
48 Split-half reliability is applicable if a test contains a great number of comparable items, which can 
randomly be split into two comparable test parts.  
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decision cases broadly targeting the questions of which vehicle to buy (henceforth: 
INVEST case) and what to do after having completed school (henceforth: EDU case) 
were developed. In the EDU case, it is assumed that all test participants already had 
experienced this particular decision at least once. Consequently, the condition of all test 
participants in terms of this decision experience is presumed to be comparable. In the 
INVEST case, it is presumed that test participants either have experienced such a 
situation already by themselves or knew someone, e.g. partner, friends, family member, 
who were confronted with such a decision. Therefore, the INVEST case topic is supposed 
to build a well-accessible and realistic basis for the test, with which all test participants 
can identify. 
Thus, the first version of the DAC-test presented two parallel cases. The INVEST 
case was set first, followed by the EDU case. 
 
Preceding the operationalization of DAC in sub-sections 4.1.1 - 4.1.8, the next 
section argues the thoughts on test and item layout, including several information-
technological considerations, and defines the eight cognitive DAC-dimensions.  
4.1 OPERATIONALIZING DECISION-ANALYTICAL COMPETENCE 
The construction of the psychometric performance test demanded two designing 
foci, which are summarised in this section and the following sub-sections: On the one 
hand, it had to be decided how to design the test and task layout taking into account 
advice about web page and test design. On the other hand, it had to be determined how 
to operationalize each dimension of DAC.  
Accessibility and display  
In order to provide the DAC-test to a broad population online enabling participants to 
complete the survey on a computer or a mobile device, the test was configured as a 
browser-based version optimised for mobile users. A consistent page layout was chosen 
to support test participants to easily process the given information and focus on 
answering the items (Dillman et al., 2014). Figure 4-1 shows an example of the screen 
design of the DAC-test. Instruction, item stem and corresponding scales are highlighted in 
blue. This information is visually dominant on the page and allows test participants to 
centre their attention upon it.  
Items that appear very complex or whose display appears very long (for details cf. 
sub-sections 4.1.1 - 4.1.8) were arranged in a single-question-per-page design to enable 
test participants to concentrate on those more voluminous items and support focusing on 
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every particular instruction. Even though tests with this design appear longer in terms of 
processing time to participants (e.g. Manfreda, Batagelj, & Vehovar, 2006), reducing the 
perceived complexity of the test (e.g. Dillman et al., 2014) appeared more important in the 
present case. To avoid test participants experiencing difficulties in remembering item 
relevant context given on a previous page, all necessary information was repeated on the 
actual page – either in the item stem or by a to-click-on example or definition.  
According to Nielson (2004), checkboxes are used for lists of options where any 
number of presented choices could be selected. In contrast, radio-buttons are applied 
“when [there are] two or more options that are mutually exclusive and the user must 
select exactly one choice” (p. 1). 
Test structure  
After entering the welcome page, web page visitors have access to information on 
the test’s and researcher’s backgrounds. Additionally, they are informed about 
transparency and discretion issues (cf. section 3.3) and are given an overview of the 
various test parts and permitted testing aids. By clicking start, test participants are 
forwarded directly to the agreement of participation where they are asked if they are 
willing to continue with the test. In addition, test participants have to confirm that they are 
of legal age, i.e. 18 years or older, to ensure that they are legally permitted to give 
consent to their study participation. Additionally, they are asked to answer a few socio-
demographic items, such as age, level of English skills, previous knowledge on decision 
science, and assess statements on their motivation and test intention. Before they actually 
start with the test, the following declaration appears:  
 
“All of the mentioned situations and persons are entirely fictitious. Any similarities 
with existing ones are coincidental and unintended. Any mentioning of brand names 
or features typical of a brand should neither give the impression of endorsement nor 
refusal. Also, the tests, test results and statistics which are in relation to brand names 
have been completely invented.” 
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Figure 4-1 Showcase–page of the DAC-test layout (pre-test-barometer)  
 
Test construction considerations  
Before operationalizing the DAC-dimensions, two requirements for the to-be-
developed indicators/items were defined to support a good testing experience for test 
takers, to encourage good quality of data, and to ensure efficient data analyses:  
(1) Theory-driven and diversified: For the process of item creation a top-down 
approach was applied, meaning that specific attributes for operationalizing each DAC-
dimension were collected from the decision-analytical literature. By constructing the items 
it was kept in mind that “[a] source of error in testing arises from boredom – especially in 
tests of ability and similar spheres, where effort and concentration are required. A variety 
of items is likely to make the test less monotonous for the subjects.” (Kline, 2015, p. 47) 
Therefore, it was attempted to composite items of the various DAC-dimensions differently 
in terms of question type, scale type, given examples, and supporting graphics. 
(2) Objective and efficient: As mentioned in section 1.2, the DAC-test aims to 
measure the quality of individual decision-making performance. Thus, each item was 
constructed in a way so that a specific target value was defined, which allows a direct 
assessment of the accuracy of each answer. In this context, the online test was 
programmed to automatically quantitatively analyse the answers and give each test 
participant feedback on the percentage achievement of the test score.  
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Control for data quality 
To avoid item skipping and answer guessing, which would result in loss of data, test 
participants are systematically forced to answer each single item. If test participants try to 
proceed with the test after omitting one or several items on a page, a reminder in red 
letters appears at the top of the page that is linked directly to the unanswered item(s) 
requesting the participant to answer it/them in order to proceed. To reduce the chance of 
guessing correctly to true-false-items and other items with a small set of answer options, 
an I do not know answer option49 was added (e.g. Muijtjens et al., 1999) with the 
explanation/hint: Please omit an item by clicking “I do not know” only when you are 
convinced that your answer would be the same as a random guess. 
Information on how long it took participants to answer each item is collected and 
saved in the database automatically. Recording this data serves to control for the quality 
of data: Participants who click through the whole test and then wait for submission to 
pretend to take as long as thoughtful and serious test participants do, can be identified 
and excluded from analyses. 
 
Before the following sub-sections introduce in detail how, for the pre-testing (cf. sub-
section 3.3.1), each cognitive DAC-dimension was operationalized, Table 4-1 gives an 
overview of the eight DAC-dimensions on the basis of their definition (right column of 
Table 4-1). Each of the following sub-sections (left column of Table 4-1) delineates the 
operationalization of the corresponding DAC-dimension. Section 4.2 subsequently 
presents the results of the statistical analyses and correspondingly, the resulting changes 
to the operationalization of the dimensions for the final version of the DAC-test. 
 
 
Table 4-1 Definitions of the eight DAC-dimensions 
Sub-
sect ion 
DAC-dimension Abbr. Def in it ion 
4.1.1 
Abi l i ty to 
envis ion one’s 
object ives 
O
BJ
EC
TI
VE
S 
This DAC-dimension describes the awareness of 
subjects of their individual preferences and the ability to 
articulate a clear set of personally relevant objectives 
during contemplation of an important decision (e.g. 
Hammond et al., 1999; Hastie, 2001; Keeney, 1992; 
Mellers & Locke, 2007). 
                                                
49 Formula scoring was applied to treat the I do not know answer option (cf. sub-section 3.2.2).  
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4.1.2 
Abi l i ty to 
recognise 
decis ion 
opportunit ies 
O
PP
O
RT
UN
IT
IE
S This DAC-dimension describes the ability of subjects to 
identify decision situations, which are characterised by 
the potential to support decision-makers in achieving 
their desired goals, and to assess which degree of 
analytical thinking is needed to solve those situations 
(e.g. Keelin et al., 2009; Keeney, 1992).  
4.1.3 Abi l i ty to assess 
decis ion f i tness  
FIT
NE
SS
 
This DAC-dimension describes the ability of subjects to 
decide whether emotions and physical status allow 
focusing on a concrete decision situation, proceeding 
analytically with the decision-making process, and 
making a conscious choice (e.g. Keelin et al., 2009; 
Thaler & Sunstein, 2008).  
4.1.4 Abi l i ty to frame 
a decis ion  FR
AM
E 
This DAC-dimension describes the ability of subjects to 
perceive the relevant aspects of a decision situation and 
to interpret their meaning for the corresponding process 
of decision-making (e.g. Hastie & Dawes, 2010; 
Howard, 2007; Mellers & Locke, 2007). 
4.1.5 
Abi l i ty to ident i fy 
re levant 
a lternat ives 
AL
TE
RN
AT
IV
ES
 This DAC-dimension describes the ability of subjects to 
envision alternatives that fit a set of given objectives in a 
decision situation (e.g. Goodwin & Wright, 2014; 
Hammond et al., 1999; Keelin et al., 2009; Keller & Ho, 
1988).  
4.1.6 Abi l i ty to deal 
with uncertainty 
UN
CE
RT
AI
NT
Y This DAC-dimension describes the ability of subjects to 
comprehend, interpret, and calculate probabilities of 
different qualities in order to make a choice (e.g. W. 
Edwards, 1954; Hastie & Dawes, 2010; J. E. Matheson 
& Howard, 1968; Raiffa, 1968). 
4.1.7 
Abi l i ty to 
integrate 
information 
IN
FO
RM
AT
IO
N 
This DAC-dimension describes the ability of subjects to 
combine assessments of uncertainties and values 
coherently, compare various alternatives and objectives, 
and correspondingly rank those alternatives in relation 
to their relevance for the decision-maker (e.g. Bazerman 
& Moore, 2009; W. Edwards, 1954; Goodwin & Wright, 
2014; Keelin et al., 2009; Raiffa, 1968).  
4.1.8 
Abi l i ty to plan to 
implement a 
decis ion  
IM
PL
EM
EN
TA
TI
O
N This DAC-dimension describes the ability of subjects to 
set up a strategy for how to translate a cognitive 
decision into action by formulating concrete next steps 
and thinking ahead about possible obstacles and ways 
to address them (e.g. Hammond et al., 1999; Keelin et 
al., 2009; Mellers & Locke, 2007).  
Note. DAC = Decision-analytical competence; Abbr. = Abbreviation.  
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The order of the following sub-sections is geared to the order of appearance of the 
DAC-dimensions in the test.  
4.1.1 Items of the Ability to Envision One’s Objectives 
The ability to envision one’s objectives (henceforth: OBJECTIVES) is the first 
dimension of DAC presented in the test. This first part operationalizes the subject’s 
awareness of their individual preferences and their ability to articulate a clear set of 
personally relevant objectives during contemplation of an important decision (e.g. 
Hammond et al., 1999; Hastie, 2001; Keeney, 1992; Mellers & Locke, 2007; Raiffa, 
1968). 
 
There were two reasons for positioning this task as the first dimension of the test:  
First, as presented by Keeney’s (1996) value focused thinking, envisioning one’s 
objectives is a good starting point for making a decision as it supports decision-makers in 
realising what they actually want to achieve with their decision. Especially for complex 
decisions, the addressed decision type in this research, the corresponding task is 
assumed to be a suitable origin for the test as “Keeney’s approach is particularly worth 
considering for major strategic or life-changing decisions where there is a need to think 
deeply about what you want to achieve in life” (Goodwin & Wright, 2014, p. 55).  
Second, the task requires test participants to list as many personal objectives as 
possible for a desired concrete complex decision situation. Since the test parts following 
this item provide stories and examples around either the INVEST case or the EDU case, it 
was aimed to avoid the contents of the other DAC-test tasks influencing the test 
participants’ answers for this particular item.  
Test concept and theoretical basis  
For the operationalization of the DAC-dimension OBJECTIVES it was possible to 
choose a criterion oriented/external test concept as the work of Bond, Carlson, and 
Keeney (2008, 2010) provides a well-developed approach to measure this ability. In their 
studies, the authors ask test takers to articulate a complete and clear set of relevant 
personal objectives for a concrete decision e.g. “What are your objectives for choosing an 
internship?” Bond et al. operationalize OBJECTIVES in four steps (cf. Figure 4-2): (1) Test 
takers have to generate as many relevant objectives as possible in a list and then put it 
aside. (2) Test takers receive a so-called master list with an exhaustive set of objectives. 
They are asked to check all objectives that are relevant to them. (3) Test takers take their 
list with self-generated objectives from step 1 and the master list from step 2 and are 
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requested to match the self-generated objectives to the ones of the master list. (4) Test 
takers are asked to rank the importance of their (in step 2) checked objectives. 
 
Figure 4-2 Outline of task procedure (cf. Bond et al., 2008, p. 59) 
 
Operationalization and layout 
For the present research, content-wise adapted items in comparison to Bond et al.’s 
item set are presented (cf. appendix sub-section 9.8.1). A single-item-per-page layout 
was chosen as the display of each step takes plenty of space. Additionally, it is important 
for measurement purposes that test participants solve this task step by step. For this 
reason, test participants are not able to back up. So their set of self-generated objectives 
from step 1 cannot be modified or complemented in retrospect.  
 
The test starts with the instruction and the corresponding example item (cf. Figure 
4-3) of the first step to operationalize OBJECTIVES:  
Step 1: Imagine you have to decide what to do after finishing school. What would be your 
most relevant objectives for choosing a direction? Please list as many objectives as you 
can think of, writing each one in the lines (from A to AD) below (cf. example).  
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Figure 4-3 Operationalization of OBJECTIVES – example step 1 
 
For the test participants it is possible to list in 28 lines up to 28 of their personal 
objectives. After having completed this task and clicking next, the instruction of the 
second step with its example item (cf. Figure 4-4) and a list of 43 potential objectives is 
presented as follows:  
Step 2: Again, imagine after you finished school you have to decide what to do now with 
your life. Please select all objectives that appear relevant to you for selecting a direction for 
your life by ticking the checkbox on the left of each objective in the list below (cf. example). 
 
Figure 4-4 Operationalization of OBJECTIVES – example step 2 
 
MEASURING DECISION-ANALYTICAL COMPETENCE - A PSYCHOMETRIC ONLINE PERFORMANCE TEST 
 
 85 
Test participants can select up to 43 objectives that appear relevant to them from the 
list with the presented potential objectives. The list of 43 objectives was compiled in a 
small pilot study (cf. appendix section 9.1). The main reason for creating such a master 
list was to provide the DAC-test participants a list that contains all relevant possible 
objectives. An overview of the list of potential objectives can be found in appendix sub-
section 9.8.1.  
On the next page both lists – the list of the self-generated objectives from step 1 and 
the list with the 43 potential objectives from step 2 – are displayed with the following 
instruction and example item (cf. Figure 4-5): 
Step 3: Please match each objective you listed in the first task (now displayed on the left 
side below) to the objectives on the right side by writing its letter to the left of them. If 
some of your personal objectives do NOT match any objective here, please write them 
down in the shaded area below. 
 
Figure 4-5 Operationalization of OBJECTIVES – example step 3 
 
To proceed to the final step of this task, test participants have to match their 
personal objectives with the given list of objectives and add self-generated objectives that 
could not be matched. The matching process is necessary to gain clarity and structure of 
both self-generated and listed objectives for participants and the test analysts. Therefore, 
a constructive basis for the final step of the task is built and a clear assignment of 
personal formulations and presented descriptions of objectives received.  
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The fourth and final step of this task consists again of a selecting task. Test 
participants have to select their seven50 most important objectives for the presented 
decision situation containing self-generated and/or recognised objectives51. The 
corresponding instruction with its example item (cf. Figure 4-6) is illustrated in the 
following: 
Step 4: Finally look at all objectives you have selected in the second task and the ones in 
the shaded area. Please mark the 7 most relevant ones for you by ticking the checkbox on 
their very left side.  
 
Figure 4-6 Operationalization of OBJECTIVES – example step 4 
 
Scoring 
“In decision theory, values are a matter of individual taste. Their accuracy cannot be 
evaluated in terms of an external standard.” (Parker & Fischhoff, 2005, p. 4) That is why a 
specific evaluation criterion had to be defined for this task of the DAC-test. The higher the 
percentage of self-generated objectives of the final selected seven objectives, the better 
the OBJECTIVES. For the scoring the number of self-generated objectives of the selected 
                                                
50 According to decision scientists and practitioners such as Ralph L. Keeney decision-makers face on 
average a set of six to 10 (R. L. Keeney, personal communication, June 28, 2016) fundamental objectives 
when solving a complex decision problem. As in the framework of the DAC-test, test participants might 
feel time pressure when solving the tasks, the magical number seven of Miller (1994), which refers to the 
number of objects an individual is able to retain in working-memory, was set as a threshold for a complete 
set of relevant objectives. 
51 While the term “self-generated objectives” describes objectives that have been listed by the test 
participants in step 1 of this block of tasks, “recognised objectives” define objectives chosen in step 2 of 
this block of tasks as relevant by the test participants from the master list of objectives.   
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seven most important ones was counted. Thus, for the pre-testing a maximum score of 
seven points could be reached for OBJECTIVES. 
4.1.2 Items of the Ability to Recognise Decision Opportunities  
The second cognitive DAC-dimension being measured is the ability to realise 
decision opportunities (henceforth: OPPORTUNITIES). It describes the ability of subjects to 
identify decision situations, which are characterised by the potential to support decision-
makers in achieving their desired goals and in assessing which degree of analytical 
thinking is needed to solve those situations (e.g. Keelin et al., 2009; Keeney, 1992).  
Test concept and theoretical basis  
For the DAC-dimension OPPORTUNITIES the literature does not provide an existing 
approach to operationalize this skill. Important within this DAC-dimension is that a good 
decision-maker is able to differentiate between situations that provide a chance to decide 
and thereby consciously influence future events, and situations that do not offer such an 
opportunity (Keeney, 1996). In this sense, a decision situation describes a “choice of 
action – of what to do or not to do” (Baron, 2008, p. 6) that is driven by decision-makers’ 
motivation to achieve their goals. A decision situation is characterised by “more than one 
possible course of action” (Hastie & Dawes, 2010, p. 24). As the DAC-test is ascribed to 
complex decision situations (J. E. Matheson & Howard, 1968), OPPORTUNITIES also 
captures the ability to differentiate between simple and complex choices, i.e. between 
decision situations, which require either a more rapid and automatic or a more deductive 
and controlled handling. The dual-process theories distinguish between two different 
cognitive processes or action strategies – intuition and reasoning (e.g. Chaiken & Trope, 
1999; Sloman, 1996). Whereas the so-called system I is intuitive, impulsive and 
emotional, reacts fast to a stimulus, and is automatic, effortless and associative, the so-
called system II is explicit, logical, controllable and slower but flexible in learning 
(Kahneman & Frederick, 2002). Consequently, for effectively dealing with more complex 
decision problems, the reasoning system II appears to be more suitable (Bazerman & 
Moore, 2009).  
Operationalization and layout 
Regarding theoretical decision-analytical definitions on how a decision situation is 
described, mini cases were constructed. The mini cases, each with four to seven 
sentences, vary in terms of presenting a decision versus a non-decision situation. Non-
decision situations are characterised by, for example, missing alternatives (Howard, 
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2007). The cases that describe a decision situation differ in terms of the decision types 
presented, i.e. the character described in the case is confronted either with a complex or 
a simple decision or it is indistinct. While complex decisions are defined for example as 
costly and uncertain (J. E. Matheson & Howard, 1968, p. 3) requiring an analytical 
decision-making process, simple52 decisions describe frequent/periodic choices for which 
decision makers have clear preferences, (cf. Keelin et al., 2009). Hence, test participants 
have to decide not only whether the character is facing a decision or not, but also which 
kind of decision type is presented and correspondingly the potential impact on the 
character’s life. For the DAC pre-testing, eight items of the first type and four items of the 
second type were constructed. The list of mini-cases of the final DAC-test is presented in 
the appendix sub-section 9.8.2. 
 
At the top of the page the instructions with the corresponding scale explanations (cf. 
Figure 4-7 and Figure 4-8) are presented:  
Please read the following case descriptions carefully and decide whether the character is 
facing a concrete decision situation or not by ticking the appropriate button. 
 
Figure 4-7 Operationalization of OPPORTUNITIES – scale explanation 1 
If you think that the character is facing a decision situation, an additional question will 
appear. If this is the case please assess the potential impact of this decision on the 
character’s life by ticking the appropriate button. 
                                                
52 To avoid test participants interpreting the word “simple“, the wording “big vs. small decision” is used in 
the test.  
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Figure 4-8 Operationalization of OPPORTUNITIES – scale explanation 2 
 
The instructions are followed by the list of mini cases with the corresponding scale(s) 
all on one page. An example item for OPPORTUNITIES looks like the following: 
If everything goes well, Luca will obtain his school-leaving qualifications next year. He has 
talked a lot with his parents about what he wants to become when he is grown up. Now 
he is thinking about what to do after passing his exams. Tomorrow, he will be able to 
apply for study programmes online, using his last school report. 
! No   ! Yes      ! I do not know 
! Big decision  !   ! Small decision  ! I do not know 
Scoring 
On both scales an I do not know option is applied to reduce the chance of guessing 
correctly. In the case of the example item above, the correct answers would be “Yes” and 
“Big decision”. In terms of scoring, binary data is calculated, i.e. only the correct answer 
scores with one point per correct answer. The option I do not know and wrong answers 
do not score. So, for the pre-testing a maximum score of 12 points could be attained for 
OPPORTUNITIES. 
4.1.3 Items of the Ability to Assess Decision Fitness  
The third dimension of the DAC-test is the ability to assess decision fitness 
(henceforth: FITNESS), which describes the ability of subjects to decide whether emotions 
and physical status allow focusing on a concrete decision situation, proceeding 
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analytically with the decision-making process, and making a conscious choice (e.g. Keelin 
et al., 2009; Thaler & Sunstein, 2008).  
Test concept and theoretical basis  
As for the previous dimension of DAC, prior research does not provide an approach 
to measuring FITNESS. On a theoretical level, according to Keelin et al. (2009), decision 
fitness describes the level of a person’s sound decision-making habits for complex 
decision situations. Keelin and colleagues describe four steps to becoming decision fit: 
First, decision-makers have to learn to differentiate between physical and emotional 
statuses, which relate to reasoning when making a decision and inability to use analytical 
decision processes. Second, decision-makers have to “[g]ain a deep understanding of 
and skill for making quality decisions so as to rapidly go through” (p. 18) the steps of an 
analytical decision-making process. Third, decision-makers have to train and practice 
their decision skills in various situations. Fourth, the more often decision-makers apply the 
learned decision-analytical steps for sound decision-making, the sooner they develop 
good decision habits, which then merge in terms of the required cognitive system - from 
system II to system I (Kahneman & Frederick, 2002).  
As the first step of Keelin et al.'s (2009) approach to becoming decision fit 
circumscribes the construct the DAC-test intends to measure, the first cognitive 
component of Keelin et al.'s (2009) approach is selected to be operationalized as FITNESS 
- knowing the difference between being decision fit and unfit. 
Operationalization and layout 
Subsequent to operationalizing FITNESS in the framework of the present research, an 
indicator had to be found that measures how far individuals recognise whether a decision-
maker’s physical condition and emotional status allow the decision-maker to run an 
analytical decision-making process. Therefore, situational judging tasks were developed. 
Situational judgment tasks/tests “are [usually] personnel selection instruments that 
present job applicants with work-related situations and possible responses to the 
situations.” (McDaniel, Hartman, Whetzel, & Grubb, 2007, p. 63) For the present research, 
this kind of test instrument was slightly adapted, so that decision situations were 
presented to test participants. In this context, mini cases with five to 10 sentences 
describing career choice situations were constructed, for which test participants had to 
decide whether the character in each case is in the right mood and/or physical condition 
to analytically address the decision faced. Circumstances, such as being very angry, 
being under time pressure, having missed a proper amount of sleep, or being enraged or 
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being extremely exhausted, shall indicate to the test participants that the character does 
not meet the requirements for a sound analytical decision process (Keelin et al., 2009).  
 
As with the items of OPPORTUNITIES, the mini case items of FITNESS and the 
corresponding scale(s) are displayed in a list on one page. The following instruction with 
the corresponding scale explanation (cf. Figure 4-9) is displayed at the top of the web 
page: 
Please read the following case descriptions carefully and pay attention to the character’s 
physical condition and emotions. Please decide whether it is advisable to make a decision 
in his or her situation. For each case, please tick the appropriate button. 
 
Figure 4-9 Operationalization of FITNESS – scale explanation 
 
For the DAC pre-testing, eight items of this type were developed. The list of mini-
cases of the final DAC-test for this dimension is presented in the appendix sub-section 
9.8.3. The following example item serves to convey an impression of how FITNESS is 
operationalized: 
Susan’s parents expect her to become a dentist, like her father. Susan however would 
rather study literature. Tonight they had a heated argument on this topic. Her parents 
refuse to finance her “foolish ideas” and Susan shouted back at them. She ran back to her 
room, slammed the door and thought: “I will show them how I can study literature. I don’t 
need their help! I will complete my online application now.”  
! No    ! Yes     ! I do not know 
Scoring 
Comparable to the items of the preceding DAC-dimension, an I do not know option 
is provided to decrease the probability from 50% to 33.33% for randomly choosing the 
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correct answer. According to the scoring for OPPORTUNITIES, binary data is calculated in 
the same style with one point per item for each correct answer. The correct answer for 
the example item presented above would be “No”. The option I do not know and wrong 
answers do not score. Thus, for the pre-testing a maximum score of eight points could be 
attained for FITNESS. 
4.1.4 Items of the Ability to Frame a Decision  
The fourth block of DAC-tasks operationalizes the ability to frame a decision 
(henceforth: FRAME). It is defined as the ability of subjects to perceive the relevant aspects 
of a decision situation and to interpret their meaning in the corresponding process of 
decision-making (e.g. Hastie & Dawes, 2010; Howard, 2007; Larrick, 2009; Mellers & 
Locke, 2007)  
Test concept and theoretical basis 
According to Larrick (2009), sound decision-making involves the consideration of a 
broad decision frame. This includes taking “into account (1) multiple objectives – not just 
the most salient one at the moment; (2) multiple alternatives – not just the first option that 
lands on the table; and (3) multiple outcomes that could arise in the near and long term – 
not just the expected state of the world.” (p. 461) To successfully solve a decision 
problem, decision-makers are required to ensure that their understanding of the situation 
is complete. This builds a basis for accurate judgments (Soll & Klayman, 2004).  
According to the decision-analytical literature, no measure to operationalize this 
ability is provided. However, Bruine de Bruin et al. (2007) and Parker and Fischhoff (2005) 
have addressed this ability from the behavioural decision science perspective and thus, by 
the ability to resist decision biases and not giving in to framing effects.  
Operationalization and layout 
As the present research intends to measure DAC and thereby relies on the decision-
analytical avenue to decision-making, the items of Bruine de Bruin et al. (2007) and Parker 
and Fischhoff (2005) did not seem to be sufficiently capturing this approach. Thus, a main 
case, which builds in terms of content the basis for the other up-coming DAC-test tasks, 
was constructed. It presents a character facing a complex personal decision including all 
relevant aspects of the situation, such as various alternatives (e.g. Hammond et al., 1999; 
Mellers & Locke, 2007), multiple objectives (e.g. Goodwin & Wright, 2014; Keeney, 2007) 
and uncertainties (e.g. Goodwin & Wright, 2014; Hastie & Dawes, 2010). The main case 
consists of approx. 750 words written in prose containing direct and indirect speech. 
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Besides including decision-relevant information such as objectives and alternatives, the 
case also gives details on secondary – partially superfluous – facts, such as relatives of 
the decision-maker or the location of the decision. This kind of additional information is 
given for two reasons: First, the case aims to present a concrete decision situation, which 
all test participants could face at least once in their lifetime, as realistically as possible; so 
background information and small details are given. Second, the secondary information 
serves as distractors (cf. sub-section 3.1.2; Kline, 2015) for the actual task to reduce the 
chance of guessing correctly. After having read the case study, participants are asked to 
click next to continue. The challenge for test participants is to differentiate between 
objectives and conflicting objectives, to recognise present alternatives, and to identify 
uncertainties in this concrete decision situation. 
 
The main case fills almost one screen of an average laptop screen of 13” or 15”. The 
main case of the final DAC-test is presented in sub-section 9.8.4 of the appendix. 
Following the presentation of the main case, the task starts with the following instruction:  
Please have a look at the following list of taken notes from the case and decide which kind 
of information it is in the decision-making situation by choosing the most appropriate 
description from the drop-down menu for each fact. 
Presented on one page, test participants have to assign facts from the main case to 
the appropriate description in this decision-making situation by selecting the compatible 
descriptions from a provided drop-down menu. A list of facts/notes from the main case in 
the form of bullets is presented in a column on the left side of the screen. On the right 
side of the screen a drop-down menu for each fact is presented. The menu contains the 
descriptions of alternative(s), conflicting objectives, decision-maker, family, friend, 
location, objectives, resources, time frame, and uncertainty. Overall, 12 items of this item 
type were created for the DAC pre-testing. Out of the 12, four items served as distractors. 
The list of items and items that served as distractors of the final DAC-test is depicted in 
sub-section 9.8.4 of the appendix.  
Scoring 
To score, the answer of an item has to satisfy two criteria. First, only the correct 
mapping of the following four descriptions score: objectives, conflicting objectives, 
alternative(s), and uncertainty. The other descriptions serve as distractors. Second, only if 
test participants select the correct/requested description from the drop-down menu, their 
solution scores - for instance assigning the fact saving money and travelling to the 
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description conflicting objectives53. The scores are saved as binary data – correct vs. not 
correct. So, for the DAC pre-testing a maximum score of eight points could be reached 
for FRAME. 
4.1.5 Items of the Ability to Identify Relevant Alternatives 
The fifth dimension being operationalized in the DAC-test is the ability to identify 
relevant alternatives (henceforth: ALTERNATIVES) representing the skill of subjects to 
envision alternatives, which score high on a set of given objectives in a decision situation 
(e.g. Goodwin & Wright, 2014; Hammond et al., 1999; Keelin et al., 2009; Keller & Ho, 1988).  
Test concept and theoretical basis 
The decision-analytical literature provides different methodological approaches to 
generating alternatives (e.g. Keeney, 1992; Keller & Ho, 1988) and empirical research on 
procedures to create alternatives (e.g. Jungermann et al., 1983; Pitz, Sachs, & Heerboth, 
1980; Selart & Johansen, 2011). The latter type of studies descriptively examines which 
kind of procedural changes may influence the quantity and quality of generating 
alternatives. While alternatives’ quantity is determined by the number of alternatives, 
alternatives’ quality is evaluated in terms of creativeness. Studies such as Gettys, Pliske, 
Manning, and Casey (1987) show that the generation of a broad set of alternatives 
satisfies decision-makers, independent of how many relevant options they were able to 
come up with. As in effective decision-making processes it is necessary to understand 
how well the alternatives satisfy the corresponding objectives - as “[a] decision can be no 
better than [the] best alternative.” (Hammond et al., 1999, p.7) - the qualitative aspect of 
identifying alternatives is the focus of the present research.  
Operationalization and layout 
The most recent research of Siebert and Keeney (2015) provides a first attempt to 
assess the quality of a person’s ability to identify alternatives by test takers themselves. 
Their approach is geared to the procedure of Bond et al. (2008); cf. sub-section 4.1.1) of 
measuring how well decision-makers are able to envision their objectives. In Siebert’s and 
Keeney’s study, test takers listed as many alternatives as possible in a first step, selected 
relevant alternatives from a master list in a second step, matched their self-generated list 
with the master list in the third step, and finally evaluated the quality of their selected 
alternatives on criteria such as the suitability to achieve given objectives. Even though the 
method of Siebert and Keeney could have been adapted and used for the present 
                                                
53 For more background information on the case cf. appendix sub-section 9.8.4.  
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research, it did not seem to be the best way to operationalize this DAC-dimension 
because of one crucial consideration: In contrast to the quality of personal objectives, for 
which the setting of an external and objective evaluation standard is not possible (Parker 
& Fischhoff, 2005), it is entirely possible to set such an impartial evaluation standard for 
the quality of alternatives. So, decision facilitators endeavour to enable decision-makers to 
recognise and verbalise every relevant objective (e.g. Phillips & Phillips, 1993; Phillips, 
2007), but they cannot be clear on whether the articulated set of objectives is complete. 
In contrast, an external person can judge whether an alternative matches corresponding 
objectives (cf. Keeney, 1992). For this reason, an objective, non-manipulable way of 
assessment, in comparison to an assessment by the test taker, was desired. Therefore, in 
the framework of the present research, new items to capture this ability have been 
developed.  
Thus, it was intended to operationalize the ALTERNATIVES’ qualitative aspect by 
assessing alternatives according to their fit to objectives. In other words, test takers are 
asked to assess whether alternatives score on the presented objectives. So by a 
matching task, they have to evaluate the so-called fit of alternatives to corresponding 
decision objectives.  
 
The complete item pool of ALTERNATIVES with its instruction is laid out on one page. 
The task starts with three sentences introducing the story of a character who is facing a 
concrete decision situation. The three objectives of the character are presented and test 
participants are instructed (cf. corresponding scale explanation in Figure 4-10):  
Knowing about the character’s objectives, please choose which of the following 
alternatives fit his/her three objectives all at the same time. Please tick the appropriate 
buttons. 
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Figure 4-10 Operationalization of ALTERNATIVES – scale explanation 
 
For the DAC pre-testing of this DAC-dimension an item set of 10 items was 
constructed. An overview of the item set of the final DAC-test is given in appendix sub-
section 9.8.5. An example of an item for ALTERNATIVES looks like the following:  
Here is what Brad thinks is relevant regarding his decision: 
- I am really happy to be out of school now. I am not going to study straight away – 
Forget it! 
- Whatever it is – I need to get some money for living. My parents aren’t going to 
pay. 
- I have always liked the countryside. Which alternatives are out there that let me 
spend some time outside? 
Alternative Scale 
Volunteering in an orphanage ! Does not fit  ! Does fit     ! I do not know 
 
Scoring 
The scale was designed so that the presented alternatives scored either on one, two, 
all or none of the presented three objectives. The main aim of this decision task was to 
identify the alternatives that “fit” all objectives. Subsequently, those alternatives had to be 
categorised as “does fit”-alternatives. In case of alternatives scoring just on one two or no 
objective, test participants had to select “does not fit”. For this DAC-dimension, an 
additional I do not know option was added to the scale (does fit – does not fit) to reduce 
the probability of subjects randomly choosing the correct answer. Binary data is 
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calculated for the scoring. Thus, each correct answer scores with one point per item. The 
option I do not know and wrong answers did not score. The correct answer for the given 
example would be “Does not fit”. Thus, for the DAC pre-testing a maximum score of 10 
points could be reached for ALTERNATIVES. 
4.1.6 Items of the Ability to Deal with Uncertainty  
The ability to deal with uncertainty (henceforth: UNCERTAINTY) is the sixth dimension of 
the DAC-test. It describes the ability of subjects to comprehend, interpret, and calculate 
probabilities of different qualities in order to make a choice (e.g. W. Edwards, 1954; Hastie & 
Dawes, 2010; J. E. Matheson & Howard, 1968; Raiffa, 1968).  
Test concept and theoretical basis 
Uncertainty and similar constructs such as ambiguity or risk form major concepts in 
decision science literature (D. E. Bell et al., 1988; W. Edwards, 1954; Lipshitz & Strauss, 
1997). This attention is justified as uncertainty builds a key obstacle to successful 
decision-making (e.g. Orasanu & Connolly, 1993). To overcome this obstacle, the 
attributes for good decision-makers are: thinking probabilistically and making judgment on 
systematically collected data (Hastie & Dawes, 2010; Kahneman & Lovallo, 1993). 
Decision science provides various approaches of how people cope with uncertainty; 
either by reducing uncertainty (e.g. Dawes, 1988; Hirst & Schweitzer, 1990), suppressing 
uncertainty (e.g. Boleman & Deal, 1991; Montgomery, 1988), or acknowledging 
uncertainty (e.g. Coombs, Dawes, & Tversky, 1970; Raiffa, 1968). The latter avenue of 
coping refers to the rational choice theory, in which a strategy to systematically include 
uncertainty into the evaluation of decision alternatives is applied. According to the rational 
choice theory, it is assumed that individuals have preferences among a set of decision 
alternatives. The attractiveness of an alternative is defined by the function of three 
components: the preference for its outcome, the probability that it will appear, and its 
costs (Raiffa, 1968). One of the most common techniques to identify the alternative that 
leads to the highest expected value is decision tree charts (Hastie & Dawes, 2010).  
Operationalization and layout 
Drawing from probability theoretical literature (e.g. Kolmogorov, 2013), it was 
intended to operationalize those aspects that are essential for making decisions under 
uncertainty. On the assumption that good decision-makers are able to comprehend and 
interpret probabilities, calculate expected values and conditional probabilities (cf. sub-
section 2.4.2), textbooks and related decision scientific books (e.g. Gigerenzer, 2003; M. 
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Peterson, 2009; Shaughnessy, 2009) were reviewed in order to identify probability tasks 
that could be adapted to the topic of the INVEST case and the EDU case. In this context, 
the test was intended to cover the following areas of uncertainty tasks: perceive and 
comprehend probabilities, interpret their meanings, calculate basic probabilities as well as 
sensitivity and specificity, solve random experiments, and calculate expected values and 
natural frequencies (cf. Hoffrage & Gigerenzer, 1998). 
For the pre-testing, eight different probability tasks were selected (cf. Table 4-2) - 
covering different levels of item difficulty according to the textbooks. In order to lead test 
participants to the more difficult items of probability calculation and to keep them 
motivated, the item block of this DAC-dimension was graded. The block of tasks starts 
with the easier items and closes with the more complex ones. Therefore, the complexity 
of all item types was analysed by determining the number of steps of thought, item by 
item: the fewer the steps of thought the less complex the item.  
Table 4-2 Overview of UNCERTAINTY items of the DAC-test (pre-testing)  
 
In contrast to the other DAC-dimensions presented so far, whose items are of the 
same structure, the items of this DAC-dimension structurally differ: different instructions 
with or without corresponding figure and/or term definition, different scales with and 
without scale explanations. The eight items are presented on three pages. The items and 
scales of the final DAC-test are presented in sub-section 9.8.6 of the appendix.  
Understanding the meaning of probabilities by comparing two probabilistic pieces 
of information 
The first item of UNCERTAINTY was set as an icebreaker item (Kline, 2015) and thus 
relatively simple. It intends to measure whether test participants understand the meaning 
Object of measurement Points to be reached 
Understanding the meaning of probabilities by comparing two probabilistic 
pieces of information  
1 
Calculating relative frequencies by gathering the relevant information from a 
table or figure 
1 
Comprehending the literal meaning of probabilistic information 1 
Calculating a two-stage random experiment by calculating one conditional 
probability 
1 
Calculating a random experiment with stochastically independent events 2 
Calculating expected values of two potential alternatives 1 
Calculating sensitivity/specificity with percentages 1 
Calculating sensitivity/specificity with natural frequencies 1 
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of probabilities by comparing two probabilistic pieces of information. Therefore, a four-
sentence decision case referring to the main case of the test is presented, providing the 
probabilities of events A and B in percentages. After reading the case description test 
participants are asked which alternative the character should choose to maximise his/her 
chance for the desired outcome. To answer this item test participants can choose 
between two given probabilities. Additionally, an I do not know option is provided. 
Calculating relative frequencies by gathering the relevant information from a table 
or figure 
The second item assesses whether test participants are able to calculate relative 
frequencies by gathering the relevant information from a table or figure. To operationalize 
this sub-skill of UNCERTAINTY, a five-sentence case and a figure containing the necessary 
information/numbers are presented. Figure 4-11 gives an example of how the second 
item of this DAC-dimension asks test participants to calculate the chances of winning for 
the blue (A) and the red (B) wheel of fortune. 
 
Figure 4-11 Operationalization of UNCERTAINTY - corresponding figure to item 2 
 
In order to answer this item, test participants have to select the two answers from a 
multiple-choice drop-down menu54 with 19 answer options. The menu is provided for the 
majority of the items of UNCERTAINTY and contains all correct answers for the whole item 
set of this dimension. Additionally, distractors have been added. They were constructed 
after analysing items’ complexity considering which arithmetic errors are likely to be made 
and to which results they would lead. These results complement the drop-down menu. 
To choose the correct answer, test participants are asked to select the closest whole 
number from the drop-down list. The drop-down menu of the final DAC-test is presented 
in sub-section 9.8.6 of the appendix. 
                                                
54 It was decided to provide a multiple-choice drop-down menu instead of presenting an open text field 
for text/number entry, as the intention was to make the items as reliable as possible and maximise their 
scorability (Kline, 2015).  
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Comprehending the literal meaning of probabilistic information 
Even though probabilities are present in our daily life, e.g. in package inserts of drugs 
or communicated on television weather forecasts, people do not have a common 
understanding of probabilities. Gigerenzer, Hertwig, van den Broek, Fasolo, and 
Katsikopoulos (2005) were able to show that even quantitative statements about 
probabilities are often misinterpreted. Based on this insight and their study, the third item 
of UNCERTAINTY intends to measure whether test participants comprehend the literal 
meaning of probabilistic information. It is operationalized by the question of what a 
probability given in the previous item means in that particular case. A corresponding 
multiple-choice drop-down menu with five potential explanations and an I do not know 
option are presented as a scale. The I do not know option was added, as it was done for 
several previous presented tasks because “[g]uessing is a major difficulty in tests, 
especially of ability and aptitude. The multiple-choice items where the distractors are 
equally good reduces the positive effects of guessing to a one-in-five chance, compared 
with the 50 per cent chance of true-false items” (Kline, 2015, p. 40). 
Calculating a two-stage random experiment by calculating one conditional 
probability 
The fourth item of this DAC-dimension assesses test participants’ competence to 
handle a two-stage random experiment by calculating one conditional probability. In two 
to three sentences the item describes two events - A and B – and their probabilities, of 
which the second event depends on the first. Test participants are asked about the 
probability of event B after having experienced event A. For answering this item test 
participants have to select the answer from the 19-option drop-down menu. It is identical 
to the drop-down menu that is also presented for the second item of this DAC-dimension. 
Calculating a random experiment with stochastically independent events 
The fifth item of this DAC-dimension captures whether test participants are able to 
calculate a random experiment with stochastically independent events. Therefore, it 
presents two independent events and their probabilities. To answer this item, test 
participants can select the required answer from the 19-option drop-down menu.  
Calculating expected values of two potential alternatives 
The sixth item of UNCERTAINTY presents a short case with two alternatives and their 
probabilities of occurrence in order to operationalize whether decision-makers are able to 
calculate expected values of two potential alternatives. Test participants are asked to 
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calculate the expected value for each alternative and write their answers without rounding 
up or down following the corresponding scale explanation (cf. Figure 4-12). This scale 
explanation is given to induce all test participants to use the same format, and to make 
the data analysis easier.  
 
Figure 4-12 Operationalization of UNCERTAINTY – scale explanation 
 
Calculating sensitivity/specificity with percentages and with natural frequencies 
Items seven and eight request the calculation of sensitivity55 or specificity56 for a test 
presented in a short case of seven sentences providing total and conditional probabilities. 
While the seventh item of this DAC-dimension provides percentages of total and 
conditional probabilities, the eighth item presents its information in natural frequencies. 
Test participants are requested to select their answers again from the given 19-answer 
drop-down menu.  
Scoring 
For all items of UNCERTAINTY binary data is calculated for the process of scoring. 
Thus, each correct answer scores one point per item; but the second item, which asks for 
two answers, scores two points maximum. Thus, for the DAC pre-testing a maximum 
score of nine points could be reached for UNCERTAINTY. 
4.1.7 Items of the Ability to Integrate Information  
The seventh dimension of the DAC-test is the ability to integrate information 
(henceforth: INFORMATION). It describes the skill of subjects to combine assessments of 
                                                
55 Sensitivity is the true-positive rate, measuring the ratio of positives that are correctly identified as such 
by a test.  
56 Specificity is the true-negative rate, measuring the ratio of negatives that are correctly identified as 
such by a test. 
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uncertainties and values coherently, compare various alternatives and objectives, and 
correspondingly rank those alternatives in relation to their relevance for the decision-
maker (e.g. Bazerman & Moore, 2009; W. Edwards, 1954; Goodwin & Wright, 2014; 
Keelin et al., 2009; Raiffa, 1968). 
Test concept and theoretical basis 
“Competent decision making requires several key skills including the ability to 
understand information, integrate information in an internally consistent manner, identify 
the relevance of information in a decision process, and inhibit impulsive responding.” 
(Finucane & Gullion, 2010) Sound decision-making also demands the evaluation of 
objectives and uncertainties in a coherent manner (W. Edwards, 1954; Raiffa, 1968). So, 
the DAC-dimension INFORMATION captures the comparison of alternatives on the basis of 
individual objectives and the consideration of occurring uncertainties. Three steps of 
thought have to be executed; comprehension, dimension weighting, probability 
consideration.  
Operationalization and layout 
One decision-analytical approach to measure aspects of INFORMATION is the work of 
Finucane and Gullion (2010), under which the authors developed a tool to measure DMC 
of older adults in the context of health, finance, and nutrition decisions. Their test contains 
four different decision task types: comprehension, consistency, dimension weighting, and 
cognitive reflection. Out of those four measures, the comprehension measure (cf. 
Finucane, Mertz, Slovic, & Schmidt, 2005) and the dimension weighting measure 
(Finucane & Gullion, 2010) served as a construction guideline for operationalizing 
INFORMATION in the present research. By adapting the decision tasks of Finucane and 
Gullion (2010) to the context of the DAC-test and creating an additional item type for 
probability consideration, it is intended to capture the ability to compare alternatives on 
various objectives and given uncertainties, thus choosing the alternative that promises the 
highest chance to achieve the desired outcome (e.g. Bazerman & Moore, 2009; W. 
Edwards, 1954; Raiffa, 1968).  
One secondary skill that is essential to successfully assess alternatives on various 
objectives is the skill to transform units and scales. As different objectives can vary in 
terms of their corresponding unit, such as costs in different currencies, decision-makers 
have to be able to transform scales to ease the comparison of alternatives. Consequently, 
a fourth item type was created to operationalize this secondary skill.  
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The process of choosing the best alternative is operationalized deterministically step-
by-step in the DAC-test. However, before the four items for comprehension, dimension 
weighting, probability consideration, and unit transformation were presented, a fifth 
item was set first. Table 4-3 gives an overview of the five item types for INFORMATION. This 
first item requires the three steps of thought - comprehension, dimension weighting, and 
probability consideration - all at once, while items two, three, and four divide these steps 
so that test participants are led through this process of thinking. The idea behind that 
item-construction decision was that test participants might experience problems 
performing all steps of thought at once and thus not score at all. This circumstance would 
raise the question of which step(s) might have caused the problem and thereby which 
steps of thought could not be executed. Hence, by disconnecting these thinking steps it 
can be detected which exact step(s) might be the greatest challenge for test participants 
within this DAC-dimension. Additionally, the fifth item asks test participants to transform 
one objective unit into the unit of another objective.  
Table 4-3 Overview of INFORMATION items of the DAC-test (pre-testing) 
 
For this dimension of the DAC-test a single-item-per-page layout was chosen. The 
items of the final DAC-test are presented in sub-section 9.8.7 of the appendix.  
 
The operationalization of INFORMATION starts with the presentation of a short decision 
case, which is connected to the main case of the DAC-test. It presents three individual 
objectives (1, 2, and 3) and three alternatives (A, B, and C) of the character. A table (cf. 
Table 4-4) containing the character’s assessment of how well the three alternatives fit 
his/her objectives is presented and the expression of the fit visualised by symbols (here 
presented by stars - reaching from zero (worst fit) to five (best fit) stars).  
  
Object of measurement Points to be 
reached 
Comprehension, dimension weighting, probability consideration 3 
Comprehension 3 
Dimensions weighting 3 
Probability consideration 3 
Unit transformation 3 
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Table 4-4 Operationalization of INFORMATION – exemplarily assessment of alternatives 
 
 
Furthermore, test participants are informed that the character realises that his/her 
objectives weigh differently for each of the three alternatives. The weights of the three 
objectives are presented in percentages, adding up to 100%. In addition, it is announced 
that the presented decision situation contains one uncertainty. The first item is as follows: 
Please rank the alternatives given the character’s objectives and the prevalent risks. Start 
with the most preferred alternative. 
Three drop-down menus, starting with the drop-down menu for the most preferred 
alternative and ending with the one for the least preferred alternative, are presented 
vertically. They provide the following answer options: “A; B; C; A and B; A and C; B and 
C; A, B, and C; /”. To clarify, the following scale explanation (cf. Figure 4-13) is given. 
 
Figure 4-13 Operationalization of INFORMATION – Scale explanation – Item 1 
 
As described above for the next three items of INFORMATION, the thinking steps of 
item one are further divided. Thus, on the next page the second item capturing 
comprehension presents a decision situation with three objectives and three alternatives, 
and a table (cf. Table 4-4) that shows the character’s assessment of how well the 
alternatives fit his/her objectives. On the third page of this DAC-dimension, the third item 
capturing dimensions weighting presents how the character weighs the importance of 
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his/her objectives. Within the fourth item capturing probability consideration it is explained 
that the character perceives an uncertainty for one of the alternatives.  
INFORMATION items two, three, and four are:  
Please put the alternatives in order according to the character’s objectives for his/her 
decision. Start with the most preferred alternative.  
Please put the alternatives in order according to the character’s assessment of the 
relevance of his/her objectives. Start with the most preferred alternative.  
Please put the alternatives in order according to the probabilities of the character’s 
alternatives. Start with the most preferred alternative. 
For answering the item, repeatedly the three drop-down menus and the 
corresponding scale explanation (cf. Figure 4-13) are presented. 
 
The fifth item intends to measure whether test participants are able to transform the 
unit of a decision objective into another unit. Therefore, the item requires the calculation of 
a monetary scale into a 0 to 100 scale. The three alternatives from the case description of 
items one to four are presented again - this time with the expected costs for each 
alternative. Test participants are asked:  
Please translate the prices into whole numbers between 0 and 100, given that 
- £X is the maximum the character could spend,  
- £Y is the minimum the character wants to spend,  
- the more money saved the better, and   
- the scale is interval-scaled, which means that the distance between 0 and 20 is 
equivalent to the distance between 60 and 80. 
To answer the item, test participants are required to round to whole numbers and 
enter the correct number into three open text fields – one for each alternative.  
Scoring 
For the scoring, binary data is computed. Each correctly ordered alternative in the 
first, second, third and fourth item scores one point, which means three points maximum 
per item. Item five, for which three answers are required, scores one point per correct 
answer. Thus for the DAC pre-testing, a maximum score of 15 points could be attained 
for INFORMATION.  
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4.1.8 Items of the Ability to Plan to Implement a Decision  
The ability to plan to implement a decision (henceforth: IMPLEMENTATION) is the 
eighth DAC-dimension. It describes the skill of subjects to set up a strategy for how to 
translate a cognitive decision into action by formulating concrete next steps and thinking 
ahead about possible obstacles and ways to address these obstacles (e.g. Hammond et 
al., 1999; Keelin et al., 2009; Mellers & Locke, 2007).  
Test concept and theoretical basis  
After having systematically compared the alternatives and reached clarity about 
which alternative to choose (Howard, 2007), decision-makers have to commit themselves 
to purposefully execute the made decision (Keelin et al., 2009). Thus, the motivational and 
volitional decision-making phases merge (Heckhausen & Gollwitzer, 1987). As the present 
research intends to assess DAC for complex decision problems, the transfer of intention, 
the motivational aspect of decision-making, into action, the volitional aspect of decision-
making, is not possible to be operationalized plausibly on a quantitative level. To plan to 
implement a complex decision comprises an immense number of considerations and 
strategies and is hardly feasible in such a limited timeframe as the present DAC-test. 
Consequently, the aim for the sub-scale of IMPLEMENTATION was to operationalize only the 
motivational aspect of decision-making, that is the formulation of concrete next steps, the 
consideration of possible obstacles and the determination of ways to address these 
obstacles. 
One approach to measure IMPLEMENTATION is the work of Lynch, Netemeyer, Spiller, 
and Zammit (2010), who developed the Propensity to Plan Scale - a self-assessment tool 
capturing the tendency of people to plan short- and long-term for time and money. 
However, two linked reasons led to the fact that their scale was neither applicable nor 
adaptable for the present research. First, Lynch et al.’s tool is a questionnaire, i.e. not 
capable of measuring actual performance like the DAC-test intends to do. Second, the 
tool thereby asked for the assessment of behaviour. The DAC-test, in contrast, aims to 
measure cognitive processes before the actual behaviour. 
Operationalization and layout 
According to the preceding DAC-dimensions, for IMPLEMENTATION, objective and 
quantitative items had to be found. As the literature does not provide an existing measure, 
it became clear that this DAC-dimension needed to be analysed exploratively first. Thus, 
the idea was to collect qualitative data in a small pilot study with 31 students and 
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subsequently analyse and cluster their answers to define quantitative standards that could 
be set as a target value to achieve in a test. 
 
Subsequently, the qualitative operationalization of IMPLEMENTATION was geared to the 
research on action planning and coping planning (cf. sub-section 2.4.3). In this 
framework it was intended to operationalize three facets of action planning and coping 
planning: (1) when-where-how plans (e.g. Gollwitzer, 1999) including the (2) anticipation of 
potential difficulties and (3) planning how to overcome those obstacles (e.g. Keelin et al., 
2009; Sniehotta et al., 2006) when intending to translate a cognitive decision into action. 
For these three facets three different items were created, each of them presented on a 
single page: (1) formulating a commitment strategy with next steps as well as needed 
resources, (2) perceiving potential barriers and (3) formulating strategies to prevent or 
overcome them. The first item sets in at the point where the decision has already been 
made. 
 
The qualitative items were presented with an open answer style in order not to imply 
that there is one correct answer. So, pilot study test participants were asked:  
(1) Imagine you have just decided to <XXX57>. What would your plan of action look like in 
the next days, weeks and months to reach your goal(s)? Please describe for each step 
what you need to do. Which resources (e.g. help, additives) do you need to proceed with 
those steps?  
(2) For each step, which difficulties could arise in transforming your plan into action? 
(3) How would you try to prevent or overcome these difficulties? 
The analysis of the qualitative results of the pilot study did not show a systematic 
pattern, to which the results could have been clustered. So it was impossible to formulate 
defined categories that could have been used as objective values for the DAC-test. As a 
result IMPLEMENTATION was not successfully operationalized for the pre-testing of the 
DAC-test. 
Scoring 
As explained above, the qualitative results of the pilot study did not allow for 
clustering the given answers since their variation was too complex. Thus, IMPLEMENTATION 
could not be operationalized for the DAC-test.  
                                                
57 Test participants of the pilot study were two decision scenarios presented; one referring to the INVEST 
case and one to the EDU case.  
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As described in this section, out of eight theoretical cognitive DAC-dimensions seven 
dimensions were operationalized by 19 different item types and by 69 items for the first 
version of the DAC-test.  
 
The following section and its sub-sections 4.2.2 - 4.2.7 present the results of the pre-
testing and corresponding item and distributional analyses of the DAC-prototype. 
4.2 ITEM ANALYSIS & ITEM SELECTION 
In order to create a valid and reliable psychometric performance test, the first version 
of the two parallel DAC-tests (INVEST case and EDU case) with their 19 various item 
types (cf. section 4.1 and corresponding sub-sections) had to be pre-tested. As 
described in sub-section 3.2.3, qualitative and quantitative pre-tests were carried out in 
order to revise the test, review the test score distribution, and inspect the test 
procedure (Lienert & Raatz, 1998).  
 
While sub-section 4.2.1 exposes the arguments for choosing one of the two cases 
for the main testing and thus, here for the item analysis and item selection, sub-section 
4.2.2 gives an overview of the socio-demographic statistics of the quantitative pre-testing. 
Sub-section 4.2.3 presents the results of the item analysis and selection (revising the test) 
and sub-section 4.2.4 shows the results of the dimensionality analysis and the test score 
distribution (reviewing the test score distribution). Before sub-section 4.2.6 concludes the 
changes to the testing procedure for the main testing (inspecting the test procedure), 
sub-section 4.2.5 presents interpretations of the findings of the pre-testing. Sub-section 
4.2.7 consolidates the modifications made to the pre-version of the DAC-test and 
explains the final-version of the test.  
4.2.1 Data Set Selection 
As presented at the beginning of chapter 4, two parallel cases of equal structure (cf. 
sub-sections 4.1.1 - 4.1.7) were contrived and tested in the pre-testing. Beforehand, both 
cases were pilot-tested qualitatively (cf. sub-section 3.2.3) and sporadically quantitatively 
by four test participants, who volunteered to run the last pilot-tests before the pre-testing. 
As a result, both cases were considered appropriate in terms of expenditure of time and 
being in a reasonable range. 
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However, the collected times for completing the INVEST case and the EDU case in 
the pre-testing and test participants’ qualitative feedback58 gave reason to select only one 
of the two cases for the main testing. On average, it took test participants of the pre-
testing 158 minutes, i.e. 2 hours 38 minutes (SD = 58 minutes) to complete both the 
INVEST and the EDU case. The mean for processing the two cases and answering a first 
set of items of the criteria of validation (cf. sub-section 5.1), was 178 minutes, i.e. 2 hours 
58 minutes (SD = 69 minutes). 
 
The length of the test and the verbal feedback of test participants on decreasing 
concentration and motivation towards the second half of the test, led to the decision to 
reduce the test volume. Consequently, one case had to be neglected and the other 
selected for the main testing.  
Even though the content of both cases was selected and designed to be as 
comparable as possible within the sample group, the EDU case was perceived as more 
generic and more accessible by the test participants59. So, the EDU case was chosen for 
the main testing. That is why the following analyses and considerations refer exclusively to 
the data set of the EDU case of the pre-testing.  
4.2.2 Socio-Demographic Statistics of the Pre-Testing  
For the pre-testing, the majority of the sample group (cf. corresponding to the criteria 
for the target group in sub-section 3.3.1) was assembled by three institutions in 2014: a 
group of the London School of Economics and Political Science summer school students 
taking the course of “Judgement and Decision Making for Management”, voluntary 
students of the psychological department at Free University of Berlin, and voluntary 
students of the management department of the University of Bayreuth. Overall 196 people 
participated in the DAC pre-testing, of which 143 data sets could be employed for 
analyses. Three selecting criteria caused this reduction of 27.0% of the total sample: (1) 
according to the chosen target group for the present research (cf. sub-section 3.3.1), 
participants younger than 18 or older than 30 years, (2) participants with English skills that 
were self-rated lower than “good”, and (3) test processing times shorter than 30 minutes 
                                                
58 Qualitative feedback was given mainly verbally by test participants who know the test constructor 
personally.  
59 After reviewing the test completion times and realising that due to the length of the two cases and the 
set of validation criteria only one case could be chosen for the main testing, an email was sent out to the 
79 test participants whose email addresses were known. In that email test participants were asked: 
“Which of the two cases – INVEST case or EDU case – did you perceive as more generic and more 
accessible?” Forty-two persons replied, of which 31 selected the EDU case as the more generic and 
accessible case.  
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and longer than 3 hours for the EDU case. Participants who met one or more of these 
criteria were excluded from the analyses.  
Table 4-5 gives an overview of the distribution of test participants according to their 
universities. Twenty-one test participants (14.7%) came from University of Bayreuth, 39 
(27.3%) from Free University of Berlin, 58 (40.6%) people from London School of 
Economics, and 25 (17.5%) from multiple other sources such as former students of the 
Free University of Berlin who had heard about the test or colleagues and friends of the 
research group.  
 
Table 4-5 Distribution by source of acquisition of the pre-testing sample 
Source Frequency % 
UB 21 14.7 
Misc. 25 17.5 
FU 39 27.3 
LSE 58 40.6 
Total 143 100.0 
 
Note. UB = University of Bayreuth; Misc. = miscellaneous; FU = Free University of Berlin; LSE = London 
School of Economics and Political Science. 
 
The mean age of the sample group was 25 years (M = 24.84; SD = 3.35; Range = 
18-30). Fifty-four per cent of the 143 test participants assessed their English skills as 
“mother tongue” or “very good/business fluent” (cf. Table 4-6). The remaining 45.5% 
quoted their language skills as “good/conversant” or “fluent”. 
 
Table 4-6 Frequencies of self-assessed English skills of the pre-testing sample 
English level Frequency % 
Good/conversant 18 12.6 
Fluent 47 32.9 
Very good/business fluent 19 13.3 
Mother tongue 59 41.3 
Total 143 100.0 
 
Of the 143 test participants, 109 (76.2%) specified their gender: fifty-five of those test 
participants (50.5%) were female and 54 test participants (49.5%) were male.  
The greatest national group were Germans with 45.5%, followed by Americans with 
21.4%, Indians with 14.3%, and British with 10.7% of the valid data (112 test participants, 
cf. Table 4-7).  
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Table 4-7 Distribution by nation (pre-testing) 
Nationality Frequency % Valid % 
German 51 35.7 45.5 
American 24 16.8 21.4 
Indian 16 11.2 14.3 
British 12 8.4 10.7 
Chinese 2 1.4 1.8 
Scottish 2 1.4 1.8 
Canadian 1 0.7 0.9 
Hungarian 1 0.7 0.9 
Italian 1 0.7 0.9 
Polish 1 0.7 0.9 
Vietnamese 1 0.7 0.9 
NA 31 21.7  
Total 143 100.0  
Note. NA = missing data/not available. 
 
The average processing time for taking the DAC-prototype including responding to 
the criteria for validation was one hour and 28 minutes (cf. Table 4-8). For only the EDU 
case, test participants of the pre-testing took on average one hour and one minute.  
 
Table 4-8 Processing times in minutes of the pre-testing (EDU case & validation criteria) 
Processing time ... N Min  Max M SD Mdn IQR 
... for the EDU case  143 30 122 61.45 40.55 58.12 
54.10  
– 
87.56 
... for the EDU case 
and criteria of validity  143 38 148 88.45 62.28 85.79 
80.49  
– 
137.43 
Note. EDU case = Education case version of the DAC-test.  
 
Table 4-9 shows how the sample group stated their educational level: Out of the 108 
test participants who specified this information, almost 29.6% (32) have a university-
entrance diploma and 48.1% (52) hold a Diploma, Bachelor’s, or Master’s degree.  
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Table 4-9 Distribution by degree of education of the pre-testing sample 
Educational certificate Frequency % Valid % 
No school leaving certificate 1 0.7 0.9 
Certificate after nine or 10 years 
of school education 18 12.6 16.7 
University-entrance diploma 32 22.4 29.6 
Certificate for apprenticeship 5 3.5 4.6 
Bachelor’s degree 44 30.8 40.7 
Diploma or Master’s degree 8 5.6 7.4 
NA 35 24.5  
Total 143 100.0  
Note. NA = missing data/not available. 
 
To the questions “What is your former, current or intended profession?” and “Which 
field does it belong to?” the pre-testing sample group made the following statements (cf. 
Table 4-10): By far the two largest groups of test participants came from Life, Physical, 
and Social Science Occupations with 41.3% (59), and from Business and Financial 
Operations Occupations with 23.8% (34). 
 
Table 4-10 Distribution by former, current or intended profession of the pre-testing sample 
Profession Frequency % 
Arts, Design, Entertainment, Sports, and 
Media Occupations 5 3.5 
Business and Financial Operations 
Occupations 34 23.8 
Community and Social Services 
Occupations 1 0.7 
Computer and Mathematical 
Occupations 10 7.0 
Education, Training, and Library 
Occupations 3 2.1 
Healthcare Support Occupations 9 6.3 
Installation, Maintenance, and Repair 
Occupations 1 0.7 
Life, Physical, and Social Science 
Occupations 59 41.3 
Management Occupations 5 3.5 
Military Specific Occupations 2 1.4 
Office and Administrative Support 
Occupations 5 3.5 
Transportation and Material Moving 
Occupations 9 6.3 
Total 143 100.0 
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4.2.3 Results of Item Analysis & Consequences for the Item Selection 
The present sub-section reveals how the constructed DAC-prototype performs 
empirically. Hence, it presents the statistical properties on each item and on the 
dimensional level. As mentioned in sub-section 3.2.3 the item analysis is intended to 
enhance reliability of the DAC-prototype by revising items and documenting the test point 
distribution. Consequentially, after the phase of item analysis, those items should be 
chosen that psychometrically fit the measurement of DAC best.  
 
After omitting respondents listwise from the data analyses, who fell below the 
minimum processing time for completing the DAC-test, single NA responses were treated 
as wrong answers and therefore coded with “0”. This was done, as it was not possible to 
skip items in the DAC-test. NA responses were generated when test participants selected 
“I do not know” for some of the items with a multiple-choice response set. As in those 
cases test participants stated that they did not know the correct answer, “I do not know” 
was treated as wrong and so coded with “0” in the process of binary coding.  
 
The following two criteria were considered for selecting the items for the final version 
of the DAC-test: First, in the context of the following analyses the item discriminatory 
power coefficient (rit, cf. sub-section 3.2.3) measures how well an item fits the 
corresponding DAC-dimension. It was intended to select items that show a rit > .2 (cf. 
Everitt, 2006; Fisseni, 2004). Second, the item difficulty index (Pi) explains the frequency 
with which an item was answered correctly by the sample group. It gives information on 
how difficult it is to solve an item. Based on Kline (2015) and Lienert and Raatz (1998) 
items with a pi60 between .8 and .2 were selected.  
 
Most of the DAC-test items go along with a multiple-choice answer set, varying 
between two and 19 answer options. So for the majority of designed the items the 
influence of chance could not be precluded and, associated therewith, the corresponding 
probabilities of guessing right vary between 6% and 50%. For those items a formula to 
correct guessing – the relative difficulty ratio of Frisbie (1981) - was applied (cf. Lienert & 
Raatz, 1998; Moosbrugger & Kelava, 2012). In comparison to the regular formula for 
calculating item difficulty61, which divides the number of correct answers by the number of 
                                                
60 pi = Pi /100 
61 According to Mossbrugger and Kelava (2012) the formula for calculating item difficulty in power tests is 
pi = nC /N.  
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participants, the corrected formula62 (cf. Formula 4—1) subtracts the quotient of the 
number of incorrect answers and the number of answer options less one from the 
number of correct answers. This formula for the relative difficulty ratio was applied in place 
of the regular formula for each multiple-choice item of the DAC-test.  
 
𝑝!_! =  𝑛!! !!!!!𝑁  
pi_c = corrected item difficulty index (Pi)/100 
nC = number of correct answers 
nI = number of incorrect answers 
k = number of answer options 
N = number of participants	 
Formula 4—1 Calculation of the relative difficulty ratio (cf. Frisbie, 1981) 
 
Theoretically, items with medium item difficulty of pi = .5 differentiate best between 
test participants with a low and test participants with a high level of the characteristic 
value (Moosbrugger & Kelava, 2012, p. 87). However, for the present research a range of 
difficulty pi between .2 and .8 appears to be appropriate as it is intended to assess 
people with low DAC as well as people with medium or high DAC (e.g. Kline, 2015, p. 
143). As the current research does not aim to examine the extreme groups, i.e. people 
with either very low or very high characteristic value, items with pi < .2 and pi > .8 are 
excluded. 
On the basis of these two essential statistics, and according to Kline (2015), all items 
meeting both criteria, discriminatory power coefficient and item difficulty index, were 
selected for the final test. Items that failed one or both of the criteria were examined for 
their relation to particular characteristics that could have caused this non-fit. Furthermore, 
all aspects of each DAC-dimension were covered content-wise and all DAC-dimensions 
provided at least eight items to enable a good comparability of scores among examinees. 
 
The following paragraphs give an overview of the resulting statistical properties for 
each of the seven measured DAC-dimensions separately. Additionally, the 
reliability/internal consistency of each DAC-dimension is specified by Cronbach’s alpha 
(α)63. The corresponding tables present the means (M), standard deviations (SD), item 
difficulty indices (pi and pi_c), discriminatory power coefficients (rit), and whether the item 
                                                
62 It is known that this kind of guessing correction occasionally leads to negative item difficulty values, 
which cannot be interpreted. However, negative values can be treated as indicators for very difficult items 
that seem to be easier, i.e. such items encourage incorrect answers (cf. Lienert & Raatz, 1998, p.75; 
Moosbrugger & Kelava, 2012, p.80). 
63 Bland and Altman (1997) and Schmitt (1996) recommend an internal consistency coefficient 
(Cronbach’s alpha) of α ≥.70 for newly constructed scales.  
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was selected for the main testing (MT) or not, including the reason for potential exclusion. 
All items of the DAC-test are coded so that higher values indicate better performance and 
therefore a higher decision competence. 
Item analysis of the ability to envision one’s objectives  
As OBJECTIVES is operationalized by the item format of Bond et al. (2008), it does not 
consist of items in the “traditional way”: The greatest difference in comparison to the other 
DAC-dimensions and their corresponding items is that in the case of OBJECTIVES the test 
participants determine the order and relevance of their objectives and thus the items 
individually. Hence, a comparison of all participants item by item is not feasible. According 
to Bond and colleagues (2008), the higher the percentage of self-generated objectives of 
the finally selected most relevant objectives, the better the test participants are able to 
envision their own objectives. In this sense, each self-generated objective of the final 
selected seven objectives scores one point.  
Item analysis of the ability to recognise decision opportunities  
Table 4-11 shows the item analysis results for the 12 items of OPPORTUNITIES in the 
pre-testing. As all items are multiple-choice items, the corrected item difficulty index pi_c is 
calculated. The values for pi are given for the sake of completeness. Out of the 12 items, 
nine items show good statistical properties with pi_c between .2 and .8 and rit above .2. 
Item DO_03 seems to be too easy as its pi_c exceeds .8. As the pi_c is negative and cannot 
be interpreted (cf. Footnote 62), pi is taken into account. With pi below .2, item DO_04 
appears to be too difficult. The same circumstance applies to item DO_11, which also 
shows a negative pi_c. Its pi marginal meets the threshold of pi >.2, but the discriminatory 
power coefficient does not fit and is too low with rit = .11.  
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Table 4-11 Statistical properties of OPPORTUNITIES (pre-testing) 
Item ID M SD pi pi_c rit MT 
Reason for potential 
exclusion 
DO_01 .78 .42 .75 .55 .32 yes  
DO_02 .62 .49 .63 .68 .37 yes  
DO_03 .86 .35 .86 .89 .37  pi_c> .8 
DO_04 .12 .33 .12 -.30 .21  pi_c < .2 
DO_05 .90 .30 .90 .80 .26 yes  
DO_06 .22 .41 .36 .23 .47 yes  
DO_07 .73 .45 .68 .45 .68 yes  
DO_08 .62 .49 .51 .75 .63 yes  
DO_09 .59 .49 .58 .32 .68 yes  
DO_10 .86 .35 .83 .72 .32 yes  
DO_11 .22 .42 .22 -56 .11  rit < .2 
DO_12 .66 .48 .64 .31 .42 yes  
Note. N = 143; pi = item difficulty index/100; pi_c = corrected item difficulty index/100; rit = item 
discriminatory power coefficient; MT = selected for the main testing; DO = Item ID for the DAC-dimension 
of OPPORTUNITIES.  
 
For the main testing, items DO_03, DO_04, and DO_11 were deleted. The remaining 
nine items were selected for the main testing. Cronbach’s alpha for the nine remaining 
items of OPPORTUNITIES lies at α = .63. 
Item analysis of the ability to assess decision fitness  
The results of the item analysis for the eight items of FITNESS are displayed in Table 
4-12. Two items show a negative corrected item difficulty index pi_c. Hence, for these two 
items - DF_02 and DF_06 – the regular item difficulty index is taken into account. 
According to those values and the values for the discriminatory power index, all items fit 
the set thresholds for pi /pi_c and rit. Cronbach’s alpha for the FITNESS is .33. 
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Table 4-12 Statistical properties of FITNESS (pre-testing) 
Item ID M SD pi pi_c rit MT 
Reason for potential 
exclusion 
DF_01 .80 .40 .80 .61 .26 yes  
DF_02 .45 .50 .45 -.09 .53 yes  
DF_03 .56 .50 .56 .21 .36 yes  
DF_04 .88 .32 .88 .76 .26 yes  
DF_05 .71 .46 .71 .41 .49 yes  
DF_06 .38 .49 .38 -.23 .53 yes  
DF_07 .64 .48 .64 .27 .36 yes  
DF_08 .71 .45 .71 .43 .49 yes  
Note. N = 143; pi = item difficulty index/100; pi_c = corrected item difficulty index/100; rit = item 
discriminatory power coefficient; MT = selected for the main testing; DF = Item ID for the DAC-dimension 
of FITNESS. 
Item analysis of the ability to frame a decision  
The items of FRAME are multiple-choice items as well; in this case with eight answer 
options. Therefore, the corrected item difficulty index pi_c in comparison to the regular item 
difficulty index pi is calculated. The statistical properties for the eight items of FRAME (cf. 
Table 4-13) all fulfil the target values for discriminatory power and item difficulty, even 
though the items FD_02 and FD_08 just meet them marginally.  
Table 4-13 Statistical properties of FRAME (pre-testing) 
Item ID M SD pi pi_c rit MT Reason for exclusion 
FD_01 .47 .50 .47 .42 .36 yes  
FD_02 .24 .43 .24 .21 .36 yes  
FD_03 .58 .50 .58 .54 .70 yes  
FD_04 .42 .50 .42 .37 .45 yes  
FD_05 .64 .48 .64 .61 .66 yes  
FD_06 .64 .48 .64 .60 .57 yes  
FD_07 .41 .49 .41 .35 .55 yes  
FD_08 .21 .41 .27 .23 .28 yes  
Note. N = 143; pi = item difficulty index/100; pi_c = corrected item difficulty index/100; rit = item 
discriminatory power coefficient; MT = selected for the main testing; FD = Item ID for the DAC-dimension 
of FRAME. 
 
Cronbach’s alpha for this DAC-dimension is .51. The DAC-dimension of FRAME did 
not show an adequate Cronbach’s alpha. However, the items of FRAME were kept for the 
main testing. One adaption that was undertaken for this scale was the presentation of a 
definition for the requested terms of the item (cf. sub-section 4.2.5).  
Item analysis of the ability to identify relevant alternatives  
Only one item out of the 10 items of ALTERNATIVES (cf. Table 4-14), IA_01, violates 
both target values of discriminatory power and item difficulty. The corrected item difficulty 
indices pi_c for items IA_02 and IA_05 are negative and not interpretable. Thus, in both 
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cases the regular item difficulty index pi is examined. Consequently, item IA_02 appears to 
be too difficult.  
Table 4-14 Statistical properties of ALTERNATIVES (pre-testing) 
Item ID M SD pi pi_c rit MT Reason for exclusion 
IA_01 .92 .28 .92 .83 .16  pi_C > .8 & rit < .2 
IA_02 .47 .50 .12 -.05 .53  pi_C < .2 
IA_03 .82 .39 .75 .64 .53 yes  
IA_04 .77 .42 .75 .54 .42 yes  
IA_05 .33 .47 .41 -.34 .21 yes  
IA_06 .66 .48 .75 .31 .58 yes  
IA_07 .67 .47 .71 .34 .63 yes  
IA_08 .83 .38 .73 .65 .47 yes  
IA_09 .74 .44 .71 .48 .37 yes  
IA_10 .61 .49 .59 .22 .53 yes  
Note. N = 143; pi = item difficulty index/100; pi_c = corrected item difficulty index/100; rit = item 
discriminatory power coefficient; MT = selected for the main testing; IA = Item ID for the DAC-dimension 
of ALTERNATIVES. 
 
Out of the 10 ALTERNATIVES items the eight remaining were selected for the main 
testing. Unfortunately, this deletion led to a decrease in Cronbach’s alpha to α = .44.  
Item analysis of the ability to deal with uncertainty  
Table 4-15 gives an overview of the statistical properties of the 10 items of 
UNCERTAINTY. Apart from items DU_07 and DU_08, all items are multiple-choice with 19 
answer options for which corrected item difficulty indices were calculated.  
It becomes apparent that the four items – DU_07, DU_08, DU_09, and DU_10 – do 
not fit the two target values of discriminatory power rit and item difficulty pi /pi_c. They seem 
to be too hard to solve.  
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Table 4-15 Statistical properties of UNCERTAINTY (pre-testing) 
Item ID M SD pi pi_c rit MT Reason for exclusion 
DU_01 .85 .36 .83 .69 .37 yes  
DU_02 .43 .50 .56 .39 .84 yes  
DU_03 .38 .49 .42 .35 .89 yes  
DU_04 .47 .50 .47 .34 .37 yes  
DU_05 .73 .44 .78 .72 .47 yes  
DU_06 .24 .43 .32 .20 .68 yes  
DU_07 .08 .28 .10 * .16 yes  
DU_08 .03 .18 .05 * .16 yes  
DU_09 .08 .28 .08 .03 .21  pi_c < .2 & rit < .2 
DU_10 .15 .36 .15 .11 .42  pi_c < .2 & rit < .2 
Note. N = 143; pi = item difficulty index/100; pi_c = corrected item difficulty index/100; rit = item 
discriminatory power coefficient; MT = selected for the main testing; DU = Item ID for the DAC-dimension 
of UNCERTAINTY. 
* Items are not multiple-choice items. Guessing correction is not necessary to calculate item difficulty 
index.  
 
Even though four items of UNCERTAINTY did not show good statistical properties in 
the item analysis, only the last two items – DU_09 and DU_10 – were excluded from the 
main testing version of the DAC-test. Items DU_07 and DU_08 were kept due to content 
reasons as they are referring to the calculation of expected values, which is one of the 
main tools in decision analysis (e.g. McNamee & Celona, 2005). For the main testing, a 
cue was introduced to ensure that all participants understood what was meant by 
expected value (cf. sub-section 4.2.5). For this DAC-dimension the deletion of two items 
resulted in a decrease of Cronbach’s alpha to α = .64.  
Item analysis of the ability to integrate information 
The 15 items of INFORMATION are presented in Table 4-16 with the results of their item 
analysis. A particular characteristic of this dimension is that its items are arranged in 
triplets. Thus, items II_01, II_02, II_03 belong to the same instruction. In the same style 
items II_04, II_05, and II_06 are counted as one instruction. The same principle applies to 
the other nine items. Except for items II_13, II_14, and II_15, all items are multiple-choice 
items with eight potential answer options. For these items the corrected item difficulty 
index pi_c was calculated. According to the statistical properties only items II_02 and II_03 
seem to be too difficult with a corrected item difficulty index pi_c of .13 and .11. All other 
items meet the threshold for both item difficulty and item discriminatory power.  
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Table 4-16 Statistical properties of INFORMATION (pre-testing) 
Item ID M SD pi pi_c rit MT Reason for exclusion 
II_01 .37 .49 .37 .28 .89  Test economy 
II_02 .24 .43 .24 .13 .74  pi_C < .2, Test economy 
II_03 .22 .42 .22 .11 .53  pi_C < .2, Test economy 
II_04 .78 .42 .76 .74 .53 yes  
II_05 .64 .48 .61 .58 .68 yes  
II_06 .68 .47 .63 .63 .63 yes  
II_07 .80 .40 .81 .78 .42 yes  
II_08 .22 .42 .31 .21 .84 yes  
II_09 .19 .39 .24 .22 .68 yes  
II_10 .17 .38 .27 .24 .74 yes  
II_11 .24 .43 .34 .29 .63 yes  
II_12 .21 .41 .25 .20 .63 yes  
II_13 .28 .45 .31 * .68 yes  
II_14 .26 .44 .29 * .68 yes  
II_15 .27 .45 .29 * .63 yes  
Note. N = 143; pi = item difficulty index/100; pi_c = corrected item difficulty index/100; rit = item 
discriminatory power coefficient; MT = selected for the main testing; II = Item ID for the DAC-dimension of 
INFORMATION. 
* Items are not multiple-choice items. Guessing correction is not necessary to calculate item difficulty 
index. 
 
Out of the 15 items of INFORMATION, 12 items were selected for the main testing. 
Even though item II_01 meets the thresholds of pi_c and rit, the other two items of the 
triplet - items II_01 and II_02 - seem to be relatively difficult to solve. In order to shorten 
the test and thereby reduce the workload for future test participants items II_01, II_02, 
and II_03 were deleted. Also, competence-wise the triplet is covered by the nine items 
II_04 - II_12 (cf. sub-section 4.1.7). In terms of its internal consistency the dimension of 
INFORMATION shows a very good Cronbach’s alpha of α = .85.  
 
According to the literature of scale construction (e.g. Moosbrugger & Kelava, 2012), it 
is worthwhile building a scale that contains of items with different levels of item difficulty 
resulting from various requirements. Items with a middle difficulty index of pi /pi_c around .5 
are best suited to differentiate between people with high and people with low level of the 
to-be-measured construct. However, for a test it is also important to contain items low in 
difficulty (pi /pi_c > .60) so that no test participant ends up with zero points and items high 
in difficulty (pi /pi_c < .40) and so that only a few test participants are able to solve all items. 
Table 4-17 gives an overview of how the item difficulty indices of each DAC-dimension of 
the pre-testing are distributed. The item difficulty indices for all dimensions, apart from 
UNCERTAINTY, range between .2 and .8. Since UNCERTAINTY consists of two very difficult 
items (DU_07: pi = .10 and DU_08: pi = .05), the average of the scale’s difficulty is lower 
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than the means of the other scales. OPPORTUNITIES appears to be the easiest scale with 
pi_c = .53. However, all means of item difficulty indices range between .36 and .53.  
 
Table 4-17 List of item difficulty indices (pi /pi_c) per DAC-dimension (pre-testing) 
DAC-dimension  M SD Range 
DO .53 .20 .23 – .80 
DF .44 .17 .21 – .76 
FD .42 .15 .21 - .61 
IA .45 .15 .22 - .65 
DU .36 .23 .05 - .72 
II .40 .21 .20 - .78 
Note. N = 143; pi = item difficulty index/100; pi_c = corrected item difficulty index/100; DAC = Decision-
analytical competence; DO = Ability to recognise decision opportunities; DF = Ability to assess decision 
fitness; FD = Ability to frame a decision; IA = Ability to identify relevant alternatives; DU = Ability to deal 
with uncertainty; II = Ability to integrate information.  
 
Besides examining item difficulty and discriminatory power, the reliability of each 
DAC-dimension was measured. Therefore the internal consistency by Cronbach’s alpha 
(Cronbach, 1951) was calculated, “which ... has become routine practice in virtually all 
psychological and social science research in which multiple-item measures of a construct 
are used” (Schmitt, 1996, p. 350). Interdisciplinary, a common presumption on the 
sufficient threshold of Cronbach’s alpha exists. According to Bland and Altman (1997), 
Nunnally et al. (1978), or Schmitt (1996), a Cronbach’s alpha of at least .70 is desirable for 
developing a new scale. Table 4-18 summarises the parameters of internal consistency 
for each DAC-dimension after the item selection. 
 
At this point, the results of the analysis for internal consistency are only described 
and not interpreted or discussed. Further critical considerations regarding these values 
can be found in sub-section 4.2.5.  
With a Cronbach’s alpha of α = .3364, FITNESS shows the lowest internal consistency, 
followed by ALTERNATIVES with α = .44, and FRAME with α = .51. The values for 
OPPORTUNITIES (α = .63) and UNCERTAINTY (α = .64) almost meet the desirable threshold 
for Cronbach’s alpha. INFORMATION presents a good value of α = .85.  
  
                                                
64 Cronbach’s alpha is sensitive to the number of items (e.g. Eid & Schmidt, 2014, Nunnally, 1978), 
especially for scales with fewer than 10 items. That could be one reason why, even though items with 
poor statistical properties have been excluded from this calculation due to the item analysis, Cronbach’s 
alpha is still pretty low. «Theoretically, the larger the number of items in a scale, the more reliable will be 
the scale.» (R. A. Peterson, 1994, p. 389) 
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Table 4-18 Overview of internal consistencies of the pre-testing after item selection 
DAC-dimension α  Number of items  
EO - - 
DO .63 9 
DF .33 8 
FD .51 8 
IA .44 8 
DU .64 8 
II .85 12 
Note. DAC = Decision-analytical competence; α = Cronbach’s alpha; EO = Ability to envision one’s 
objectives; DO = Ability to recognise decision opportunities; DF = Ability to assess decision fitness; FD = 
Ability to frame a decision; IA = Ability to identify relevant alternatives; DU = Ability to deal with 
uncertainty; II = Ability to integrate information.  
4.2.4 Test Score Distribution & Dimensionality of DAC 
Having selected the items for the main testing, the item analysis also serves to test 
the distribution of test points, examining whether the test and its sub-scales are normally 
distributed. Table 4-19 gives an overview of the descriptive statistics for the calculated 
sum scores of the seven operationalized DAC-dimensions of the pre-testing.  
 
The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test (Massey, 1951) and the more powerful Shapiro-Wilk 
test (Shapiro & Wilk, 1965) are known for being case sensitive (cf. Mason & 
Schuenemeyer, 1983), i.e. they are very sensitive to small variations given the large 
sample group. Thus, the values of skewness and kurtosis (cf. Table 4-19), and graphical 
distributions (cf. Figure 4-14 and Table 4-20) were analysed to examine the distribution of 
the present data. 
Table 4-19 Descriptive statistics of the sum scores of the seven operationalized DAC-dimensions 
DAC-
dimension M SD 
Potential 
range 
Observed 
range Skew Kurtosis 
EO sum score 5.50 2.03 0-7 0-7 -1.31 0.65 
DO sum score 5.97 1.85 0-9 0-9 -0.63 0.28 
DF sum score 5.14 1.52 0-8 1-8 -0.25 -0.08 
FD sum score 3.60 1.80 0-8 0-8 -0.29 -0.59 
IA sum score  5.42 1.59 0-8 0-8 -0.59 0.32 
DU sum score 3.22 1.77 0-8 0-8 0.32 -0.41 
II sum score 4.73 3.12 0-12 0-12 0.68 -0.19 
Note. N = 143; DAC = Decision-analytical competence; skew = skewness; EO = Ability to envision one’s 
objectives; DO = Ability to recognise decision opportunities; DF = Ability to assess decision fitness; FD = 
Ability to frame a decision; IA = Ability to identify relevant alternatives; DU = Ability to deal with 
uncertainty; II = Ability to integrate information. 
 
According to George and Mallery (2011) the values for skewness and kurtosis 
between -1 and +1 are considered very acceptable in order to prove the normal univariate 
distribution for psychometric uses. Even though all dimensions apart from OBJECTIVES 
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show slightly asymmetrical distributions (skew ≠ 0), they are located within the acceptable 
range for normal distribution. The skewness of OBJECTIVES by far exceeds this range. It 
presents a negative value of -1.31 and so reveals that the majority of test participants of 
the pre-testing have reached high scores of this scale. While OPPORTUNITIES, FITNESS, 
ALTERNATIVE, and FRAME present a negative skew as well and thus a longer tail to the left, 
UNCERTAINTY and INFORMATION show a longer tail to the right, i.e. more than fifty per cent 
of test participants have gained less than half of the to-be-reached points of the two 
DAC-dimensions. According to the kurtosis values (kurtosis of a Gaussian distribution = 0) 
OBJECTIVES, OPPORTUNITIES, and ALTERNATIVES have a more peaked distribution and 
FITNESS, FRAME, UNCERTAINTY, and INFORMATION have flatter distributions than a normal 
distribution.  
Figure 4-14 shows the scaled boxplots (M = 0; SD = 1; statistical outliers of two 
standard deviations and more are excluded) of the seven DAC-dimensions after the item 
selection. As the skewness values of OBJECTIVES already suggests, the boxplot of 
OBJECTIVES reinforces a strong asymmetry. The OBJECTIVES-boxplot shows a ceiling effect 
(Cramer & Howitt, 2004, p. 21, [entry “ceiling effect”]), which appears if “the majority of 
values obtained for a variable approach the upper limit of the scale” (Zedec, 2014, p. 38). 
Therefore, the variance within a variable cannot be measured precisely. In the case of 
OBJECTIVES, too many test participants have reached a high score of this DAC-dimension 
and thus, the item(s) do not discriminate well enough.  
 
Note. EO = Ability to envision one’s objectives; DO = Ability to recognise decision opportunities; DF = 
Ability to assess decision fitness; FD = Ability to frame a decision; IA = Ability to identify relevant 
alternatives; DU = Ability to deal with uncertainty; II = Ability to integrate information 
Figure 4-14 Boxplots of the seven scaled DAC-dimensions after item selection (pre-testing) 
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Table 4-20 presents the sum scores with overlaid curves of a normal distribution for 
each DAC-dimension, the overall score and thus, the DAC test point distribution. Also 
here, OBJECTIVES shows an extreme in the area of high scores. Looking at the data of 
OBJECTIVES, on average test participants have generated eight objectives (M = 7.95; SD = 
5.06; Range: 0 – 30). From the master list they have recognised on average 20 objectives 
(M = 19.88; SD = 9.27; Range: 1 - 43) and they have matched on average 32.15% of the 
recognised objectives (SD = 22.05%; Range: 0% - 95.35%) with their self-generated 
objectives. Given these results, it seems as test participants might not put too much effort 
into the generation task. However, Bond and colleagues (2008) admit that a high 
percentage of self-generated objectives of the finally selected objectives might happen if 
test participants “overrate the importance of self-generated objectives” or “notice the 
substantial number of recognized objectives and thus overrate their importance” (p.61). 
Additionally, one adaption that has been made in comparison to the original measuring 
procedure of Bond et al. (2008, 2010) is that the number of objectives, which had to be 
chosen in the last step, was reduced from 10 to seven. This reduction could also have 
caused the ceiling effect, which does not allow variance to be adequately measured 
within the sample group and thus, differentiating between test participants. For this 
reason and to run further analyses on the assumption that the data of the pre-testing is 
normally distributed (cf. lowest plot of right column of Table 4-20), the data of OBJECTIVES 
had to be excluded from the following analyses.  
 
Table 4-20 Histogram of each DAC-dimension and the overall DAC-test score (pre-testing) 
 Histogram of scaled values  Histogram of scaled values 
EO
 
 
DO
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Note. DAC = Decision-analytical competence; EO = Ability to envision one’s objectives (N = 143; M = -
4.44E-16; SD = 1.00); DO = Ability to recognise decision opportunities (N = 135; M = 0.14; SD = 0.83); 
DF = Ability to assess decision fitness (N = 143; M = -1.40E-11; SD = 1.00); FD = Ability to frame a 
decision (N = 143; M = 8.39E-11; SD = 1.00); IA = Ability to identify relevant alternatives (N = 142; M = 
0.2; SD = 0.96); DU = Ability to deal with uncertainty (N = 138; M = -0.09; SD = 0.91); II = Ability to 
integrate information (N = 143; M = 2.45E-10; SD = 1.00); DAC w/o EO = Decision-Analytical 
Competence without ability to envision one’s objectives (N = 130; M = 1.01E-16; SD = 1.00).  
a Statistical outliers of two standard deviations and more are excluded.  
 
As the composition of the sample group was compatible and the display of the 
frequency distribution (cf. lowest plot of right column of Table 4-20) justifies the 
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supposition of a normal distribution, it is assumed that the DAC-prototype scores are 
normally distributed. 
 
Table 4-21 presents bivariate correlations among the six remaining DAC-dimensions. 
They are all positive and range from low65 rp = .21 (among ALTERNATIVES and FITNESS) to 
strong rp = .53 (among INFORMATION and UNCERTAINTY) with a moderate overall mean 
correlation of rp = .32. 
Table 4-21 Pearson correlations (rp) between DAC-test sub-scales 
 DO DF FD IA DU II 
DO 1      
DF 0.27*** 1     
FD 0.22*** 0.43*** 1    
IA 0.28*** 0.21*** 0.33*** 1   
DU 0.30*** 0.32*** 0.34*** 0.29*** 1  
II 0.28*** 0.33*** 0.34*** 0.29*** 0.53*** 1 
Note. DAC = Decision-analytical competence; DO = Ability to recognise decision opportunities; DF = 
Ability to assess decision fitness; FD = Ability to frame a decision; IA = Ability to identify relevant 
alternatives; DU = Ability to deal with uncertainty; II = Ability to integrate information.  
a Mean correlation: rp = .32. 
*Two-sided; *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001. 
 
Another aspect examined for the DAC-prototype, is the dimensionality of the DAC-
test by an exploratory factor analysis (EFA). An EFA with promax rotation66 (factors are 
non-orthogonal and thus related; Gorusch, 1983, p. 203/204) was applied to the six 
DAC-dimensions in order to explore and reveal one or more potential underlying 
constructs. As a result, a one-factor model was obtained (cf. Figure 4-15).  
                                                
65 According to Cohen (1988) to evaluate correlations the following thresholds are set: low correlation " r 
≥ .1, moderate correlation " r ≥ .3, strong correlation " r ≥ .5.  
 
66 “Any of several methods in factor analysis by which the researcher attempts to relate the calculated 
factors to theoretical entities. This is done differently depending upon whether the factors are believed to 
be correlated (oblique) or uncorrelated (orthogonal).” (Vogt, 1993, p. 91) 
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Figure 4-15 Parallel analysis screen plots for the data of the pre-testing 
 
The one-factor solution explains 29% of the variance of the pre-testing data. All of its 
loadings meet the cut-off of λ ≥ .30 (Hair, Tatham, Anderson, & Black, 1998, p. 112) and 
are presented in Table 4-22. Respectively to Tabachnick and Fidell's (2007) and Comrey 
and Lee's (1992) distinction of cut-offs for factor loadings, four of the six dimensions show 
good (λ ≥ .55) or very good (λ ≥ .63) fit. According to these results, it appears reasonable 
that an underlying general ability of DAC creates a moderate percentage of performance 
variance. 
Table 4-22 Loadings for the EFA one-factor DAC model (pre-testing) 
DAC-dimension  Loadings of one-factor model  
II .66 
DU .62 
FD .57 
DF .55 
IA .45 
DO .36 
Eigenvalue 1.76 
Variance explained  29% 
Note. EFA = Exploratory factor analysis; DAC = Decision-analytical competence; DO = Ability to 
recognise decision opportunities; DF = Ability to assess decision fitness; FD = Ability to frame a decision; 
IA = Ability to identify relevant alternatives; DU = Ability to deal with uncertainty; II = Ability to integrate 
information.  
 
Cronbach’s alpha of the six DAC-dimensions’ sum scores accounted for α = .72. 
Thus, the threshold of .70 for Cronbach’s alpha (cf. Bland & Altman, 1997; Nunnally et al., 
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1978; Schmitt, 1996) was met in the pre-testing for the DAC-test, which is composed of 
the sum scores of the six DAC-dimensions. 
4.2.5 Interpretations of the Findings of the Pre-Testing 
As presented by Table 4-18, none of the DAC-dimensions except INFORMATION 
meets the desired threshold for Cronbach’s alpha of .70. Before this sub-section 
discusses what that means for the five remaining dimensions, it presents potential 
reasons for these reliability results and outlines how to proceed, followed by a short 
discourse on the reliability coefficient and its minimally acceptable value for scale 
development.  
 
It is rather surprising that the technical literature provides only a small number of 
recommendations on a sufficient threshold for Cronbach’s alpha. However, these 
recommendations do have two things in common: “they indicate that the required degree 
of reliability is a function of the research purpose, whether the research is exploratory, 
applied, or so forth ... [and they all miss] an empirical basis, a theoretical justification, or 
an analytical rationale.” (R. A. Peterson, 1994, p. 381). So, Nunnally (1967) postulates a 
Cronbach’s alpha between .50 and .60 as being within the minimal acceptable range for 
preliminary research. Eleven years later, Nunnally, Bernstein, and ten Berge (1978) 
recommend a minimal threshold of .70 without giving an explanation for the increase of 
the targeted value. Now, the threshold of .70 is widely accepted in various research fields 
such as business, education, psychology (R. A. Peterson, 1994). Thus, it is also applied 
to the present research.  
 
While Cronbach’s alpha greater than .70 is taken as a checkpoint in the scale 
construction phase, lower values lead to further analyses. The received low Cronbach’s 
alphas of the pre-testing entailed the following three considerations:  
First, “[t]heoretically, the larger the number of items in a scale, the more reliable will 
be the scale.” (R. A. Peterson, 1994, p. 389) Especially for scales with less than 10 items, 
Cronbach’s alpha is sensitive to the number of items (e.g. Eid & Schmidt, 2014, Nunnally, 
1978). That could be one reason why, even though items with poor statitistical properties 
have been excluded due to the item analysis, the five DAC-dimensions with fewer than 10 
items - all but INFORMATION – end up with relatively low Cronbach’s alphas.  
Second, if a scale aims to capture a complex construct it is difficult to reach high 
values for Cronbach’s alpha (Krüger, Parchmann, & Schecker, 2013). In comparison, 
according to Schmitts (1996) a low Cronbach’s alpha does not have to be a reason for 
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dropping a scale: “When a measure has other desirable properties, such as meaningful 
content coverage of some domain and reasonable unidimensionality, this low reliability 
[(Schmitt talks about a Cronbach’s alpha of .49)] may not be a major impediment to its 
use”. (p. 351/352) Thus, the underlying conceptual complexity of some DAC-dimensions, 
as for instance FRAME (cf. sub-section 4.1.4) could have led to low internal consistency.  
Third, if a scale’s reliability coefficient cannot be increased by deleting items based on 
the item analysis, the items’ interrelatedness has to be examined by an EFA to investigate 
the scale’s dimensionality (e.g. Schmitt, 1996). 
 
The first consideration was present during the data analysis of the pre-testing. 
However, due to the test volume, which was to be kept as short as possible, raising the 
number of items for each of the five DAC-dimensions with medium or low Cronbach’s 
alphas, was not an option; particularly not because this would be contrary to the classical 
meaning of analysing a scale’s reliability by Cronbach’s alpha.  
For the second consideration, the five DAC-dimensions with medium or low 
Cronbach’s alpha values were examined carefully by the research team – comparing its 
theoretical content and the methodological coverage of this content. All scales were 
considered as fitting. This conclusion represented the first doubts about the data quality 
of the pre-testing. The test volume with both cases and the reported decreasing 
motivation and concentration of some test participants (cf. sub-section 4.2.1) reinfornced 
the suspicion that not all test participants gave their best to take the test, especially not in 
the second case – the EDU case (cf. sub-section 4.2.1). As those DAC-dimensions show 
the lowest alpha (FITNESS with α =. 33 and ALTERNATIVES with α =. 44), with the smallest 
answer option set, it has to be questioned whether some test participants might have just 
guessed.  
According to the third consideration and the suspicion that the quality of data of the 
pre-testing might show weak points, it was decided to keep all DAC-prototype sub-scales 
for the main testing. By approaching a more homogeneuos sample group and setting 
financial incentives (cf. sub-section 3.3.3), an attempt was made to ensure data quality for 
the main testing. If the values for Cronbach’s alpha turned out to be similar to the values 
of the pre-testing, then the dimensionality of the scales would be examined by 
confirmatory factor analyses (CFA). In that case, other measures for reliability have to be 
found (cf. Table 5-9, sub-sections 6.1.1, 6.1.2, and section 6.2).  
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4.2.6 Changes to the Test Procedure for the Main Testing 
Besides the reduction of items with poor statistical properties (cf. sub-section 4.2.3), 
the pre-testing also helped to reveal potential sources of error, and thus to improve the 
measuring procedure. In this context, the participants in the main testing received the 
following instructions at the beginning of the test: 
! Please make sure to follow all test instructions precisely.  
! The test will take approx. 1.5 hours to complete. So please allow yourself 
enough time and answer each item with consideration and very thoroughly.  
! If you take a break, please leave the browser window open. If you close it, you 
will have to start over again.  
! You cannot go back in the test. If you press enter the system will guide you to 
the next page.  
 
After the verbal feedback of colleagues and some test participants that displaying a 
graphical progress indicator would enable test participants to track their progress during 
the test and thereby support them, the question arose as to how helpful such a tool 
would be. As studies have shown that such an indicator tends to be effective only for 
short surveys (e.g. Couper, Traugott, & Lamias, 2001; Heerwegh & Loosveldt, 2006) and 
in “long surveys they may be more discouraging than encouraging” (Dillman et al., 2014, 
p. 326), the idea of implementing a graphical progress indicator was discarded. 
 
According to the operationalization of the seven DAC-dimensions three adaptions 
were made: 
OBJECTIVES: As a consequence of the observed ceiling effect concerning OBJECTIVES, 
the number of objectives to be selected in the last step of the item instruction (cf. sub-
chapter 4.1.1) was increased from seven to 10 objectives.  
FRAME: To ensure that all test participants are able to understand what is meant by 
the presented descriptions/terms of the instruction for FRAME (cf. sub-chapter 4.1.4), and 
thus grasp the descriptions’ meaning in the decision-making context, term definitions 
were added. Figure 4-16 shows the definitions of the descriptions, which are provided by 
manoeuvring the cursor over the underlined comment cf. definitions at the end of the 
item instruction. 
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Figure 4-16 Added definitions for decision-analytical terms requested for FRAME 
 
UNCERTAINTY: In order to create fair initial conditions regarding solving the sixth item 
of UNCERTAINTY (cf. sub-section 4.1.6), a definition of expected value is presented to 
support those test participants who do not know the term from previous education or 
working experience. Figure 4-17 shows the definition which appears by moving the cursor 
over the underlined comment cf. definitions at the end of the item instruction. 
 
Figure 4-17 Added definition for expected values requested for the sixth item of UNCERTAINTY 
4.2.7 The DAC-Test Version for the Main Testing 
Once the item and distributional analyses were concluded, the final version of the 
DAC-test was assembled. It contains 16 various item types for operationalizing seven 
different dimensions of DAC. Hence, three item types have been deleted (two items of 
UNCERTAINTY and one item of INFORMATION). The overall item number was cut from 70 to 
63 items, as items with poor statistical properties (pi < .2 and/or rit < .2) were excluded as 
well. The calculated parameter for internal consistency, Cronbach’s alpha, ranged from α 
= .33 (poor fit) to α = .85 (good fit). However, Cronbach’s alpha of the complete DAC-
scale (without taking into account OBJECTIVES) ended up at α = .72, which met the goal 
for creating a new measure (e.g. Bland & Altman, 1997).  
According to the values of skewness and kurtosis and the graphical display of the 
dimensional distributions and the overall DAC-score distribution, a normal distribution of 
the DAC-prototype for the present data is assumed. The results of a Pearson correlation 
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present a moderate inter-dimensional correlation of rP = .32 and the output of an EFA 
shows a one-factor solution, which explains 29% of the variance. 
 
Chapter 5 is devoted to the analysis of goodness criteria for the final DAC-test. While 
sub-section 5.1 presents the chosen criteria of validation including the selected scales, 
sub-section 5.2 shows the results of the empirical control (cf. sub-section 3.2.4).  
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5 ANALYSING GOODNESS CRITERIA OF THE DAC-TEST  
The pre-testing served to revise the prototype of the DAC-test, to review its test 
score distribution and dimensionality, and to inspect the testing procedure. The resulting 
final version of the DAC-test was prepared for the main testing to analyse the test’s 
quality criteria.  
Section 5.1 gives an overview of the selected criteria for validation, which have been 
applied to examine the DAC-test’s validity. Therefore, sub-sections 5.1.1 to 5.1.6 
introduce six psychological constructs. In sub-section 5.1.7 the obtained socio-
demographic variables are presented and, for the sake of completeness, a short 
summary of the pre-tested and rejected criteria for validation is given in sub-section 5.1.8. 
Section 5.2 presents the results of the empirical control. Sub-section 5.2.1 shows 
the socio-demographic statistics of the main testing and sub-section 5.2.2 discusses the 
test score distribution and examines reliability and the dimensionality of the DAC-
dimensions. While sub-section 5.2.3 presents the results of the dimensionality and 
reliability analyses of the DAC-test as a whole, sub-section 5.2.4 describes the findings of 
the validity analyses. Finally, sub-section 5.2.5 argues the parameters for objectivity.  
5.1 CRITERIA FOR VALIDATION 
Validity is one of the main goodness criteria for psychometric tests. “[It] is 
represented in the agreement between two attempts to measure the same trait through 
maximally different methods” (Campbell & Fiske, 1959, p. 83). As mentioned in sub-
section 3.2.4, in modern validity theory construct validity dominates other types of validity 
concepts (e.g. Messick, 1995). For the present research, a correlational approach was 
chosen to empirically analyse the construct validity of the DAC-test. In this context, 
Campbell and Fiske (1959) underline examining both sub-types of construct validity: 
convergent validity and discriminant validity67. Therefore, the overall DAC-test score was 
correlated with the test scores of other theoretically related and unrelated constructs. 
These constructs and the corresponding selected scales, which build the validation 
criteria of this research, are presented in sub-sections 5.1.1 - 5.1.6. Each construct is 
introduced by its definition, followed by the assumed and to-be-tested theoretical 
hypothesis about the correlation with DAC. Furthermore, the chosen scale, applied for the 
main testing with its statistical properties, is quoted. 
                                                
67 While convergent validity applies to the level to which two measures, which are theoretically supposed 
to be related, are de facto related, the latter type of validity refers to the degree to which two measures, 
which are theoretically supposed to be unrelated, are effectively unrelated (e.g. Campbell & Fiske, 1959). 
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5.1.1 Decision Self-Esteem 
Definition of construct  
The construct of general self-esteem refers to the positive or negative evaluation of 
the self-concept (e.g. Rosenberg, 1979; Smith & Mackie, 2007), or in other words to the 
self-assessment of the worth as a person (e.g. MacDonald & Leary, 2012).  
“Importantly, self-esteem does not necessarily reflect a person’s objective talents and 
abilities, or even how a person is evaluated by others” (Orth & Robins, 2014, p. 381). The 
construct involves feelings of confidence and self-acceptance. Regarding decision self-
esteem, the term alludes to self-confidence and self-reliance in one’s competences to 
successfully solve decision problems.  
Theoretical hypothesis about correlation with DAC 
“[T]he fact that self-esteem is related to the frequency with which different decision 
patterns [vigilance, buck-passing, procrastination, and hypervigilance (cf. Mann et al., 
1997)] are used (the higher the self-esteem, the less the tendency towards buck-passing 
and procrastination)” (Sáez de Heredia, Arocena, & Gárate, 2004, p. 116), and findings on 
the positive correlation of life satisfaction and decision self-esteem (Deniz, 2006) support 
the hypothesis that a sound style of decision-making referring to DAC positively correlates 
with decision self-esteem: hence, a significant positive correlation is expected between 
the final score of the DAC-test and decision self-esteem.  
Chosen scale and statistical properties 
The Melbourne Decision Making Questionnaire I (henceforth: MDMQ-I; (Burnett, 
Mann, & Beswick, 1989; Mann, 1982; Mann et al., 1998) is one of the most frequently 
applied measures for self-esteem in decision science (e.g. Deniz, 2006; Sáez de Heredia 
et al., 2004) aiming to determine decision-makers’ level of self-esteem according to their 
DMC (e.g. “I think that I am a good decision maker”). The self-rating measure consists of 
six items, which are graded by assigning numerical values of 1 (not true for me), 2 
(sometimes true), or 3 (true for me). Three of the six items are reversed items that are 
negatively-keyed. After recoding these three items, higher values indicate a higher level of 
decision self-esteem. Cronbach’s alpha of this measure was found to be .74 (Mann et al., 
1998). Appendix sub-section 9.11.1 presents the MDMQ-I.  
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5.1.2 Decision-Making Style 
Definition of construct 
Scott and Bruce define decision-making style as “the learned habitual response 
pattern exhibited by an individual when confronted with a decision situation. It is not a 
personality trait, but a habit-based propensity to react in a certain way in a specific 
decision context” (1995, p. 820). The term is often used in contrast with the term 
cognitive style (e.g. Thunholm, 2004), which refers to thinking methods applying to 
decision-making processes (e.g. Hunt et al., 1989). In the framework of the conflict 
theory of decision-making by Janis and Mann (1977), the term decision-making style 
refers to decision-coping patterns (unconflicted adherence, unconflicted change, 
defensive avoidance, hypervigilance, and vigilance) that were identified. 
Theoretical hypothesis about correlation with DAC 
As the vigilant “decision maker clarifies objectives to be achieved by the decision, 
canvasses an array of alternatives, searching painstakingly for relevant information, 
assimilates information in an unbiased manner, and evaluates carefully before making a 
choice ... [and as] vigilance is the only coping pattern that allows sound and rational 
decision making” (Mann et al., 1997, p. 2), it is assumed for this research that this style of 
decision-making is related to better DAC-test scores. Conversely, other decision-making 
styles should be related to lower DAC-test scores.  
Chosen scale and statistical properties 
The Melbourne Decision Making Questionnaire II (henceforth: MDMQ-II; Mann et al., 
1997) was chosen to capture test participants’ decision-making style. The MDMQ-II is the 
revised version of the Flinders Decision Making Questionnaire (Mann, 1982) and 
consists of 22 items measuring the tendencies to vigilance (items 1-6, e.g. “When 
making decisions I like to collect a lot of information”), buck-passing (items 7-12, e.g. “I 
do not make decisions unless I really have to”), procrastination (items 13-17, e.g. “When I 
have to make a decision I wait a long time before starting to think about it.”), and 
hypervigilance (items 18-22, e.g. “The possibility that some small thing might go wrong 
causes me to swing abruptly in my preference.”). Like in the MDMQ-I, its response set 
contains three options; 2-true for me, 1-sometimes true, 0-not true for me. Higher scores 
refer to a higher accordance of the decision coping pattern. The four sub-scales of 
MDMQ-II show internal consistency coefficients of α = .80 (vigilance), α = .87 (buck-
MEASURING DECISION-ANALYTICAL COMPETENCE - A PSYCHOMETRIC ONLINE PERFORMANCE TEST 
 
 136 
passing), α = .81 (procrastination), and α = .74 (hypervigilance) (Mann et al., 1998). The 
items and the instruction for the MDMQ-II are presented in appendix sub-section 9.11.2.  
5.1.3 Decision Satisfaction  
Definition of construct  
Decision satisfaction refers to a cognitive process of judgement whereby decision-
makers assess the quality and/or accuracy of their decision after completing the decision-
making process. It is an attempt to evaluate the quality of a decision post-decision 
(Sainfort & Booske, 2000), according to individual decision criteria. In the case of the 
present study, decision satisfaction describes the assessment of the latest complex 
decision situation that has been experienced. 
Theoretical hypothesis about correlation with DAC 
Given the assumption that a sound decision process, i.e. an accurately carried out 
decision according to decision-analytical guidelines, contributes to a good decision and 
enhances the chances of achieving a desired outcome (e.g. Hammond et al., 1999; Keren 
& Bruine de Bruin, 2003; Larrick et al., 1993), it is presumed that persons who reach 
higher scores in the DAC-test are more satisfied with a recently made decision than 
persons achieving a lower DAC-test score. Thus, a significant positive correlation of 
satisfaction with the latest made complex decision and DAC is expected.  
Chosen scale and statistical properties 
To measure decision satisfaction the Satisfaction with Decision Scale (henceforth: 
SwD) of Holmes-Rovner et al. (1996) was used. The SwD is based on the conceptual 
model of an effective decision of O’Connor and O’Brien-Pallas (1989), which, for instance, 
assumes that the decision-maker is well informed or that the decision is consistent with 
the decision-maker’s objectives. The main aim of the SwD is “to measure global 
satisfaction with the decision” (Holmes-Rovner et al., 1996, p. 58). The scale consists of 
six items, e.g. “The decision I made was the best decision possible for me personally”, 
and a five-step response set ranging from strongly disagree, disagree, neither agree nor 
disagree, agree, to strongly disagree. High scores of the SwD refer to a high satisfaction 
with one’s decisions. Cronbach’s alpha of the SwD was found at α =.86 (Holmes-Rovner 
et al., 1996). 
As the SwD was developed to assess patient satisfaction with health care decisions, 
the instruction had to be slightly adapted relating to the latest complex decision that the 
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person has made. The adjusted instruction and the SwD are presented in sub-section 
9.11.3 of the appendix.  
5.1.4 Intolerance of Uncertainty  
Definition of construct  
“Intolerance of uncertainty may be deﬁned as the excessive tendency of an 
individual to consider it unacceptable that a negative event may occur, however small the 
probability of its occurrence” (Buhr & Dugas, 2002, p. 932). It describes that people who 
experience problems in tolerating uncertainty perceive various aspects of life as intolerable 
due to the presence of risk, uncertainty, and ambiguity in daily situations. “Intolerance of 
uncertainty can be seen as a filter through which individuals view their environment”, 
explain Buhr and Dugas (2002, p. 933).  
Theoretical hypothesis about correlation with DAC 
Dugas and Robichaud (2012) describe three thinking processes that might appear 
when individuals, intolerant of uncertainty, are facing uncertainty in decision situations. In 
comparison to individuals who tolerate uncertainty, these people: (1) perceive the 
ambiguous situation as more threatening, (2) need more information before making a 
decision, and (3) feel less confident making a decision. “It could, thus, be argued that 
[intolerance of] uncertainty ... represents procrastination of action until sufficient 
information is obtained, or of decision-making due to a lack of confidence” (Birrell, 
Meares, Wilkinson, & Freeston, 2011, p. 1205). As complex decisions are described as 
uncertain and as the DAC-test aims to capture UNCERTAINTY, it could be assumed that 
people who do not tolerate uncertainty (e.g. J. E. Matheson & Howard, 1968), perform 
worse in sound decision-making assessed by the DAC-test. Thus, for this Ph.D. research 
a negative correlation is expected between the measure of intolerance of uncertainty and 
the DAC-test score.  
Chosen scale and statistical properties  
To capture test participants’ intolerance of uncertainty, the Intolerance of Uncertainty 
Scale (henceforth: IoU) of Buhr and Dugas (2002) was selected. “The original French 
version of the IoU was developed to assess emotional, cognitive, and behavioral reactions 
to ambiguous situations, implications of being uncertain, and attempts to control the 
future” (Buhr & Dugas, 2002, p. 934). The corresponding English measure of Buhr and 
Dugas (2002) consists of 27 items with a five-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (not at all 
characteristic of me) to 5 (entirely characteristic of me). A promax-rotated principal-factor 
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analysis had identified four moderately correlated factors (λ [.42; .69], ps < .001), which 
capture: uncertainty leads to the inability to act, uncertainty is stressful and upsetting, 
unexpected events are negative and should be avoided, being uncertain about the 
future is unfair. The correlation with the IoU overall score varies from rP = .82 to rP = .94 (p 
< .001). For the present study, the sub-scale uncertainty leads to the inability to act was 
chosen to measure the decision relevant aspect of intolerance of uncertainty, e.g. “When I 
am uncertain, I can’t go forward”. Its Cronbach’s alpha was found to be α = .87. The 
eight items of the sub-scale and the scale instruction are presented in sub-section 9.11.4 
of the appendix. High scores of the IoU sub-scale refer to a high degree of IoU.  
5.1.5 Fluid Intelligence  
Definition of construct  
Fluid intelligence is a factor of general intelligence, which was established by 
Cattell (1963, 1987) and Horn (1985). It describes the ability to think logically and solve 
problems. It captures inductive and deductive thinking, independent of the acquired 
knowledge. The construct is correlated with success factors in areas like education (e.g. 
Kuncel, Hezlett, & Ones, 2004; Kunina, Wilhelm, Formazin, Jonkmann, & Schroeders, 
2007) and career (e.g. Hunter & Hunter, 1984; Ng, Eby, Sorensen, & Feldman, 2005; 
Salgado et al., 2003). 
Theoretical hypothesis about correlation with DAC 
As analytical decision-making captured by the DAC-test is defined as a quantitative 
and logical procedure to solve decision problems - a procedure that allows the “logical 
balancing of the factors that influence a decision” (Howard, 1973, p. 64), a positive 
correlation of a measure for fluid intelligence and the DAC-test score is expected here. 
Comparably, Bruine de Bruin and colleagues (2007) have found a significant positive 
correlation of their A-DMC test and Raven’s standard progressive matrices (Raven, 
Raven, & Court, 2003) of rP = .61 (p < .001).  
Chosen scale and statistical properties  
Raven’s standard progressive matrices are often applied to measure fluid intelligence 
(e.g. Fry & Hale, 1996; Hayashi, Kato, Igarashi, & Kashima, 2008). However, for the 
present study a less time consuming, online, and open access scale had to be found as 
the overall length of the testing procedure, including the DAC-test and its validation 
criteria, was intended to be kept as short as possible to reduce test participants’ 
workload. Thus, the short version of the Hagen Matrices Test (henceforth: HMT-S; 
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Heydasch, Haubrich, & Renner, 2013) was chosen. It intends to measure fluid reasoning 
and more specifically, induction as the core aspect of fluid intelligence (cf. Schneider & 
McGrew, 2012). The HMT-S consists of six matrices with an internal consistency of α = 
.64 and a correlation of rP = .49 (p < .001) with the Intelligenz-Struktur-Test 2000R 
(Liepmann, Beauducel, Brocke, & Amthauer, 2007; [engl: inteligence-structure-test]). In 
the present study the Cronbach’s alpha was found at α = .70. On average it takes nine 
minutes to complete the HMT-S. Performance is measured by the number of matrices 
answered correctly. Appendix sub-section 9.11.5 presents the instruction and an 
example matrix of the HMT-S. 
5.1.6 Problem-Solving Competence  
Definition of construct  
“Problem solving is a process in which we perceive and resolve a gap between a 
present situation and a desired goal. ... In general, the situation is one not previously 
encountered, or where at least a specific solution from past experiences is not known.” 
(Huitt, 1992, p. 34) In comparison to reasoning, problem-solving competence focuses 
on the “experimental interactions with the environment to clarify the nature of a problem 
and potential solutions” (Raven, 2000, p. 54). Therefore, the task environment is dynamic 
and some of the corresponding “regularities can only be revealed by successful 
exploration and integration of the information gained in that process” (Axel Buchner in 
Frensch & Funke, 1995, p. 14). In this framework, problem-solving competence describes 
the ability to observe and examine the variables of a situation, in which the status quo and 
the desired goal differ, and to develop a strategy to move towards achieving the defined 
goal.  
Theoretical hypothesis about correlation with DAC 
“The steps in both problem solving and decision making are quite similar. In fact, the 
terms are sometimes used interchangeably” (Huitt, 1992, p. 34). In the present research, 
the term DAC refers to the cognitive and motivational steps of the decision-making 
process and omits its voluntary phase (cf. sub-section 2.4.3). Thus, DAC measured by its 
corresponding test is seen as one part of the general problem-solving process, which 
starts with an input phase and ends with the implementation and reviewing phase (e.g. 
Bransford & Stein, 1984). Inferentially, a positive correlation is expected between 
participants’ DAC-test score with the measure for problem-solving competence for this 
research.  
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Chosen scale and statistical properties 
To capture problem-solving competence an online version of the Tower of Hanoi 
(henceforth: ToH) has been selected. The puzzle developed by the French mathematician 
Èdouard Lucas in 1883 (Hinz, 1992) has been used in experimental settings for decades 
(e.g. Anderson & Douglass, 2001; H. J. Bell, 2004; Schiff & Vakil, 2015; Vernon & 
Strudensky, 1988).  
For the present study the chosen ToH version consists of four rings with different 
sizes and three rods. All rings are placed on the rod in the middle. The main aim of the 
task is to move all rings to one of the other rods in as few moves as possible. At the end 
the rings have to be sorted by size; starting with the largest ring at the bottom. 
Performance is measured by the number of total moves – the fewer moves the better. 
The task instruction and an exemplification are presented in sub-section 9.11.6 of the 
appendix.  
5.1.7 Socio-Demographic Variables  
Additional to the validation criteria presented in sub-sections 5.1.1 to 5.1.6, age, 
grade point average, and average mark in maths as socio-demographic variables have 
been surveyed.  
Age 
Previous studies on age-related differences of behavioural DMC reveal mixed results 
(cf. Bruine de Bruin et al., 2012; Hanoch, Wood, & Rice, 2007; Peters, Hess, Västfjäll, & 
Auman, 2007): Some decision-making abilities seem to increase with age, such as 
resisting the influence of irrelevant alternatives (e.g. Kim & Hasher, 2005; Tentori, 
Osherson, Hasher, & May, 2001). Other skills seem to decrease with age, such as the 
application of decision rules (cf. Bruine de Bruin et al., 2007). And yet other tasks, such as 
resisting to framing effects, show ambiguous results in various studies (cf. Finucane, 
Mertz, Slovic, & Schmidt, 2005 v. Rönnlund, Karlsson, Laggnäs, Larsson, & Lindström, 
2005).  
In general, behavioural decision science scholars conjecture that the decision-making 
performance of older adults depends on a decision-making task’s underlying required 
cognitive ability. While fluid cognitive skills begin to weaken in the early 20s (e.g. Park et 
al., 2002; Salthouse, 2004), crystallized cognitive abilities profit from life experiences that 
come with age (e.g. Neubauer, 2005). Also, emotion-related abilities, such as emotion 
regulation (e.g. Mather & Carstensen, 2003) and recognising emotional states (e.g. 
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Labouvie-Vief, DeVoe, & Bulka, 1989), show evolvement over the lifespan (e.g. 
Forstmeier, Uhlendorff, & Maercker, 2005).  
So far, previous studies have mostly compared age groups that reflect different 
stages of psychological development (cf. Erikson, 1959); ranging from adolescence or 
early adulthood to maturity (e.g. Bruine de Bruin et al., 2007, 2012). The present study in 
contrast focuses on the age group of young adults between 18 and 30 years and thus 
explores the potential age-related variations within one phase of psychological 
development.  
Given the mixed study results of age-related performances on decision-making tasks, 
the variety of required decision tasks presented by the DAC-test (cf. section 4.1), and the 
relatively tight-scoped age range of the sample group of the present study (cf. sub-
section 3.3.1, it is presumed that age and the DAC-test performance do not significantly 
correlate.  
Grade point average 
Several studies have shown correlations between DMC and various measures of 
intelligence-related aspects as e.g. fluid intelligence and numeracy (cf. Bruine de Bruin et 
al., 2007; Del Missier, Mäntylä, & Bruine de Bruin, 2010; Dieckmann, 2008), crystalline 
intelligence (Bruine de Bruin et al., 2007; Finucane & Gullion, 2010), or specialised 
knowledge (Stanovich, 2009; cf. Stanovich & West, 2008). As intelligence in general is 
considered a key predictor for academic success (cf. Neisser et al., 1996) within this 
study a positive correlation between the grade point average of study participants and the 
DAC-test score is assumed. 
Average mark in maths 
Numeracy, which describes “the ability to understand and work with numbers” 
(Oxford Dictionary Online, n.d., [entry “numeracy”]) has been identified as an influencing 
factor to decision making (cf. Peters et al., 2006; Reyna, Nelson, Han, & Dieckmann, 
2009). Thus, it is expected that the average mark in maths correlates positively with DAC 
in general, but especially with those DAC-dimensions that rely on numeracy such as 
UNCERTAINTY (cf. sub-section 4.1.6).  
5.1.8 Pre-tested & Rejected Criteria for Validation 
Besides the above listed validation criteria, other potentially relevant constructs have 
been considered and corresponding scales have been surveyed and analysed in the pre-
testing. However, the Generalised Self-Efficacy Scale of Schwarzer and Jerusalem (1995), 
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the Satisfaction with Life Scale of Diener, Emmons, Larsen, and Griffin (1985), and the 
Decision Outcome Inventory (Bruine de Bruin et al., 2007) were tested and rejected as 
having no significant correlation; neither with the overall DAC-test score nor with any of 
the DAC-dimensions. Also, the rejection served to reduce study participants’ workload for 
the main testing.  
 
The following section presents the results of the main testing and thus, shows how 
the finally selected validation criteria perform.  
5.2 RESULTS OF THE EMPIRICAL CONTROL  
The DAC-test, which was adapted after the pre-testing (cf. section 4.2) and is 
presented in appendix section 9.8, and the criteria for validation introduced in section 5.1 
were surveyed in the main testing phase of the present Ph.D. research 
The results of the so-called empirical control, which serves to analyse the goodness 
criteria of the developed DAC-test, are presented in the following sub-sections. While 
sub-section 5.2.1 gives an overview of the socio-demographics of this main study, sub-
section 5.2.2 discusses the test score distributions and examines the dimensionality of 
the sub-scales of the DAC-test, and in sub-section 5.2.3 the dimensionality of the 
construct and its internal consistency is analysed. Sub-section 5.2.4 reveals the results of 
the test’s validation and sub-section 5.2.5 reviews the arguments for the test’s objectivity.  
5.2.1 Socio-Demographics of the Main Testing 
In 2015, the sample group for the main testing (cf. corresponding to the criteria for 
the target group in sub-section 3.3.1) was acquired through five institutions: volunteers of 
the acquisition list for study participants of the Max Planck Institute of Human 
Development in Berlin, a group of students taking the “Judgement and Decision Making 
for Management” summer school course at the London School of Economics and 
Political Science, students of “Industrial and Systems Engineering” course at Virginia 
Tech, voluntary students of the social and psychological department at Free University of 
Berlin, and voluntary students of the management department of University of Bayreuth.  
Overall, 455 people did participate in the main study of the present research. 368 of 
these were selected for the statistical analyses. According to the pre-testing, three 
selection criteria caused this reduction to 80.9% of the total sample: (1) participants 
younger than 18 or older than 30 years, (2) participants with English skills that were self-
MEASURING DECISION-ANALYTICAL COMPETENCE - A PSYCHOMETRIC ONLINE PERFORMANCE TEST 
 
 143 
rated as “basic English knowledge”, and (3) test processing times shorter than 20min68 
and longer than 3h.  
The percentage distribution of study participants by their acquisition source is 
presented in Table 5-1. Twenty eight (7.6%) test participants were sent from the 
University of Bayreuth, 37 (10.1%) came from Free University of Berlin, 63 (17.1%) 
students came Virginia Tech, 66 (17.9%) students were from the London School of 
Economics and Political Science, 80 (21.7%) were contacted via the mailing list of the 
Max Planck Institute for Human Development, and 94 (25.5%) persons came from 
multiple other sources, such as former students of the Free University of Berlin and 
Humboldt University of Berlin, who had heard about the test or colleagues and friends of 
the research group.  
 
Table 5-1 Distribution by source of acquisition of the main testing sample 
Source Frequency % 
UB 28 7.6 
FU 37 10.1 
VT 63 17.1 
LSE 66 17.9 
MPI 80 21.7 
Misc. 94 25.5 
Total 368 100.0 
 
Note. UB = University of Bayreuth; FU = Free University of Berlin; VT = Virginia Tech; LSE = London 
School of Economics and Political Science; MPI = Max Planck Institute for Human Development Berlin, 
Misc. = miscellaneous.  
 
The mean age of the sample group was 24 years (M = 23.75; SD = 3.41; Range = 
18-30). About 49.7% of the 364 test participants69 assessed their English skills as 
“mother tongue” or “very good/business fluent” (cf. Table 5-2). The remaining 50.3% saw 
their language skills as “good/conversant” or “fluent”. 
  
                                                
68 In contrast to the pre-testing, data sets with processing times between 20min and 30min were kept for 
the statistical analyses as they showed proper results in terms of DAC-test performance – results better 
than the probability of guessing the answers correctly. The achieved performance in the DAC-test is 
treated as an indicator for thoroughness of participation.  
69 Data contains four missing data sets.  
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Table 5-2 Frequencies of self-assessed English skills of the main testing sample 
English level Frequency % Valid % 
Good/conversant 55 14.9 15.1 
Fluent 128 34.8 35.2 
Very good/business fluent 113 30.7 31.0 
Mother tongue 68 18.5 18.7 
NA 4 1.1  
Total 368 100.0  
Note. NA = missing data/not available. 
 
Three hundred and sixty six individuals of the study participants (99.5%) specified 
their gender: One hundred and seventy four (47.5%) of the sample group were male and 
192 (52.5%) were female.  
Of the main testing sample group, 152 participants (41.3%) received a financial 
incentive of €15.00. The remaining 216 participants (58.7%) were not paid and 
participated either voluntarily or because the DAC-test was presented as part of an 
academic course they took at that time.  
 
The greatest national group of the main study were Germans with 52.9%, followed 
by Americans with 16.4%, Indians with 7.4%, Chinese with 3.8%, Polish with 1.6%, and 
British and South-Korean each with 1.4% of the valid data (365 test participants, cf. Table 
5-3).  
Table 5-3 Distribution by nation of the main testing sample 
Nationality Frequency % Valid % 
German 193 52.4 52.9 
American 60 16.3 16.4 
Indian 27 7.3 7.4 
Chinese 14 3.8 3.8 
Polish 6 1.6 1.6 
British 5 1.4 1.4 
South-Korean 5 1.4 1.4 
Misc. 55 14.9 15.0 
NA 3 0.8  
Total 368 100.0  
Note. Misc. = miscellaneous; NA = missing data/not available; National groups consisting of less than 
three individuals have been summarised under misc.  
 
The average processing time of the main testing for taking the DAC-test and 
responding to the criteria for validation averaged out at 97 minutes (cf. Table 5-4). 
Completing only the case study test, participants took around 73 minutes.  
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Table 5-4 Processing times (main testing) 
Processing time... N Min  Max M SD Mdn IQR 
...for the case  368 16 162 73.12 29.85 65.82 
31.44 
- 
81.47 
...for the case and 
criteria of validity  368 22 178 97.33 33.17 85.94 
39.43 
- 
128.17 
 
How the sample group of the main testing stated their highest educational level is 
presented by Table 5-5: Out of the 358 test participants who specified this information, 
1.4% indicated not holding any school leaving certificate. Thirteen point four per cent 
gained a certificate after nine or 10 years of school education, 33.5% hold a university-
entrance diploma, 35.2 have completed their Bachelor studies, 14.8% their Diploma or 
Master studies, and 1.7% hold a doctoral degree.  
 
Table 5-5 Distribution by degree of education of the main testing sample 
Educational certificate Frequency % Valid % 
No school leaving certificate 5 1.4 1.4 
Certificate after nine or 10 years 
of school education 48 13.0 13.4 
University-entrance diploma 120 32.6 33.5 
Bachelor’s degree 126 34.2 35.2 
Diploma or Master’s degree 53 14.4 14.8 
Ph.D. 6 1.6 1.7 
NA 10 2.7  
Total 368 100.0  
Note. NA = missing data/not available. 
 
Table 5-6 shows how test participants of the main testing have answered the item 
“What is your former, current or intended profession? Which field does it belong to?”: The 
four largest groups of the 323 test participants who stated this information come from 
Business and Financial Operations Occupations with 21.1%, from Architecture and 
Engineering Occupations with 16.4%, from Life, Physical, and Social Science 
Occupations with 10.5%, and from Healthcare Support Occupations with 10.2%.  
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Table 5-6 Distribution by former, current or intended profession of the main testing sample 
Note. NA = missing data/not available. 
5.2.2 Test Score Distribution, Reliability, & Dimensionality of the DAC-Dimensions 
A basic condition for running specific statistical analyses with interval and ratio scaled 
data is the normal distribution of the test data set. To investigate for normality, the values 
of skewness and kurtosis (cf. Table 5-7) and graphical distributions (cf. Figure 5-1 and 
Table 5-8) were examined. Table 5-7 presents the descriptive statistics for the calculated 
sum scores of the seven operationalized DAC-dimensions. Comparable to the results of 
the pre-testing, all DAC-test sub-scales besides OBJECTIVES conform to the acceptable 
range between -1 and +1 of skewness and kurtosis (George & Mallery, 2011) for proving 
normal univariate distribution.  
Profession Frequency % Valid % 
Architecture and Engineering 
Occupations 53 14.4 16.4 
Arts, Design, Entertainment, Sports, 
and Media Occupations 24 6.5 7.4 
Building and Grounds Cleaning and 
Maintenance Occupations 1 0.3 0.3 
Business and Financial Operations 
Occupations 68 18.5 21.1 
Community and Social Services 
Occupations 7 1.9 2.2 
Computer and Mathematical 
Occupations 21 5.7 6.5 
Construction and Extraction 
Occupations 2 0.5 0.6 
Education, Training, and Library 
Occupations 26 7.1 8.0 
Food Preparation and Serving Related 
Occupations 3 0.8 0.9 
Healthcare Support Occupations 33 9.0 10.2 
Installation, Maintenance, and Repair 
Occupations 1 0.3 0.3 
Legal Occupations 5 1.4 1.5 
Life, Physical, and Social Science 
Occupations 34 9.2 10.5 
Management Occupations 27 7.3 8.4 
Office and Administrative Support 
Occupations 6 1.6 1.9 
Personal Care and Service Occupations 3 0.8 0.9 
Production Occupations 4 1.1 1.2 
Sales and Related Occupations 2 0.5 0.6 
Transportation and Material Moving 
Occupations 3 0.8 0.9 
NA 45 12.2  
Total 368 100.0  
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Table 5-7 Descriptive statistics of the sum scores of the seven operationalized DAC-dimensions 
DAC-
dimension M SD 
Potential 
range 
Observed 
range Skew Kurtosis α 
EO sum score 8.45 2.42 0-10 0-10 -1.68 2.14 - 
DO sum score 5.18 1.76 0-8 0-8 -0.50 -0.46 .58 
DF sum score 4.86 1.47 0-7 0-7 -0.38 -0.27 .47 
FD sum score 3.70 1.73 0-8 0-8 0.01 -0.53 .42 
IA sum score  5.58 1.39 0-7 1-7 -0.88 0.16 .51 
DU sum score 3.28 1.72 0-7 0-7 0.09 -0.73 .61 
II sum score 6.24 3.42 0-12 0-12 0.21 -0.88 .86 
Note. N = 368; DAC = Decision-analytical competence; skew = skewness, α = Cronbach’s alpha; EO = 
Ability to envision one’s objectives; DO = Ability to recognise decision opportunities; DF = Ability to 
assess decision fitness; FD = Ability to frame a decision; IA = Ability to identify relevant alternatives; DU = 
Ability to deal with uncertainty; II = Ability to integrate information. 
 
The scaled boxplots in Figure 4-14 (M = 0; SD = 1; statistical outliers of two or more 
standard deviations are excluded) present a comparable view of the test score 
distributions: Complementary to the skewness values of OBJECTIVES the OBJECTIVES-
boxplot reveals that the median of the OBJECTIVES values closes the upper quartile and 
thus, builds the upper extreme of this test score distribution. This means that more than 
half – more precisely 56.79% – of the test participants achieved the highest score of this 
DAC-dimension; the scores plateau.  
 
Note. EO = Ability to envision one’s objectives; DO = Ability to recognise decision opportunities; DF = 
Ability to assess decision fitness; FD = Ability to frame a decision; IA = Ability to identify relevant 
alternatives; DU = Ability to deal with uncertainty; II = Ability to integrate information 
Figure 5-1 Boxplots of the seven scaled DAC-dimensions (main testing) 
 
As happened in the pre-testing, a ceiling effect (cf. Zedec, 2014) appeared. This 
effect does not allow for measuring variance within the sample group. For this reason, 
OBJECTIVES had to be excluded from the analyses of the main testing. 
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Perusing the main testing data of OBJECTIVES, test participants generated 10 
objectives (M = 9.73; SD = 6.57; range: 0 - 30) on average. They identified a mean of 23 
objectives as relevant from the master list (M = 22.87; SD = 7.72; range: 1 - 40) and 
matched 46.55%70 of the recognised objectives on average (SD = 24.09%; range: 0% - 
100%) with their self-generated objectives. The difference of 13.14 objectives between 
9.73 self-generated objectives and 22.87 recognised objectives leads to the assumption, 
similar to the findings of Bond and colleagues (2008) and to the results of the pre-testing, 
that test participants either had problems to envision a complete list of individual relevant 
objectives or that they did not put enough effort into completing the first task, or a 
combination of both.  
In comparison to the pre-testing, participants of the main testing created 1.78 
objectives more in the first step of the task. Also, on average 2.99 more objectives of the 
master list were recognised in the main testing and the percentage of matched objectives 
increased from 31.15% to 45.55%. It could also be presumed that test participants of the 
main testing in comparison to participants of the pre-testing were either more skilled, 
more motivated, and/or more concentrated when completing the matching task of 
OBJECTIVES. 
While participants of the pre-testing envisioned on average 78.57% of their seven 
chosen most important objectives, in the main testing participants selected on average 
84.50% of their self-generated objectives for the list of the 10 most important objectives. 
In percentage terms, this means more self-generated objectives in the main testing, 
independent of the change to the task instruction (cf. sub-section 4.2.5).  
In all four steps of the OBJECTIVES task (cf. sub-section 4.1.1) participants of the main 
testing have performed better than participants of the pre-testing. The increase from 
seven (pre-testing) to 10 (main testing) required objectives in the last step of the 
OBJECTIVES task did not help in terms of the observed ceiling effect. The OBJECTIVES task 
per se seems to be too easy for test participants. Potential explanations and ideas for 
improvement are discussed in section 6.1.  
 
Once again, the discrepancy of OBJECTIVES’ distribution from normal distribution can 
be observed by its sum score distribution with overlaid curve of a normal distribution (cf. 
very high row, left column of Table 5-8). The values of OBJECTIVES present an extreme in 
                                                
70 Due to the matching of self-generated objectives and objectives presented at the master list, it is 
possible to match one self-generated objective to several objectives from the master list, and also the 
other way around.  
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the area of high scores. Table 5-8 also presents the histograms for the other six DAC-
dimensions, each with an overlaid curve of a normal distribution.  
 
As the values of OBJECTIVES violate the condition of a normal distribution they had to 
be excluded from further analyses. Therefore, the left cell of the very low row of Table 5-8 
presents DAC-test sum score distribution of the main testing without the OBJECTIVES’ 
values. According to the display of this frequency distribution, the assumption of a normal 
distribution of the main testing data set is justified. 
Table 5-8 Histogram of each DAC-dimension and the DAC-overall-score (main testing) 
 Histogram of scaled values  Histogram of scaled values 
EO
 
 
DO
 
 
DF
 
 
FD
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Note. DAC = Decision-analytical competence; EO = Ability to envision one’s objectives (N = 333; M = 
0.38; SD = 0.68); DO= Ability to recognise decision opportunities (N = 353; M = 0.49; SD = 0.96); DF = 
Ability to assess decision fitness (N = 362; M = 0.07; SD = 0.95); FD = Ability to frame a decision (N = 
350; M = 0.09; SD = 0.92); IA = Ability to identify relevant alternatives (N = 355; M = 0.13; SD = 0.89); DU 
= Ability to deal with uncertainty (N = 354; M = -0.07; SD = 0.91); II = Ability to integrate information (N = 
368; M = 0.1; SD = 1.01); DAC w/o EO = Decision-Analytical Competence without ability to envision one’s 
objectives (N = 312; M = 0.8; SD = 1.01).  
a  Statistical outliers were excluded. 
 
To examine the internal consistency for each DAC-test sub-scale, Cronbach’s alpha 
and McDonald’s omega (McDonald, 1999)71 were calculated. Table 5-9 compares the 
reliability coefficients for each DAC-test sub-scale of the pre-testing to the main testing 
and specifies the number of items that have been considered for this analysis.  
  
                                                
71 McDonald’s omega (ωH) is an estimate for internal consistency and captures the general factor 
saturation of a scale. In comparison to Cronbach’s alpha, which purely relies on the common variance of 
all items, McDonald’s omega is based on factor loadings and thus presents a different picture of a test’s 
internal consistency (McDonald, 1999). The desired threshold for McDonald’s omega is ωH ≥ .70 (Zinbarg 
et al., 2005). As Cronbach’s alpha assumes tau equivalent items (Cronbach, 1951), it only suits scales 
where all items have comparable discriminatory power (cf. the range of discriminatory power coefficients 
in the main testing in appendix section 9.12); the more sophisticated measure called McDonald's Omega 
was used. 
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Table 5-9 Internal consistencies of the DAC-dimensions (pre-testing & main testing) 
 Pre-testing (pre-testing)  Main testing (main testing) 
DAC-
dimension 
α 
Number of 
items after 
item 
selection 
 
α ωH 
Number of 
items after 
item selection 
DO sum score .63 9  .58 .76 8 
DF sum score .33 8  .47 .66 7 
FD sum score .51 8  .42 .56 8 
IA sum score  .44 8  .51 .69 7 
DU sum score .64 8  .61 .84 7 
II sum score .85 12  .86 .97 12 
Note. N = 143 (pre-testing) & 368 (main testing); DAC = Decision-analytical competence; α = Cronbach’s 
alpha; ωH = McDonald’s omega; DO = Ability to recognise decision opportunities; DF = Ability to assess 
decision fitness; FD = Ability to frame a decision; IA = Ability to identify relevant alternatives; DU = Ability 
to deal with uncertainty; II = Ability to integrate information. 
 
To examine the dimensionality of each DAC-dimension, CFAs were run to test for 
homogeneity. Therefore, one-factor solutions for each sub-scale were tested separately. 
The analyses were carried out in R with the lavaan-toolbox (http://lavaan.ugent.be) using 
a maximum likelihood estimator with “Huber-White” robust standard errors and a (scaled) 
robust test statistic (Rosseel, 2012). 
As the Chi-square (χ2) statistic tends to be susceptible to sample size, i.e. χ2 was 
found to become significant for even small differences in large sample groups (cf. Hair et 
al., 1998; Hoyle, 1995; Netemeyer, Bearden, & Sharma, 2003), other model fit indices as 
the Comparative Fit Index (CFI), the Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA), 
and the Weighted Root-Mean-Square Residual (WRMR) were additionally consulted. For 
evaluating the DAC sub-scales for homogeneity the cut-off criteria of Brown and Cudeck 
(1993), Hu and Bentler (1999), and Yu (2002) were used; CFI ≥ .95, RMSEA ≤ .08, 
WRMR ≤ 1. Table 5-10 gives an overview of the various fit indices for the homogeneity 
tests.  
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Table 5-10 CFAs to test DAC-test sub-scales for homogeneity 
DAC-
dimension χ
2 df WRMR CFI RMSEA CIRMSEA 
DO sum score 81.341*** 20 1.362 .975 .092 .072 - .114 
DF sum score 12.330*** 14 0.577 1.000 .000 .000 - .045 
FD sum score 27.392*** 20 0.804 .924 .032 .000 - .059 
IA sum score  18.893*** 14 0.735 .975 .031 .000 - .063 
DU sum score 89.993*** 14 1.708 .893 .122 .099 - .147 
II sum score 706.295*** 54 3.733 .987 .181 .170 - .193 
Note. N = 368; CFA = Confirmatory factor analysis; DAC = Decision-analytical competence; χ2 = Chi-
square; df = degrees of freedom, WRMW = Weighted Root-Mean-Square Residual; CFI = Comparative Fit 
Index; RMSEA = Root Mean Square Error of Approximation; CIRMSEA = Confidence interval of RMSEA; 
DO = Ability to recognise decision opportunities; DF = Ability to assess decision fitness; FD = Ability to 
frame a decision; IA = Ability to identify relevant alternatives; DU = Ability to deal with uncertainty; II = 
Ability to integrate information. 
* p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001. 
 
Of the nine items of OPPORTUNITIES, one item (item DO_01) had to be deleted as in 
the split-half analysis72 it appeared to be unintentionally negatively poled73. Cronbach’s 
alpha for the remaining eight items is .58, and therefore does not meet the desired 
threshold for this quality criterion. As discussed in sub-section 4.2.5, a low value for 
Cronbach’s alpha can be seen as an indicator for multi-dimensionality. Correspondingly, a 
confirmatory factor analysis for binary data was run to examine the scale for homogeneity 
by a one-factor model. Table 5-9 gives an overview of the weighted root-mean-square 
residual (WRMR, cf. Yu, 2002) for each DAC-dimension. A value above 1 for the WRMR 
reveals that the scale for OPPORTUNITIES is not homogeneous, χ2 (20, N = 368) = 81.341, 
p < .001, WRMR = 1.362, CFI = .975, RMSEA = .092, 90%-CIRMSEA74 = .072 - .114. To 
further analyse internal consistency of the sub-scale for OPPORTUNITIES, McDonald’s 
omega was calculated and met the desired threshold with ωH = .76. 
FITNESS was measured with an eight-item scale in the main testing. Due to one 
negatively loading item (item DF_02) in the split-half analysis, seven items remained for 
further analyses. The internal consistency of the seven-item measure shows a Cronbach’s 
alpha of .47, which is below the aspired critical value of .70. Here, the confirmatory factor 
analysis supported the assumption for the scale of FITNESS being homogeneous, χ2 (14, N 
                                                
72 Split-half reliability is “a measure of the internal consistency of surveys, psychological tests ... [and] is 
determined by dividing the total set of items (e.g., questions) relating to a construct of interest into halves 
(e.g., odd-numbered and even-numbered questions) and comparing the results obtained from the two 
subsets of items thus created.“ (Zedec, 2014, p. 346 [entry “split-half reliability”]) 
73 Decisive for the deletion of this item after the final item selection was that no item in the pre-testing 
appeared to be negatively-poled. The unexpected negative-poling in the main testing led to the unusual 
exclusion of this item and three other items; one from each dimension: FITNESS, ALTERNATIVES, and 
UNCERTAINTY.  
74 CIRMSEA = Confidence interval of RMSEA 
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= 368) = 12.330, p = .580, WRMR = 0.577, CFI = 1.000, RMSEA = .000, 90%-CIRMSEA 
= .000 - .045. McDonald’s omega for the DAC sub-scale of FITNESS slightly missed the 
corresponding threshold with ωH = .66. 
Eight items measured the DAC-dimension FRAME. The Cronbach’s alpha for this 
scale is .42 and is below the critical threshold. A confirmatory factor analysis for binary 
data confirmed that the items of FRAME form a homogeneous scale, χ2 (20, N = 368) = 
27.392, p = .125, WRMR = 0.804, CFI = .924, RMSEA = .032, 90%-CIRMSEA = .000 - 
.059. With ωH = .56 the critical value for the internal consistency of FRAME analysed by 
McDonald’s omega was missed. 
One (item IA_05) of the eight items of ALTERNATIVES had to be removed from further 
analyses, as it appeared to be unintentionally negatively poled in the split-half analysis. 
The remaining seven items show an internal consistency of α = .51, which is below the 
critical value for Cronbach’s alpha. The remaining seven items build a homogeneous 
scale for ALTERNATIVES, χ2 (14, N = 368) = 18.893, p = .169, WRMR = 0.735, CFI = .975, 
RMSEA = .031, 90%-CIRMSEA = .000 - .063. For the DAC sub-scale of ALTERNATIVES, 
McDonald’s omega also met the threshold by ωH = .69.  
As for OPPORTUNITIES, FITNESS, and ALTERNATIVES, one item (item DU_01) of 
UNCERTAINTY had to be removed as it was negatively poled in the split-half analysis. The 
remaining seven items of UNCERTAINTY show a Cronbach’s alpha of .61. The WRMR 
above the threshold of 1 disproves the assumption of homogeneity for the scale of 
UNCERTAINTY, χ2 (14, N = 368) = 89.993, p < .001, WRMR = 1.708, CFI = .893, RMSEA = 
.122, 90%-CIRMSEA = .099 - .147. In terms of McDonald’s omega, the threshold of 
internal consistency was met by ωH = .84.  
Also for INFORMATION Cronbach’s alpha was applied to measure internal consistency. 
The 12 items of this DAC-dimension present a reliability coefficient of .86, which meets 
the desired threshold for Cronbach’s alpha. The 12 items of INFORMATION generate a 
heterogeneous scale, χ2 (54, N = 368) = 706.295, p < .001, WRMR = 3.733, CFI = .987, 
RMSEA = .181, 90%-CIRMSEA = .170 - .193. McDonald’s omega turned out to be very 
high at ωH = .97. Looking at the results of validity and reliability analyses on the DAC-
dimension level, it is conspicuous that the three heterogeneous sub-scales present 
McDonald’s omegas over .70, while the homogeneous sub-scales miss this threshold. 
The apparent difference between the evaluations of validity examined by the CFAs and 
reliability measured by internal consistency might have resulted from the fact that, on the 
one hand CFA tests are only unidimensional and discriminatory power of the items do not 
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influence model fit. Measures of reliability on the other hand refer (in part) to those very 
discriminatory powers. Thus, results can be diverging, just as validity and reliability 
measure different aspects of a test. In the case of e.g. FITNESS, the inter-item correlations 
are relatively low, even though the CFA confirms its homogeneity. So, the items only 
roughly measure the same construct. Due to the low inter-item correlations a second 
factor is not formed. 
5.2.3 Reliability & Dimensionality of the DAC-Test  
To further research the dimensionality of the DAC-dimensions, Table 5-11 shows the 
bivariate correlations among the six remaining DAC-test sub-scales. All correlations are 
significant and positive, and range from low rp = .12 (among UNCERTAINTY and 
OPPORTUNITIES) to moderate rp = .44 (among INFORMATION and UNCERTAINTY) with an 
overall mean correlation of rp = .24.  
Table 5-11 Pearson correlations (rp) between DAC-test sub-scales 
 DO DF FD IA DU II 
DO 1      
DF .27*** 1     
FD .27*** .20*** 1    
IA .19*** .23*** .23*** 1   
DU .12* .16** .31*** .22*** 1  
II .17** .23*** .33*** .34*** .44*** 1 
Note. DAC = Decision-analytical competence; DO = Ability to recognise decision opportunities; DF = 
Ability to assess decision fitness; FD = Ability to frame a decision; IA = Ability to identify relevant 
alternatives; DU = Ability to deal with uncertainty; II = Ability to integrate information.  
a Mean correlation: rp = .24. 
*Two-sided; *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001. 
 
Based on decision-analytical theory (cf. chapter 2), the corresponding research 
hypotheses (cf. section 3.1), and the results of the EFA in the pre-testing (cf. sub-section 
4.2.4), a CFA (cf. Figure 5-2) was run to confirm the one factor solution of the EFA in the 
pre-testing. 
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Note. CFA = Confirmatory factor analysis; DAC = Decision-analytical competence; DO = Ability to 
recognise decision opportunities; DF = Ability to assess decision fitness; FD = Ability to frame a decision; 
IA = Ability to identify relevant alternatives; DU = Ability to deal with uncertainty; II = Ability to integrate 
information 
* p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001. 
Figure 5-2 One-factor CFA-model of DAC 
 
The results of the CFA for the one-factor model are presented in Table 5-12. Besides 
the Chi-square (χ2) statistic, the model fit indices of CFI, RMSEA, and the Standardized 
Root Mean Square Residual (SRMR) were examined. For assessing the one-factor model 
displayed in Figure 5-2 the cut-off criteria of Brown and Cudeck (1993), and Hu and 
Bentler (1999) were used.  
The Chi-square test statistics turned out to be significant75 (χ2 = 17.527, p = .041). 
However, the threshold for CFI ≥ .95 was met with CFI = .974, as well as the cut-off of 
RMSEA ≤ .08 with RMSEA = .051, and the benchmark for SRMR ≤ .08 with SRMR = 
.031. Referring to these three model fit indices, the proposed one-factor model shows an 
acceptable fit.  
  
                                                
75 To affirm a model fit, Chi-square should not become significant (e.g. Sörbom, 1975). 
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Table 5-12 CFA of the one-factor model for DAC  
  Overall model fit  
Factor/construct Indicator/dimension χ2 df CFI RMSEA SRMR 
DAC 
II 
17.527* 9 .974 .051a .031 
FD 
DU 
IA 
DF 
DO 
Note. N = 368; CFA = Confirmatory factor analysis; DAC = Decision-Analytical Competence; χ2 = Chi-
square; df = degrees of freedom, CFI = Comparative Fit Index; RMSEA = Root Mean Square Error of 
Approximation; SRMR = Standardized Root Mean Square Residual; II = Ability to integrate information; FD 
= Ability to frame a decision; DU = Ability to deal with uncertainty; IA = Ability to identify relevant 
alternatives; DF = Ability to assess decision fitness; DO = Ability to recognise decision opportunities.  
* p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001. 
a 90 per cent confidence interval: .010 - .086.  
 
Table 5-13 gives an overview of the factor loadings (λ), the intercepts, and the error 
variances for each of the six DAC-dimensions. All standardised factor loadings appear 
above λ = .4, ranging from λstand = .421 for OPPORTUNITIES to λstand = .688 for INFORMATION, 
and thereby fit the interpretation advice of Guadagnoli and Velicer (1988). There is, thus, 
reason to believe that the latent construct of DAC is able to significantly explain all DAC-
dimensions.  
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Table 5-13 Factor loadings, intercepts, and variances of the one-factor CFA-model for DAC 
 λunstand  SE z-value λstand p 
Loadings      
DF 0.758 .102 7.407 .488 .000 
FD 1.018 .094 10.855 .587 .000 
DU 0.968 .099 9.956 .568 .000 
II 2.391 .171 13.972 .688 .000 
DO 0.795 .120 6.601 .421 .000 
IA 0.766 .088 8.657 .525 .000 
Intercepts      
DF 5.443 .081 67.220 3.506 .000 
FD 3.692 .091 40.737 2.131 .000 
DU 4.041 .091 44.524 2.326 .000 
II 6.639 .181 36.620 1.910 .000 
DO 5.936 .099 59.744 3.144 .000 
IA 6.109 .076 80.233 4.188 .000 
Error Variances      
DF 1.835 .142 12.943 0.762 .000 
FD 1.966 .179 11.000 0.655 .000 
DU 2.046 .183 11.155 0.678 .000 
II 6.367 .670 9.509 0.527 .000 
DO 2.932 .218 13.444 0.823 .000 
IA 1.541 .132 11.693 0.724 .000 
Note. N = 368; CFA = Confirmatory factor analysis; DAC = Decision-analytical competence; λunstand = 
unstandardised estimate for factor loadings; SE = standard error; λstand = standardised estimate for factor 
loadings; DF = Ability to assess decision fitness; FD = Ability to frame a decision; DU = Ability to deal with 
uncertainty; II = Ability to integrate information; DO = Ability to recognise decision opportunities; IA = 
Ability to identify relevant alternatives.  
 
Overall, the DAC-test presents relatively good internal consistency. The z scores of its 
49 items demonstrate a Cronbach’s alpha of α = .85. The z scores of its six sum score 
values for OPPORTUNITIES, FITNESS, FRAME, ALTERNATIVES, UNCERTAINTY, and INFORMATION 
only marginally miss the desired threshold for Cronbach’s alpha with α = .69, but meet 
the threshold for McDonald’s omega by ωH = .72. 
5.2.4 Validity of the DAC-Test  
After examining reliability, test score distribution, and dimensionality of the DAC-test, 
the current sub-section shows the results of the validation. As nomological validity 
expresses the degree of accuracy with which “the measure fits lawfully into a network of 
expected relationships” (Nunnally & Bernstein, 1994, p. 91), the correlations of the DAC-
test score with a set of chosen manifest variables, so-called validation criteria, are 
presented. If the found correlations fit the theoretical interdependences as described in 
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sub-sections 5.1.1 - 5.1.7, it can be assumed that the DAC-test results can be attributed 
to the to-be-measured latent construct.  
Decision Self-Esteem 
In the present research, decision self-esteem was measured by the self-rating 
Melbourne Decision Making Questionnaire I (Mann et al., 1998). As three of its six items 
are negatively poled, they had to be reversed for the correlation analysis. On a 3-point 
scale, decision self-esteem was assessed on average with 1.97 (SD = 0.65). The first row 
of Table 5-14 shows low positive correlations in the expected direction between decision 
self-esteem and DAC, i.e. for the DAC-dimensions and the overall scores. While 
OPPORTUNITIES, FRAME, ALTERNATIVES, UNCERTAINTY, and DAC-test overall are significantly 
related to decision self-esteem, FITNESS and INFORMATION are not. Apart from these two 
DAC-dimensions, DAC is significantly associated with decision self-esteem (cf. sub-
section 5.1.1). 
Table 5-14 Correlations between DAC-dimensions, validation criteria, and socio-demographic 
variables 
 DO (+) 
DF 
(+) 
FD 
(+) 
IA 
(+) 
DU 
(+) 
II 
(+) 
DAC 
(+) 
DSE (+)  .170***  .100***  .114***  .146***  .171***  .083***  .181*** 
V (+)  .119***  .097*** -.004***  .103***  .107***  .143***  .167*** 
B (-) -.090***  .044*** -.049*** -.055*** -.028***  .057*** -.003*** 
P (-) -.107*** -.064*** -.066*** -.062*** -.078*** -.066*** -.100*** 
H (-) -.059***  .030*** -.066*** -.057*** -.117*** -.092*** -.096*** 
SwD (+)  .087***  .055***  .078***  .004***  .057***  .066***  .098*** 
IoU (-) -.134*** -.127*** -.104*** -.144*** -.173*** -.127*** -.204*** 
HMT-S (+)  .238***  .238***  .270***  .319***  .378***  .467***  .488*** 
ToH (+)  .176***  .216***  .165***  .168***  .203***  .331***  .340*** 
Age (+)  .049*** -.029***  .064*** -.059*** -.006***  .044***  .026*** 
GPA (+)  .068***  .141***  .107***  .102***  .151***  .091***  .185*** 
PA-M (+)  .026***  .154***  .135***  .148***  .314***  .212***  .279*** 
Note. The sign pictured next to each variable indicates whether higher scores reflect better (+) or worse 
(-) performance. DAC = Decision-analytical competence; DO = Ability to recognise decision 
opportunities; DF = Ability to assess decision fitness; FD = Ability to frame a decision; IA = Ability to 
identify relevant alternatives; DU = Ability to deal with uncertainty; II = Ability to integrate information; DSE 
= Decision self-esteem (Melbourne Decision-Making Questionnaire I); V = Melbourne Decision-Making 
Questionnaire II - vigilance; B = Melbourne Decision-Making Questionnaire II – buck-passing; P = 
Melbourne Decision-Making Questionnaire II – procrastination; H = Melbourne Decision-Making 
Questionnaire II – hypervigilance; SwD = Satisfaction with Decision Scale; IoU = Intolerance of 
Uncertainty Scale; HTM-S = Hagen Matrices Test – Short version; ToH = Tower of Hanoi total moves; GPA 
= general point average; PA-M = point average in maths. 
*Two-sided p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001. 
Decision-Making Style  
Test participants’ style of decision-making was measured by the 22 items of the 
Melbourne Decision Making Questionnaire II (Mann et al., 1997) distinguishing between 
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vigilance (M = 2.56, SD = 0.59), buck-passing (M = 1.71, SD = 0.71), procrastination (M 
= 1.62, SD = 0.69), and hypervigilance (M = 1.72, SD = 0.72) on its 3-point scale. Rows 
two to five of Table 5-14 present the correlation of these decision-making style 
dimensions and DAC. While all DAC-test sub-scales but FITNESS and FRAME, show 
significant positive correlations with the effective decision-making style vigilance, the 
results for the three remaining less constructive decision-making styles, i.e. buck-
passing, procrastination, and hypervigilance, are either negative and/or not significant. 
According to vigilance, the results of DAC’s validation appear in the expected direction 
(cf. sub-section 5.1.2).  
Decision Satisfaction 
On a 5-point scale decision satisfaction was measured by the 6-item questionnaire of 
Holmes-Rovner and colleagues (1996) named Satisfaction with Decision Scale. Test 
participants evaluated their decision satisfaction on average at 3.95 (SD = 0.82). In Table 
5-14 the sixth row presents the slight positive but not significant correlations between the 
DAC components and decision satisfaction. The results appear in the expected direction 
but they are not significant.  
Intolerance of Uncertainty 
The tendency of people’s inability to act in cases of perceived uncertainty was 
measured by the correspondent sub-scale of the Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale of Buhr 
and Dugas (2002). Mean self-ratings of 2.43 (SD = 1.19) were produced by the 
negatively-keyed scale. The correlations of the DAC components and the IoU are shown 
in row seven of Table 5-14. As expected, all DAC-dimensions and the overall DAC-test 
score correlate significantly negative with the inactivity due to perceived uncertainty. Of 
the DAC-dimensions, UNCERTAINTY presents the highest negative association with the 
self-assessed inability to act in cases of perceived uncertainty (cf. sub-section 5.1.4).  
Fluid Intelligence  
Fluid intelligence was operationalized by the short version of the Hagen Matrices Test 
of Heydasch et al. (2013) consisting of six matrices. The number of correctly solved 
matrices measures the performance of this scale. Of all test participants, 244 (66.12%) 
completed the HMT-S. On average, test participants solved 4.41 matrices (SD = 1.46). 
Row eight of Table 5-14 gives an overview of the significant moderate to good 
correlations with DAC. With OPPORTUNITIES, FITNESS, and FRAME the HMT-S shows 
moderate positive correlations. With ALTERNATIVES, UNCERTAINTY, INFORMATION, and the 
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DAC overall score, the HMT-S presents good positive correlations. Thus, it can be 
assumed that DAC is associated with fluid intelligence (cf. sub-section 5.1.5).  
Problem-Solving Competence  
The Tower of Hanoi with four disks/rings served to measure problem-solving 
competence in the present research. Performance was calculated by the total number of 
moves test participants needed to complete the task. Two hundred and seventy-nine test 
participants (75.61%) completed the ToH. Of those, test participants needed on average 
25 moves (M = 24.71; SD = 10.14) to solve the problem-solving task. As the fewer moves 
the better, the scale is negatively-keyed and had to be reversed for the validation analysis. 
Row nine of Table 5-14 shows the correlation with DAC. As presumed problem-solving 
competence correlates positively with all DAC components (cf. sub-section 5.1.6), these 
significant correlations support the validation of DAC.  
Socio-Demographic Variables  
Row 10 of Table 5-14 presents the correlation of the DAC components with age. The 
results show slight positive and negative, but, as assumed, no significant relations.  
The calculated correlations of the DAC components with the GPA are shown in row 
11 of Table 5-14. For all DAC components the relationships appears to be positive. While 
values for FITNESS, FRAME, UNCERTAINTY, and the overall DAC-score are significant, values 
for the remaining DAC-dimensions are not.  
Row 12 of Table 5-14 gives an overview of the found correlations between the DAC 
components and test participants’ point average in maths. As presumed, relationships are 
positive (cf. sub-section 5.1.7), significant for all DAC components except OPPORTUNITIES. 
The highest correlation can be found between point average in maths and UNCERTAINTY – 
a DAC-dimension, which relies on numeracy. 
5.2.5 Objectivity of the DAC-Test  
Besides reliability and validity, objectivity belongs to the three intended key quality 
criteria for psychometric measures. According to this important aim in the process of test 
development, the following short sub-section argues to what extent the test results 
concerning testing procedure, the test analysis, and the results interpretation can be 
assumed to be independent of the researcher.  
Referring to the testing procedure, the DAC-test was exclusively executed online. 
The order of task appearance was kept the same including its display of tasks and items 
for all test participants. The complete set of received digital data was automatically saved 
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on a server and within this process immediately coded. The set of closed items of the 
DAC-test led to comparable and analysable data. As the performance test contained 
concrete and precise definitions of the correct answer options for each item, the analysis 
of results did not provide any tolerance for interpretations. All data analyses were run with 
the same R-scripts or SPSS syntaxes.  
Concluding, objectivity was paid attention to for the test development. Given the 
DAC-test’s circumstances described above, it is assumed that the results of the test are 
independent of the researcher.  
 
After the main testing results of this PhD research have been presented in the current 
chapter, chapter 6 discusses these results by highlighting ways of explanation, by revising 
the hypotheses, by comparing the DAC-test with the A-DMC performance test of Bruine 
de Bruin and colleagues (2007), and by pointing out the limitation and potential for further 
research of the present avenue of research.   
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6 RESULTS DISCUSSION 
The discipline of decision analysis allows a problem to be broken down into 
comprehensible components (Edwards, Miles Jr., et al., 2007) and thereby provides a 
systematic procedure that supports people in making sound decisions and sorting out 
problems (Bazerman & Moore, 2009). The main aim of the present research was to 
operationalize the skill of analytical decision-making by an objective, reliable, and valid 
psychometric performance test. The developed DAC-test can be understood as an 
achievement test for decision-analytical knowledge. Consequently, DA is not seen as an 
aptitude. The DAC-test measures how well a person is able to follow decision-analytical 
reasoning steps to solve a complex decision problem. While chapter 4 presented the 
operationalization of the construct and the results of the pre-testing, the preceding 
chapter 5 constituted the results of the main testing according to reliability and validity of 
the DAC-test. The current chapter carefully considers these results and offers 
interpretations.  
Thereto, section 6.1 discusses findings and presents attempts to explain certain 
results. Section 6.2 answers the to-be-examined hypotheses, while section 6.3 presents 
a summarising contrasting juxtaposition of the A-DMC index (Bruine de Bruin et al., 2007) 
and the developed DAC-test by their quality criteria. Scientific contributions and potential 
practical utilisation are addressed by section 6.4. Limitations of the findings and directions 
for further research close this chapter in section 6.5.  
6.1 DISCUSSION OF THE FINDINGS & ATTEMPTS TO EXPLAIN 
The presented results of the empirical control of this Ph.D. research (cf. section 5.2) 
are partially strong in evidence and thus distinct to interpret. However, several findings are 
not that explicit and as a result do not satisfy the expectations and set goals for this Ph.D. 
research. For this reason, the subsequent sub-sections discuss the results and highlight 
various approaches of explanation.  
The first sub-section 6.1.1 presents reflections on reliability and dimensionality of the 
DAC-test on dimensional level and sub-section 6.1.2 of the DAC-test as a whole. In sub-
section 6.1.3, reflections on validity of the aggregated DAC-test score are discussed. 
6.1.1 Reflections on Reliability & Dimensionality of the DAC-Dimensions 
Derived from decision-analytical literature, eight cognitive dimensions (cf. sub-
sections 2.4.1 to 2.4.3) have been identified to capture DAC, of which six were 
successfully operationalized by a performance-based set of decision tasks. Following this, 
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the item sets of the DAC-dimensions OPPORTUNITIES, FITNESS, FRAME, ALTERNATIVES, 
UNCERTAINTY, and INFORMATION were tested in the pre-testing. According to the thresholds 
for the two quality criteria of the item analysis76, items with an item discriminatory power of 
rit < .2 (cf. Fisseni, 2004) and/or an item difficulty index of pi > .8 and pi < .2 (Kline, 2015, 
p. 143; Lienert & Raatz, 1998, p. 115) were excluded from further analyses and deleted 
from the test.  
In the main testing, the split-half analyses led to the exclusion of four more items. 
Thus, the dimensions OPPORTUNITIES, FITNESS, ALTERNATIVES, and UNCERTAINTY each 
retained one item less than in the pre-testing. As appeared in the pre-testing, only 
INFORMATION reached the desired cut-off of .70 for internal consistency measured by 
Cronbach’s alpha (e.g. Bland & Altman, 1997; Nunnally et al., 1978). However, 
INFORMATION is the only sub-scale that consists of more than 10 items. As the internal 
consistency coefficient reacts sensitive to the number of items considered, but not so 
extreme for scales with more than 10 items (R. A. Peterson, 1994), the length of the 
INFORMATION scale could have caused the high Cronbach’s alpha. While the coefficients 
for FITNESS (α = .33 " α = .47) and ALTERNATIVES (α = .44 " α = .51) showed an 
increase, the values for OPPORTUNITIES (α = .63 " α = .58), FRAME (α = .51 " α = .42), 
and UNCERTAINTY (α = .64 " α = .61) decreased from the pre-testing to the main testing. 
In the cases of OPPORTUNITIES and UNCERTAINTY the reduction of items could be assumed 
as one reason for the decrease (Nunnally et al., 1978). But still, other arguments as 
presented in sub-section 4.2.5, have to be taken into account. 
Multi-dimensionality of the underlying constructs could be considered as another 
reason for low Cronbach’s alphas (Schmitt, 1996). Subsequently, in order to analyse the 
dimensionality a CFA for each DAC-dimension was run. Values below 1 for the WRMR 
confirmed the homogeneity for the scales of FITNESS, FRAME, and ALTERNATIVES. The 
scales of OPPORTUNITIES, UNCERTAINTY, and INFORMATION appeared to be heterogeneous 
(cf. Table 5-9). The inspection of the referring factor loadings of exploratory factor 
analyses for these three DAC-dimensions did not offer valuable clues to the underlying 
structure. Thus, the dimensionality of these DAC sub-scales could not exclusively be 
resolved.  
One suspicion concerning the low internal consistencies of OPPORTUNITIES, FITNESS, 
FRAME, ALTERNATIVES, and UNCERTAINTY and the detected unintentionally negatively-poled 
items are contradictory answers across test participants within the said DAC-dimensions. 
                                                
76 Appendix sub-section 9.12 displays item difficulty indices and discriminatory power coefficients for 
each DAC-dimension of the main testing. 
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So, it is presumable that not all test participants have solved all items in a consistent 
manner, i.e. a few participants might have randomly guessed to complete the test; either 
in case of some items or even in case of the whole set of items. As random guessing 
usually leads to a correlation close to r = 0 (cf. Bortz & Döring, 2005), a different effect 
might have appeared here: All four items, which had to be removed from the final 
analyses in the main testing were items with true/false response sets (cf. Table 6-1). 
Assuming that the DAC-test was “clicked through” by a certain group of test participants 
and not thoughroughly answered, the way of clicking might have had a systematic effect 
on the results. So, if this group has completed the test by clicking enter – forward – enter 
– forward – enter and so forth, a specific and maybe recurring answering-pattern might 
have occurred for this group of people77. In case of true/false items this potential pattern 
might have resulted in the finding that some items were somewhat negatively-answered. 
Table 6-1 Tested DAC-dimensions, assessment criterion, and response scales 
DAC- 
dimension 
Required  
decision-making ability  
Assessment 
criterion Response scale 
DO 
Ability to identify decision situations, which 
are characterised by the potential to 
support decision-makers in achieving their 
desired goals, and to assess which degree 
of analytical thinking is needed to solve 
those situations. 
Accuracy a) True/False b) MCa with 3 options 
DF 
Ability to decide whether emotions and 
physical status allow focusing on a 
concrete decision situation, proceeding 
analytically with the decision-making 
process, and making a conscious choice. 
Accuracy True/False 
FD 
Ability to perceive the relevant aspects of a 
decision situation and to interpret their 
meaning for the corresponding process of 
decision-making. 
Accuracy MCa with 10 options 
IA Ability to envision alternatives that fit a set of given objectives in a decision situation. Accuracy True/False 
DU 
Ability to comprehend, interpret, and 
calculate probabilities of different qualities 
in order to make a choice. 
Accuracy 
a) True/Falsea 
b) MCb with 5 options 
c) MCb with 19 options 
d) Open format 
II 
Ability to combine assessments of 
uncertainties and values coherently, 
compare various alternatives and 
objectives, and correspondingly rank those 
alternatives in relation to their relevance for 
the decision-maker. 
Accuracy MCb with 7 options 
Note. DAC = Decision-analytical competence; DO = Ability to recognise decision opportunities; DF = 
Ability to assess decision fitness; FD = Ability to frame a decision; IA = Ability to identify relevant 
alternatives; DU = Ability to deal with uncertainty; II = Ability to integrate information.  
                                                
77 The position of the correct answer – either true or false – was varied within the scales.  
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a The only item of DU (DU_01) with a true/false response set was removed for final analyses. 
b MC = Multiple-choice. 
 
As Cronbach’s alpha is restricted due to the various item loadings, the internal 
consistency coefficient named McDonald’s omega, for which item loadings do not have 
to be equal, was additionally calculated. Three of the six DAC-dimensions met the desired 
threshold of McDonald’s omega by ωH ≥ .70 (Zinbarg, Revelle, Yovel, & Li, 2005): 
OPPORTUNITIES (ωH = .76), UNCERTAINTY (ωH = .84), and INFORMATION (ωH = .97). While 
ALTERNATIVES (ωH = .69) and FITNESS (ωH = .66) barely missed the targeted value, FRAME 
(ωH = .56) showed the lowest McDonald’s omega. Deductively, according to McDonald’s 
omega three of the six DAC-dimensions show good reliability by internal consistency. 
 
To further analyse the reliability of each DAC-dimension, other reliability tests have to 
be applied (e.g. Schmitt, 1996). For the present research though, neither re-test reliability 
nor parallel-test reliability were applicable. For re-test reliability, the same group of people 
has to complete the test twice. For analysing the test’s reliability, the test scores of the 
first and the second measuring have to be compared directly, i.e. the two test scores of 
each participant have to be assigned distinctly to each other. Due to the ensured 
confidentiality of this Ph.D. research project, such a case-wise comparison was not 
feasible.  
Examining parallel-test reliability was the intention at the beginning of this research 
project. However, due to test economy and that test participants should be able to 
complete the test in a reasonable time, the originally planned second case - INVEST case 
(cf. sub-section 4.2.1) - had to be neglected.  
6.1.2 Reflections on Reliability & Dimensionality of the DAC-Test  
According to the proposal of researchers such as e.g. Stanovich and West (2000) or 
hitherto existing research of e.g. Bruine de Bruin and colleagues (2007), DMC can be 
assumed as a latent construct underlying various decision-making tasks. The present 
research intended to examine the internal consistency and dimensionality of the proposed 
DAC-test as a whole, containing six cognitive sub-scales with corresponding item sets. 
Therefore, in the pre-testing an EFA with varimax rotation was run. One factor was 
extracted and explained 29% of the observed variance. All factor loadings exceeded the 
recommended benchmark for interpretation of factor loadings with λ ≥ .30 (Hair et al., 
1998, p. 112). In the main testing, a CFA was applied to analyse the model fit of the one-
factor structure. Its results presented a good overall model fit (cf. Hu & Bentler, 1999). 
Cronbach’s alpha for the final set of 49 DAC items met the desired threshold and 
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performed at α = .85 (Bland & Altman, 1997; Nunnally et al., 1978; Schmitt, 1996). The 
internal consistency of the six sub-scale sum scores reached α = .69 and ωH = .72 
forming one general factor.  
 
A CFA was run to examine whether the concept of DAC fits the assumed structural 
composition of the concept presented in Figure 5-2. The main aim of the statistical 
procedure was to determine whether the gathered data is consistent with the 
hypothesised measurement model, which was based on preceding analytic research, ran 
by an EFA (cf. sub-section 4.2.4). While EFA is a structure-searching analytical tool, the 
CFA can only verify the expected pattern of a construct. Thus, the CFA cannot reverse 
theoretically-made decisions. Also, it is important to keep in mind that the various model 
fit indices do not confirm the correctness of the model, they only indicate the plausibility of 
the model (Schermelleh-Engel, Moosbrugger, & Müller, 2003). In this context, it is also 
important to point out that reliability measures turn out to be better when a more precise 
factor model is used. 
 
The one-factor model met the cut-off criteria for CFI, RMSEA, and SRMR of Brown 
and Cudeck (1993) and Hu and Bentler (1999) in the CFA and the good internal 
consistency of the complete DAC-test item set supported the assumption of DAC being 
an explanatory latent factor explaining significant variance of the six sets of DAC-tasks; 
however, the missed threshold for Cronbach’s alpha of the six DAC sub-scale sum 
scores gives reason to think about potential explanations, including that having six 
variables to calculate Cronbach’s alpha affected the small internal consistency coefficient 
(Nunnally et al., 1978); also, the construct of DAC is too heterogeneous to show internal 
consistency (Schmitt, 1996), and some test participants might not have answered the 
DAC-test consistently and/or conscientiously and hence show a higher vulnerability to 
guessing. Table 6-1 gives an overview of the six tested DAC-dimensions including their 
required skills, the corresponding criterion for assessment, and the presented response 
scale. The three scales for OPPORTUNITIES, FITNESS, and ALTERNATIVES mainly go along 
with a true/false response set and hence show a vulnerability to guessing (Kline, 2015), 
i.e. the binary-scaled response sets involve a higher chance to correctly guess the 
answer. The remaining three sub-scales FRAME, UNCERTAINTY, and INFORMATION are 
predominantly presented as multiple-choice, i.e. an interval-scaled, response set.  
One remark that has to be made is that the presented conclusions on DAC’s 
dimensionality just refer to the six DAC-dimensions, which have been successfully 
MEASURING DECISION-ANALYTICAL COMPETENCE - A PSYCHOMETRIC ONLINE PERFORMANCE TEST 
 
 167 
operationalized within the framework of this research. As long as missing aspects of DAC, 
such as OBJECTIVES, have not been effectively surveyed and together with the other sub-
scales examined, then no final statement about the construct’s dimensionality can be 
made.  
 
Although the DAC-test's structure was proven to coincide with theory on an 
aggregated level, some subscales displayed discrepancies. Further investigations are 
necessary to research the dimensionality of the DAC sub-scales and the construct as a 
whole.  
6.1.3 Reflections on Validity of the DAC-Test 
The validity of the DAC-test was examined for its nomological validity, which 
describes the accuracy with which the empirical results of the test conform to a set of 
theoretically founded relationships with other constructs (e.g. Nunnally & Bernstein, 1994). 
In this framework, the DAC-test was presented with a catalogue of 12 psychological 
scales and demographic variables, which served as validation criteria. 
In general, the observed relationships between the DAC-test and its validation criteria 
displayed in Table 5-14 appeared in the expected directions (cf. sub-sections 5.1.1 - 
5.1.7). Nevertheless, not all results were significant and especially correlations with self-
assessment scales turned out to be lower than expected. According to the assumption 
that some test participants answered the DAC-test and its validation criteria in a non-
consistent manner, e.g. by “clicking-through”, less distinctive results are comprehensible. 
Also, it appears to be challenging to operationalize DAC holistically. The successful 
operationalization of two dimensions did not work out in the framework of the present 
research. In addition, the dimensionality of the DAC sub-scales needs further 
investigation. So far, DAC seems to be a complex construct; theoretically homogeneous 
and empirically calling for more insights. Linking the further development of both theory 
and measurement should thus be more pronounced. 
With decision self-esteem measured by the Melbourne Decision Making 
Questionnaire I of Mann et al. (1998) the overall DAC-test score showed a significant 
relationship of r = .181 (p = .001). A vigilant style of decision-making and DAC-test 
demonstrated a significant positive correlation of r = .167 (p = .05). The less respectable 
styles of decision-making, i.e. buck-passing, procrastination, and hypervigilance, 
demonstrated negative but not significant correlations with DAC. All four styles of 
decision-making were captured by the Melbourne Decision Making Questionnaire II of 
Mann et al. (1997). The empirical results indicated that higher DAC-test scores are 
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associated with lower scores of the sub-scale uncertainty leads to the inability to act (r = 
-.204; p = .001) of the Intolerance of Uncertainty Scales of Buhr & Dugas (2002). The 
scores of decision satisfaction (Satisfaction with Decision Scales by Holmes-Rovner et al., 
1996) were slightly positive but not significantly linked to higher DAC-test scores.  
In contrast to the findings of these self-rating measures, the results for both 
performance-based measures, for fluid intelligence and problem-solving competence, 
were more distinctive. So, DAC and fluid intelligence, the latter construct measured by the 
short version of the Hagen Matrices Test (HMT-S; Heydasch, Haubrich, & Renner, 2013), 
demonstrated a good positive relationship of r = .488 (p = .001). Better performance in 
problem-solving competence, assessed by the Tower of Hanoi (ToH; for instance 
Anderson & Douglass, 2001; H. J. Bell, 2004; Schiff & Vakil, 2015; Vernon & Strudensky, 
1988), was related significantly to higher scores of the DAC-test (r = .340; p = .001).  
 
One possible explanation for the difference in the distinctiveness of the correlation 
between the DAC-test and self-rating vs. performance-based measures, might be the 
self-selection bias (e.g. Hudson, Seah, Hite, & Haab, 2004; Whitehead, 1991). The self-
selection bias appears in any situation where test participants assign themselves to a 
specific group. In case of the Tower of Hanoi task, test participants were able to quit the 
task. This opportunity was given to allow test participants who were not able to solve the 
task to continue with the survey. Due to this self-selection a certain group, 75.61% of test 
participants, skipped the task – some could not successfully complete the task; some 
were not motivated enough. To examine this conjecture, a logistic regression for binary 
data was run. It shows that the probability of completing the ToH increases with rising 
overall DAC-test scores. Indeed, the chance to accomplish the ToH duplicates with each 
standard deviation of the DAC-test (ex(0.68) = 1.97). 
In a comparable style, the results of the HMT-S have to be considered: For 
administrative reasons, Heydasch and colleagues did not agree to embed their matrices 
test into the existing DAC-test website. For this reason, the HMT-S was appended at the 
very end of the survey, following the DAC-test, the catalogue of validation criteria, and the 
socio-demographic variables. Sixty-six per cent of all test participants who completed the 
DAC-test also submitted the HMTS-S. Consequently, the self-selection bias might also 
have occurred in this case. The more motivated or competent test participants may have 
completed both the DAC-test and the HMT-S, and therefore produced the scores that 
form the correlation results. However, here the logistic regression showed that the final 
DAC-test score is not significantly correlated (p = .194) with the probability of completing 
the HMT-S. 
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In terms of the non-significant relationship of DAC and decision satisfaction it has to 
be noted that the SwD in its original study (Holmes-Rovner et al., 1996) was presented in 
the context of acute postmenopausal hormone-replacement therapy decisions. In 
comparison to the present study, test participants were able to relate their self-
assessment to one concrete real life decision. In this Ph.D. research, test participants 
were asked to envision the last complex decision they had to deal with. Consequently, 
test results might be very heterogeneous in terms of how long the considered decision 
lies in the past or whether output and/or outcome for this individual decision were already 
known. This implied heterogeneity might be one reason why the scores of DAC and the 
SwD do not show a significant relationship.  
“While the need to measure post-decision satisfaction has been recognized in 
previous studies, the resulting measurements have been limited, both in scope and in 
depth.” (Sainfort & Booske, 2000, p. 53) In comparison to other scales, such as Houston, 
Sherman, and Baker's one-item measure to assessing how happy persons are with their 
choice (1991) or Jones' 32-item Career Decision Profile (1989), the SwD of Holmes-
Rovner et al. (1996) was chosen as it presented a good trade-off between length of the 
scale with its six items and content fit capturing, among other things, the consistency with 
personal objectives or the comparison of alternatives. Due to the complexity in terms of 
content and duration of the DAC-test and its catalogue of validation criteria, even scales 
with an average of 10 items, as for instance the Decision Making Quality Scale of Hollen 
(1994) were neglected.  
 
Between age and DAC performance no significant relationship could be observed. 
According to the theoretical expectations, the age range of the target group might have 
been too tight, as test participants between 18 and 30 years belong to the same phase of 
psychological development (cf. Erikson, 1959). 
As found by the correlation of the DAC-test with the HMT-S, the tasks of the DAC-
test seem to capture fluid intelligence. That may be one explanation why the DAC-test 
and the GPA significantly positively correlate. Also, the average mark in maths, which 
relies on numeracy, shows a significant positive relationship with the overall DAC-test 
score and especially with UNCERTAINTY – a scale that mainly captures mathematical skills.  
 
Some initial evidence about the validity of DAC as a psychological construct could be 
observed by the present study; validated by decision-self esteem, vigilant decision-
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making style, intolerance of uncertainty, fluid intelligence, problem-solving competence, 
GPA and average mark in maths.  
The following section addresses the achievement of the set research hypotheses. 
6.2 REVISION OF RESEARCH HYPOTHESES 
The statistical-methodological research hypothesis H1 claims that each dimension of 
the DAC-test is reliable and thus shows appropriate internal consistency. To measure 
internal consistency on a sub-scale level two different coefficients were calculated: 
Cronbach’s alpha (Cronbach, 1951) with its threshold of α ≥ .70 (e.g. Nunnally et al., 
1978) and McDonald’s omega (McDonald, 1999) with its desired value of ωH ≥ .70 
(Zinbarg et al., 2005). Other reliability coefficients could not be applied. So, calculating re-
test reliability was not possible due to vested confidentiality78 and missing research 
resources such as budget. Parallel-test reliability was intended at the beginning of this 
research. However, due to test economic issues the designed parallel form of the EDU 
case of the DAC-test, the INVEST case, could not be tested in the main testing. 
According to the internal consistency coefficients of Cronbach’s alpha and 
McDonald’s omega, Hypothesis H1 could only partially be verified. While the threshold for 
Cronbach’s alpha was only met by INFORMATION (α = .86), the DAC-test sub-scale with 
more than 10 items, the threshold for McDonald’s omega was met by OPPORTUNITIES (ω 
= .76) UNCERTAINTY (ω = .84), and INFORMATION (ω = .97). Thus, it can be stated that three 
DAC-test sub-scales show internal consistency and are thus reliable measures.  
 
Research Hypothesis H2, which refers to the reliability of the DAC-test as a whole, 
could be verified in terms of the internal consistency for the final set of 49 DAC-test items, 
which showed a Cronbach’s alpha of α = .85. Cronbach’s alpha of the six z-scores of the 
sum score values for OPPORTUNITIES, FITNESS, FRAME, ALTERNATIVES, UNCERTAINTY, and 
INFORMATION is α = .69. However, McDonald’s omega for the z-scores of the DAC-test 
sum score values meets the threshold and performs at ω = .72.  
 
The third statistical-methodological research hypothesis H3, which states that the 
DAC-dimensions refer to one general factor of decision-making, could be verified. In the 
pre-testing, an EFA presented a one-factor solution for the z-scores of the six analysed 
                                                
78 The self-created identification code of each test participant (cf. appendix section 9.10 first paragraph) 
was automatically saved in the database after test completion. It served to reconstruct who of the test 
participants had successfully finished the testing and deserved the remuneration of €15.00. However, the 
identification code was saved in another data sheet, independent of the actual test data. An assignment 
of test and re-test data would not be possible. 
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DAC-dimensions with factor loadings above λ = .30 (Hair et al., 1998, p. 112). It captured 
29% of the variance. The CFA of the main testing confirmed a good model fit for the 
tested one-factor structure of the six z-scores of the DAC-dimensions. Even though chi-
square was significant (Sörbom, 1975; χ2 = 17.527, p = .041), the thresholds by Hu and 
Bentler (1999) for the three model fit indices CFI ≥ .95, RMSEA ≤ .08, and SRMR ≤ .08 
were met with CFI = .974, RMSEA = .051, and SRMR = .031.  
 
The content-valid research hypothesis H4, which claims that the DAC-test score 
correlates significantly with suitable criteria for validation, is partially seen as verified. To 
validate the DAC-test, correlations with a catalogue of 12 validation criteria were 
calculated. The DAC-test showed positive significant relationships with decision self-
esteem (rP = .181, p < .001), vigilant decision-making style (rP = .167, p < .05), fluid 
intelligence (rP = .488, p < .001), problem-solving competence (rP = .340, p < .001), the 
GPA (rP = .185, p < .001), and the average mark in maths (rP = .279, p < .001). The DAC-
test presented a negative significant correlation with the inability to act in case of 
perceived uncertainty, a sub-scale of intolerance of uncertainty (rP = -.204, p < .001). All 
correlations appeared in the expected direction. However, the correlations of DAC with 
decision satisfaction, buck-passing, procrastination, and hypervigilance turned out to be 
not significant.  
 
Summarising, the majority of the research hypotheses of this Ph.D. research could 
be verified. Reliability in terms of internal consistency measured by McDonald’s omega 
could be proven for three DAC-dimensions, OPPORTUNITY, UNCERTAINTY, and 
INFORMATION, as well as on test-level. The assumption of DAC being a higher-order factor 
underlying various dimensions was supported by the results of the EFA and CFA. 
Evidence for the DAC-test’s validity was found, for instance, by significant positive 
correlations of DAC and decision self-esteem, vigilance, fluid intelligence, or problem-
solving competence.  
The subsequent section compares the A-DMC of Bruine de Bruin et al. (2007) and 
the developed DAC-test of the present research on content criteria and statistical 
properties.  
6.3 COMPARISON OF THE A-DMC & THE DAC-TEST  
In the present section, the developed DAC-test is compared to so far one of the 
most promising approaches of measuring DMC by a performance test – the A-DMC of 
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Bruine de Bruin and colleagues (2007). The tables below serve to give a compact 
overview of the two measures by their data basis and statistical properties.  
 
While the A-DMC is based on the normative approach to decision-making, the DAC-
test aims to measure prescriptive DMC (cf. Table 6-2). Hence, the A-DMC concentrates 
on behavioural decision theory, whereas the DAC-test focuses on analytical decision 
theory. The target group is set much broader for the A-DMC than for the DAC-test. The 
A-DMC is designed for adults in general. This fact becomes apparent by the age range of 
the sample group in the study of Bruine de Bruin and colleagues (2007). Here, the mean 
age of the 360 study participants, which were recruited by social service organisations 
and community groups, lies at 48 years (M = 47.7; SD = 17.0) with a range of 18 to 88 
years. Seventy-three point eight per cent of the A-DMC study participants were female 
and 26.2% male. In comparison, young adults between 18 and 30 years built the target 
group for the DAC-test. The corresponding 368 study participants were acquired via 
universities and research institutes. The average age of study participants was 24 years 
(M = 23.8; SD = 3.4), of which 52.5% were women and 47.5% men.  
 
Table 6-2 Comparison of the A-DMC and the DAC-test by theoretical basis, target –, and sample 
group 
Criterion  Specification A-DMC  DAC-test 
Theoretical basis   Normative approach to decision-making79 
Prescriptive approach to 
decision-making  
Target group  Adults Young adults  
Sample group 
N N = 360 N = 368 
Group 
specifics 
Acquired through social 
service organisations and 
community groups 
Acquired through 
universities and research 
institutes 
Age 
M = 47.7 
SD = 17.0 
Range = 18-88 
M = 23.8 
SD = 3.4 
Range = 18-30 
Sex Female: 73.8% Male: 26.2% 
Female: 52.5%  
Male: 47.5% 
Note. A-DMC = Adult Decision-Making Competence index score (Bruine de Bruin et al., 2007); DAC-test 
= Decision-Analytical Competence test; N = Total number of cases.   
 
Table 6-3 gives an overview of the covered dimensions of both tests and presents 
the dimensions’ statistical properties. The A-DMC captures seven dimensions: resistance 
to framing, recognising social norms, under/overconfidence, applying decision rules, 
                                                
79 Bruine de Bruin et al. (2007) describe that the A-DMC refers to the normative approach of decision 
science. However, in comparison to the DAC-test, it could be stated that both tests, the A-DMC and the 
DAC-test, intend to measure deviations from normative decision-making standards, while the A-DMC 
covers behavioural decision-making aspects and the DAC-test captures decision-analytical aspects.  
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consistency in risk perception, resistance to sunk costs, and path independence. The 
dimensions are represented each by a set of six (path independence) to 34 
(under/overconfidence) items. Four of the seven dimensions meet the threshold for 
Cronbach’s alpha of α = .70 (e.g. Nunnally et al., 1978). The re-test reliability of the A-
DMC sub-scale lies between rtt = .28 (p < .001) for path independence and rtt = .77 (p < 
.001) for applying decision rules. Only one of the seven A-DMC dimensions meets the 
desired values for the re-test reliability of rtt = .70 (Guilford, 1956).  
Six cognitive dimensions operationalize DAC: ability to recognise a decision 
opportunity, ability to assess decision fitness, ability to frame a decision, ability to identify 
relevant alternatives, ability to deal with uncertainty, and ability to integrate information. Of 
the six sub-scales, one meets the threshold for Cronbach’s alpha. However, the item sets 
of the DAC-test consist on average only of half as many items as the sub-scales of the A-
DMC, varying between seven and 12 items per dimension. In terms of McDonald’s alpha, 
three DAC sub-scales meet the threshold for internal consistency by ωH > .70.  
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Table 6-3 Comparison of the A-DMC and the DAC-test by their dimensions and the corresponding 
statistical properties  
Criterion/ 
statistical 
property 
Specification A-DMC DAC-test 
Dimensions 
Dimensions 
1) Resistance to framing 
2) Recognising social norms 
3) Under/overconfidence 
4) Applying decision rules 
5) Consistency in risk 
perception 
6) Resistance to sunk costs 
7) Path independence 
1) Ability to recognise a 
decision opportunity 
2) Ability to assess decision 
fitness 
3) Ability to frame a decision  
4) Ability to identify relevant 
alternatives 
5) Ability to deal with 
uncertainty  
6) Ability to integrate 
information 
Number of 
items; 
Cronbach’s 
alpha;  
re-test 
reliability; 
McDonald’s 
omega 
1) 14; α = .62; rtt  = .58***; -- 
2) 16; α = .64; rtt  = .46***; -- 
3) 34; α = .77; rtt  = .47***; -- 
4) 13; α = .73; rtt  = .77***; -- 
5) 10; α = .72; rtt  = .51***; -- 
6) 10; α = .54; rtt  = .61***; -- 
7)   6; α = .75; rtt  = .28***; -- 
1)   8; α = .58; --; ωH = .76 
2)   7; α = .47; --; ωH = .66 
3)   8; α = .42; --; ωH = .56 
4)   7; α = .51; --; ωH = .69 
5)   7; α = .61; --; ωH = .84 
6) 12; α = .86; --; ωH = .97 
Note. A-DMC = Adult Decision-Making Competence index score (Bruine de Bruin et al., 2007); DAC-test 
= Decision-Analytical Competence test; α = Cronbach’s alpha; rtt = re-test reliability (p < .001); ωH = 
McDonald’s omega.  
* p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001. 
 
Criteria for the internal consistency on construct-level and dimensionality are shown 
in Table 6-4. While the 103 items of the A-DMC present a Cronbach’s alpha of α = .85, 
the 49 items of the DAC-test demonstrate the same value for internal consistency. The 
seven A-DMC z-scores of the dimensional sum scores show Cronbach’s alpha at α = .83. 
The six z-scores of the DAC-dimension’s sum scores present an internal consistency at α 
= .69 and ωH = .72. For examining the dimensionality of the construct, an EFA with non-
orthogonal oblimin rotation was used for the A-DMC. The one-factor solution explained 
30% of the variance, whereby two of the seven sub-scales miss the threshold for factor 
loadings of λ ≥ .30 stated by Hair et al. (1998, p. 112). For the DAC-test, the EFA with 
non-orthogonal promax rotation presents a one-factor solution, which explains 29% of 
the variance. All sub-scales met the threshold for factor loadings. Additionally, to verify the 
theoretical assumptions that general DMC builds a latent construct underlying various 
correlated dimensions (e.g. Stanovich & West, 2000), for the DAC-test the CFA presented 
a good fit for the one-factor model. For the A-DMC, a CFA to confirm the one-factor 
solution was not specified.   
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Table 6-4 Comparison of the A-DMC and the DAC-test by internal consistency and dimensionality 
Criterion/ 
statistical 
property 
Specification A-DMC DAC-test 
Internal 
consistency...  
...of all items  α = .85 α = .85 
...of the z-
scores of the 
test’s 
dimensions 
α = .83 α = .69; ωH = .72 
EFA 
Rotation Oblimin rotation  
" non-orthogonal 
Promax rotation 
" non-orthogonal 
Number of 
extracted 
factors 
One80 One 
Factor 
loadings 
1) λ = .48 
2) λ = .40 
3) λ = .35 
4) λ = .80 
5) λ = .49 
6) λ = .23 
7) λ = .10 
1) λ = .45 
2) λ = .36 
3) λ = .57 
4) λ = .55 
5) λ = .62 
6) λ = .66 
Percentage of 
explained 
variance  
30% 29% 
CFA 
Tested model -- One-factor model 
Model fit and 
fit indices -- 
Good:  
CFI = .974 
RMSEA = .051 
SRMR = .031 
Note. A-DMC = Adult Decision-Making Competence index score (Bruine de Bruin et al., 2007); DAC-test 
= Decision-Analytical Competence test; EFA = Exploratory factor analysis; CFA = Confirmatory factor 
analysis; α = Cronbach’s alpha; ωH = McDonald’s omega; λ = Factor loadings; CFI = Comparative Fit 
Index; RMSEA = Root Mean Square Error of Approximation; SRMR = Standardized Root Mean Square 
Residual. 
 
Table 6-5 juxtaposes the validation criteria for both tests and the corresponding 
correlations with significance level. To validate the A-DMC, nine self-rating scales, two 
performance measures, and three socio-demographic variables were co-tested. The 
results show positive correlations of A-DMC with the decision-making style using 
behavioural coping (rP = .28; p < .001) and deciding rationally (rP = .22; p < .001). 
Negative relationships are found with the decision-making style of feeling regret (r = -.14; 
                                                
80 According to Bruine de Bruin et al., (2007), the EFA actually extracted a two-factor solution. The 
authors argue that the loadings of the two-factor model ”resemble those of the one-factor solution. 
Recognizing Social Norms, Resistance to Sunk Costs, and Path Independence have a higher loading on 
the second factor, but the latter remains under .30. The two-factor solution does not correspond to the 
three-factor solution reported for the Y-DMC (Parker & Fischhoff, 2005) [the prototype of the A-DMC]. Nor 
does either factor solution correspond to any of the three task characteristics ... : response mode, 
criterion, or general decision-making skills.” (Bruine de Bruin et al., 2007, p. 944)  
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p < .05), needlessly maximising (rP = -.19; p < .001), avoiding decisions (rP = -.21; p < 
.001), and deciding spontaneously (rP = -.29; p < .001). The A-DMC also correlates with 
the DOI (rP = .29; p < .001) – the Decision Outcome Inventory - an introduced “self-report 
measure of decision-making success in terms of avoiding negative decision outcomes.” 
(Bruine de Bruin et al., 2007, p. 943) The strongest correlations appeared with nonverbal 
cognitive ability (rP = .61; p < .001), crystallised verbal ability (rP = .50; p < .001), using 
social services (rP = -.54; p < .001), and edcuation (rP = .47; p < .001).  
 
Table 6-5 Comparison of the A-DMC and the DAC-test by validity 
Criterion/ 
statistical 
property 
Specification A-DMC DAC-test 
Validation 
criteria  
Self-rating 
scales  
Decision-making styles 
1) To feel regret 
2) To needlessly maximize 
3) To use behavioural 
coping 
4) To decide rationally 
5) To decide intuitively 
6) To depend on others 
7) To avoid decisions 
8) To decide spontaneously  
Experienced decision 
outcomes  
9) DOI 
Decision-making styles 
1) Decision self-esteem 
2) Vigilance 
3) Buck-passing 
4) Procrastination 
5) Hypervigilance 
 
6) Decision satisfaction 
 
7) Intolerance of uncertainty 
Performance 
measures  
Cognitive abilities  
10) Nonverbal cognitive 
ability 
11) Crystallised verbal ability 
Cognitive abilities 
8) Fluid intelligence 
9) Problem-solving 
competence  
Socio-
demographics  
12) Using social services 
13) Education 
14) Age  
10) Age 
11) GPA 
12) PA-M 
Correlations & 
level of 
significance 
1) rp = -.14* 
2)  rp = -.19*** 
3)  rp =   .28*** 
4)  rp =   .22*** 
5)  rp =   .09 
6)  rp =   .03 
7)  rp =  -.21*** 
8)  rp =  -.29*** 
9)  rp =   .29*** 
10)  rp =   .61*** 
11)  rp =   .50*** 
12)  rp =  -.54*** 
13)   rp =   .47*** 
14)  rp =  -.03 
1)  rp =   .18*** 
2)  rp =   .17* 
3)  rp =   .00 
4)  rp =  -.10 
5)  rp =  -.10 
6)  rp =   .10 
7)   rp =  -.20*** 
8)  rp =   .49*** 
9)  rp =   .34*** 
10)  rp =   .03 
11)  rp =   .16*** 
12)  rp =   .28*** 
Note. A-DMC = Adult Decision-Making Competence index score (Bruine de Bruin et al., 2007); DAC-test 
= Decision-Analytical Competence test; DOI = Decision Outcomes Inventory; GPA = grade point 
average; PA-M = Point average in maths; rP = Pearson correlation. 
* p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001. 
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The DAC-test is validated by a set of 12 measures: seven self-assessment scales, 
two performance tests, and three socio-demographic variables. Significant correlations 
could be observed for decision self-esteem (rP = .18; p < .001), vigilant decision-making 
style (rP = .17; p < .05), and interlerance of uncertainty (rP = -.20; p < .001). The 
relationships with fluid intelligence (rP = .49; p < .001) and problem-solving competence (rP 
= .34; p < .001) appeared as the highest values. Also, the overall DAC-test overall score 
correlates positively with the GPA (rP = .16; p < .001) and the point average in maths (rP = 
.28; p < .001).  
It can be summarised that both measures, the A-DMC and the DAC-test, intend to 
operationalize DMC. The two performance tests differ in terms of their theoretical basis of 
captured decision-making approach and target group. This section intended to 
descriptively point out the strengths and weaknesses of the A-DMC and the DAC-test. In 
direct comparison, the A-DMC seems to perform better in terms of internal consistency 
on sub-scale and construct-level. According to the construct’s dimensionality, the DAC-
test shows a better fit of the empirical data in respect to its theory. Validity-wise, the 
evidence of the A-DMC shows more significant and more distinctive relationships with 
corresponding validation criteria.  
 
Addressing the strengths and weaknesses of the developed DAC-test, the following 
two sub-sections discuss the scientific contribution and potential practical utilisation as 
well as the limitations of the current research and points out potential for further research.  
6.4 SCIENTIFIC CONTRIBUTION AND POTENTIAL PRACTICAL UTILISATION 
The present research dedicated itself to a relatively under-studied branch of decision-
analytical research, which has traditionally emphasised the development of methods and 
tools to support decision-making. It followed the examples of behavioural approaches, 
which have been constructed performance-based measures that allow for assessing an 
individual’s decision-making competence on various cognitive dimensions. While these 
existing instruments (cf. Bruine de Bruin et al., 2007; Parker & Fischhoff, 2005) mostly 
focus on capturing the ability to resist decision biases and therefore concentrate on roots 
from descriptive decision science, this PhD research provides a new approach to 
quantifying individuals’ competence to run an analytical decision process to solve 
complex decision problems. The following paragraphs try to assess the scientific 
contribution of this study and identify potential areas for its practical utilisation.  
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Over fifty years since the discipline of decision analysis has emerged, it seemed 
reasonable to make use of the great amount of knowledge the scientific field has created 
on how decision makers can better solve complex decision problems. The time appeared 
to be suitable to focus on individual choices and provide a prescriptive approach to the 
question of how the quality of individuals’ decision-making could be assessed objectively.  
By doing a literature review on decision-analytical descriptions of good decision-
making processes, eight cognitive steps, which are widely recognised in the field, were 
identified. The so-called Process Cycle of Decision-Analytical Competence (cf. Figure 2-5) 
illustrates the aspects of the constructs and thereby defines DAC. The core of the present 
work was the operationalization of those aspects of DAC. For this purpose, a set of 
cognitive performance tasks was developed. The thereby designed DAC-test was then 
field-tested and examined in two studies in terms of its statistically quality criteria.  
In the field of decision analysis, this research makes a clear contribution to 
understanding how researchers of prescriptive decision science define good individual 
decision-making and how the quality of decision-analytical knowledge can be evaluated 
by a rigorous assessment tool. So far there are very few attempts of conducting such 
assessments in the decision analysis literature. One recently published exception is the 
work of Siebert and Kunz (2016) which proposes the proactive decision-making scale. 
The scale classifies decision makers’ decision-making habits as proactive or reactive by a 
self-assessment questionnaire. Besides the study of Finucane and Gullion (2010), which 
provides among other constructs indices of comprehension and dimension weighting, the 
present research on DAC is the first attempt to offer a performance-based measure to 
objectively evaluate the quality of individual decision-analytical processes.  
 
The developed DAC-test goes along with a wide range of potential areas for 
application: Accessible to the public, an individual could use the test results for personal 
reflection and thereby identify areas for improvement. Corresponding training could be 
undertaken to address the specific DAC-ability/ies, which showed potential for 
improvement. Also, the individual would learn more about their strengths and thus, 
expand their awareness of well-developed abilities.  
At the same time, training, workshops, and courses targeting decision-analytical 
knowledge transfer, might use the DAC-test to understand the status quo of their target 
group better or run pre-post testing to evaluate their work.  
Given the case that various educational programmes used the DAC-test for their 
evaluation or impact measuring, the effectiveness of different programmes could be 
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compared and thus, clients had the chance to justify their decision for a specific 
programme on an objective/independent criterion. 
One relatively obvious area for application might be the personal selection in human 
resources. The DAC-test could be used to diagnose differences between people of 
certain groups. As part of an assessment centre the DAC-test could be applied to figure 
out who of the applicants showed the highest decision-analytical knowledge. For a job 
position, which goes along with a high frequency of high-stake decisions, this testing 
instrument could help to find inter-individual differences and thereby identify the best 
fitting candidate. Based on the relevance of decision-making competence for the 
requirements profiles of current and future occupational fields (for instance in the areas of 
politics, risk management, economics and news selection in fast digital media), the 
necessity of an instrument to measure this competence is increasing. 
 
In contrast to this section but also reflecting the present research, the next section 
discusses the limitations and potential for further research. 
6.5 LIMITATIONS AND POTENTIAL FOR FURTHER RESEARCH  
The present research intended to psychometrically capture DMC from a decision-
analytical perspective. Therefore, the latent construct of DAC built the focus of this Ph.D. 
project. DAC was theoretically defined by the decision-analytical literature and 
operationalized by a set of performance-based decisions tasks. According to prescriptive 
decision theory, eight cognitive and motivational dimensions of DAC were revealed: the 
ability to recognise a decision, the ability to assess decision fitness, the ability to frame a 
decision, the ability to envision one’s objectives, the ability to identify relevant alternatives, 
the ability to deal with uncertainty, the ability to integrate information, and the ability to 
plan to implement a decision. For all DAC-dimensions except the ability to plan to 
implement a decision a set of objectively, and by a programmed feedback scheme, ad 
hoc assessable items could be developed.  
The remaining seven DAC-dimensions were qualitatively pilot-tested, quantitatively 
pre-tested, and finally tested in the main study. Due to weakly observed variance within 
the data set for the ability to envision one’s objectives, no empirical evidence for this sub-
scale of DAC could be collected. The other dimensions were examined in terms of their 
internal consistency and dimensionality. On a construct-level, DAC was analysed in terms 
of its internal consistency, dimensionality, and validity. The latter quality criterion was 
investigated by a set of 12 different validation criteria. 
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The following sub-section serves to highlight subset aspects and results of the 
current research in terms of their limitations and potential for further research. Sub-section 
6.5.1 discusses aspects of the data quality and transferability of the research results. 
Sub-section 6.5.2 reflects the statistical properties of the developed DAC-test and the 
potential for improvement. Sub-section 6.5.3 points out that not all intended dimensions 
of DAC could be empirically captured by this Ph.D. research and sub-section 6.5.4 
presents prospects for future research on measuring DAC.  
6.5.1 Aspects of the Data Quality & Transferability of Results 
The main reason for designing an online test rather than a paper-pencil test was the 
limited resources of a Ph.D. research – time- and money-wise. Thus, the developed DAC-
test set up as an online measure helped to keep the expenses for the acquisition of test 
participants, for printing, and for data entry low. It provided great speed in the phases of 
acquisition, responding, and data entry. Also, a positive side-effect was the 
corresponding objectivity (cf. sub-section 5.2.5) of data entry and evaluation.  
Even though the challenges of online studies, such as multiple submissions, 
incomplete responses, or high dropout rates (Reips, 2001), have be addressed in 
preparation of the research, a general sample bias could not be prevented (Tuten, Urban, 
& Bosnjak, 2002). For the pre-testing, approximately 2190 different users entered the 
DAC-test website, of whom 8.95 per cent (N = 196) completed the test. For the main 
testing, approximately 3430 various IP-addresses accessed the website within the period 
of data gathering. Of those web-site visitors, 13.27 per cent (N = 433) completed the test 
and thereby submitted their results. To test whether the sample group of the present 
research shows obviously group differences, maybe due to sample biases, four group 
comparison tests have been undertaken. With regard to the classic socio-demographic 
variables, sex, age, and education, a quite homogeneous picture appears. An 
independent samples t-test was conducted to compare the scaled overall DAC-test 
scores for male and female test participants. No significant difference between female test 
participants (M = 0.11, SD = 0.95) and male test participants (M = -0.02, SD = 1.03) was 
found; t (353) = 1.20, p = .231. By a Pearson correlation, the relation among age and the 
scaled overall DAC-test score was examined. No significant correlation was found with rP 
= .071 (p = .182). A nonparametric correlation with Spearman’s rho was calculated to 
analyse the coherence of the scaled overall DAC-test score and the educational level of 
the test participants. Also here, no significant difference was found by rS = .061 (p = .252).  
Additionally, to investigate whether the two groups of paid and unpaid test 
participants differ in terms of their performance in the DAC-test, again an independent 
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samples t-test was run. The groups did not differ significantly. Paid participants ended up 
with a scaled overall mean DAC-test score of M = 0.02 (SD = 1.02) on average and 
unpaid test participants reached a mean overall DAC-test score of M = 0.08 (SD = 0.95); t 
(355) = 0.63, p = .530.  
 
A general issue that had to be addressed for the present research is its quality of 
data. Nevertheless, given the advantages of online testing for the researcher, e.g. 
efficiency and access to a large locally-independent sample (e.g. Dillman et al., 2014), and 
for test participants, e.g. their comfort to complete the test whenever and wherever they 
want, less control over the quality of data might be a price to pay. One way to control for 
data quality was the set control criterion of a minimum completion time for the survey as a 
whole. However, the criterion of minimum completion time turned out to be not 
distinctively applicable as 7.24 per cent of test participants, who attained more than 90 
per cent of the overall DAC-test score, fell below the set threshold of 30 minutes for 
completion. Other attempts at data cleansing, such as by controlling for motivation or 
level of English skills, did not bring any clearer picture of the empirical data. To better 
address the issue of data quality in further research on this topic, standardised and 
controlled testing in labs might be an opportunity.  
 
The results of the present research have to be considered more as a work in 
progress than as final statements about how DAC has to be measured for young adults. 
This Ph.D. research is mainly an attempt to create a psychometric performance measure 
and especially in terms of its statistical properties it became clear that further research 
effort is needed. The current developed DAC-test is tailored towards young people 
between 18 and 30 years. The test is presented in English, and thus demands a proper 
level of English understanding. That is why people with self-assured “basic English skills” 
were excluded from the data analyses. The results are exclusively assigned to the 
observed sample group and consequentially cannot be used to draw a conclusion for the 
population in general. 
6.5.2 Improving Statistical Properties for the DAC-Test 
As consistently pointed out during this Ph.D. research, its main aim was to create a 
reliable and valid DAC performance test. On the basis of a literature review, analytical 
steps for a sound decision-making process were identified and operationalized by a set of 
either existing, adapted, or newly created cognitive decision tasks. At the very beginning 
the empirical research intended to prove the reliability of the designed test by examining 
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two parallel-tests of the DAC-test. Therefore, two comparable tests were developed, 
pilot-, and pre-tested. However, the actual completion time for both test forms and the 
corresponding effort for test participants exceeded the level of reasonableness with over 
three hours on average. That is why one test form had to be neglected and only one of 
the two test forms could be provided and tested in the main testing. Consequently, 
testing for parallel-test reliability was not possible. The measure of split-half reliability was 
indirectly determined by the mean of all split-half measures expressed by Cronbach’s 
alpha. This coefficient in turn only works for homogeneous scales and is very susceptible 
for scales with fewer than 10 items (Nunnally et al., 1978), as occurred for five of the six 
tested DAC-test sub-scales. Therefore, it might be advisable to provide for each DAC-test 
sub-scale at least 10 items; ideally, the same number of items so that a comparison of the 
DAC sub-scales’ Cronbach’s alpha provides more effective information on the internal 
consistency and does not leave so much room for conjecture. Further research is 
therefore necessary to expand the examination the reliability of the DAC-test and its sub-
scales and thereby improve the statistical properties. Especially, gathering evidence on 
the DAC-test’s re-test reliability would be worthwhile.  
Additionally, to further improve the comparability of the DAC-dimensions, it might be 
reasonable to provide all items of the DAC-test with the same number of responses. In 
this case, the chances of guessing correctly would be comparatively equal over all items 
and thus, could be left out from analysing considerations.  
In terms of the dimensionality on a construct level, satisfying results have been 
extracted by an EFA and confirmed by a CFA. Hence, as assumed in relation to the 
literature (Stanovich & West, 2000), DAC can be considered as a construct underlying 
several correlated dimensions. The data of the present research provided undetermined 
results on the homogeneity of the DAC-test sub-scales. Therefore, further exploration on 
the dimensionality of the DAC-dimensions is necessary81. 
Referring to the test’s validity, significant correlations in expected direction to the 
theory could be observed for the seven constructs and variables: decision self-esteem, 
vigilant decision-making style, intolerance of uncertainty, fluid intelligence, problem-solving 
competence, the GPA, and the point average in maths. These results are treated as first 
evidence for the validity of the developed DAC-test. Nevertheless, further validation is 
                                                
81 Besides some possible irregularities in the item answers due to “clicking-through”, the CFA results 
point to another topic for re-evaluation. To increase the statistical properties of the scales it might be 
necessary to address the issue that the items of some scales show low discriminatory power or plain lack 
of unidimensionality and to further scrutinise these items. This may lead to another cycle of item 
construction and evaluation in order to replace some of the existing wordings. Despite the effort 
undertaken in this thesis to validate the DAC-test, this task is not completed yet and further research is 
required from a statistical point of view. 
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essential. So, an explicit and more distinct ascription of DAC to sound decision-making 
styles and habits is desirable. At the same time a precise differentiation from irrational, 
emotional, or non-analytical approaches to decision-making is neccessary. In addition, 
the strong relation to intelligence is not suprising. However, a definite borderline to the 
construct of intelligence is crucial and hence, calls for further examination. 
 
6.5.3 Providing a More Holistic Picture of DAC 
According to prescriptive decision theory, DAC is seen as a multi-dimensional higher-
order construct (cf. Finucane & Gullion, 2010; Stanovich & West, 2000). The decision-
analytical literature captures a set of cognitive steps that describes a good decision-
making process (cf. Mellers & Locke, 2007). The DAC-test aimed to make all relevant 
dimensions measureable by an online performance test. However, some constraints 
mainly in terms of data analysis were the reason for why not all eight identified DAC-
dimensions could be successfully operationalized and measured.  
The following remarks address the missing aspects of DAC and present ideas on 
how a more holistic picture of the construct could be operationalized in future research.  
Ability to Envision One’s Objectives  
One aspect of analytical decision-making, which is indispensable to decision analysis, 
is the ability to envision one’s objectives - OBJECTIVES. However, both in the pre-testing 
and in the main testing, the data of OBJECTIVES had to be excluded from further analyses 
as for both test score distributions a ceiling effect appeared (Cramer & Howitt, 2004), with 
which the condition of a normal distribution was violated and variances within the group 
could not be observed sufficiently. After adapting the number of required objectives from 
seven in the pre-testing to 10 in the main testing, it was assumed to be able to correct 
this effect, as study participants of Bond et al. (2008) have on average selected 7.7 self-
generated objectives of the final chosen objectives (cf. Table 6-6). By increasing the 
required number to 10 objectives, it was intended to create more room for variance of the 
test results. Table 6-6 gives an overview of OBJECTIVES’ indicators of the present research 
and the study of Bond et al. (2008).  
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Table 6-6 Comparing Bond et al. (2008) and the DAC-test results for OBJECTIVES indicators 
 
Bond et a l. ,  2008 Present study 
Study 1  Study 2 Study 3 AV Pre-testing 
Main 
testing AV 
Mean number of 
listed objectives  7.4 5.9 6.8 6.7 8.0 9.7 8.9 
Mean number of 
objectives checked 
as relevant 
13.6 14.3 14.8 14.2 19.9 22.9 21.4 
Mean number of self-
generated objectives 
of the final selected 
objectives 
(percentage) 
7.6 
(76%) 
7.7 
(77%) 
7.9 
(77%) 
7.7 
(77%) 
5.5 
(79%) 
8.5 
(85%) 
-a 
(82%) 
Note. DAC = Decision-analytical competence; AV = average.  
a The dash indicates that an average of the means of self-generated objectives of the final selected 
objectives of pre-testing and main testing is not applicable as the number of required objectives had 
been increased from seven to 10 and thus might have anchored test participants. In the Bond et al. 
studies each time the selection of 10 objectives was required.  
 
It becomes clear that the results of both research projects do not differ that much, 
even though the percentage of self-generated objectives of the final selected objectives 
(cf. last row) is five per cent higher in the current study. 
The crucial difference between the two studies is their corresponding research 
intentions. While Bond and colleagues aimed to prove that individuals are not able to 
envision a complete list of individually relevant objectives, the present study wanted to 
measure inter-individual differences. Due to the received ceiling-effect and thereby the 
missing variances within the group, neither the setting with seven nor the setting with 10 
required objectives fitted this research aim. Deductively, the operationalization of 
OBJECTIVES as it was applied for this research seems to be too easy for this group of test 
participants and for this reason another way of operationalization has to be found in 
further research. 
 
(Nisbett and Wilson (1977) analysed introspection in think-aloud experiments and 
came to the conclusion that people are not able to achieve true introspection when asked 
to report on their cognitive processes. Thus, OBJECTIVES might be a challenging task per 
se for test takers and might not properly measure the intended construct rather 
introspection. Nevertheless, the approach of Bond, Carlson, & Keeney (2008) was 
identified as the best trial so far to operationalize this important aspect of DAC.  
 
One further critical aspect to the operationalization of this DAC-dimension is its 
assessment criterion. In comparison to the assessment criteria of the other DAC sub-
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scales (cf. Table 6-1), for which the accuracy of test participants’ responses could be 
evaluated objectively, for this decision task the percentage of self-generated objectives of 
the finally selected, individually most important, objectives is calculated. Some test 
participants might have identified this assessment criterion. One possible way to reduce 
this potential effect in further studies, is to divide the OBJECTIVES task: to ask at the 
beginning to list all objectives that arise in the test participant’s mind, to choose in the 
second step the relevant objectives from the master list, and to match the own list with 
the master list. After completing the remaining tasks of the DAC-test, i.e. at the very end 
of all items, test participants are required to choose their 10 most important objectives 
from the combined list of self-generated and identified objectives. To support this setting, 
it should not be traceable for test participants which of the objectives of the final list have 
been identified as self-generated in the first step and which have not been identified.  
Ability to Plan to Implement a Decision 
As presented in sub-section 4.1.8, the first ideas of how the ability to plan to 
implement a decision - IMPLEMENTATION - could be operationalized were collected. 
However, within the framework of this Ph.D. no standard of comparison for the qualitative 
results of the pre-testing for this DAC-test sub-scale could be extracted. For the sake of 
completeness, future research should address this issue and find a way of quantitatively 
assessing the ability to plan to implement a decision. 
 
Even though the other six DAC-dimensions effectively have been operationalized 
quantitatively and the corresponding results turned out analysable, enhancements for two 
of the sub-scales are presented in the following, as additional aspects of these two 
dimensions should be considered in further research of DAC. 
Ability to Assess Decision Fitness  
Referring to decision-analytical literature, the ability to assess decision fitness – 
FITNESS - implies a skill and can be described as metacognition (W. Edwards, 1954; 
Raiffa, 1968), i.e. being aware of the extent of one’s competences. So far, this aspect has 
not been considered for measuring DAC. For prospective studies, one indicator could be 
added to the DAC-test. This indicator would measure whether people are able to 
realistically assess the extent of their cognitive competences after having solved a 
decision-making task. Such an item would be a self-evaluation task. In this respect, it 
could be set right after each item block of each DAC-dimension. Test participants would 
be asked to estimate their performance on the completed block of items. This type of 
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item could serve to measure whether test participants are able to assess the quality of 
their own decision-making competency and thereby provide a more holistic picture of this 
DAC-dimension.  
Ability to Identify Relevant Alternatives  
The ability to identify relevant alternatives - ALTERNATIVES - is hitherto measured by 
items that request test participants to decide whether provided alternatives fit presented 
individual objectives of the character in the test. This type of item refers to the qualitative 
aspect of this DAC-dimension, as test participants have to evaluate the alternatives on the 
basis of the given objectives. An additional aspect of ALTERNATIVES could be quantity. 
According to the literature, good decision-making requires the creation of a sound set of 
alternatives (Siebert & Keeney, 2013). As a first step, test participants could be asked to 
list as many alternatives as they can think of for a presented decision situation, which is 
connected to the main case of the test. This type of item would refer to the quantitative 
aspect of this DAC-dimension and could be split into creativity, which is defined by 
originality, and fluency, which describes “the ability to generate ideas, words, mental 
associations, or potential solutions to a problem with ease and rapidity.” (APA, 2007, p. 
381 [entry "fluency"]) 
6.5.4 Future Prospects for Researching DAC 
Summarising, the results of the present Ph.D. research show promise for capturing 
analytical DMC of individuals as a construct underlying related cognitive dimensions. The 
empirical findings verify this assumption. However, further research intensions are 
necessary to further develop the assessment to a more advanced level. Some future 
attention should be paid to analyse the dimensionality of DAC and the structure of the 
DAC-dimensions. In this respect, effort should be undertaken to expand the number of 
solid items with comparable response sets. Especially in terms of statistical properties, 
the DAC-test needs additional mindfulness. So, the reliability of each dimension and the 
DAC-test as a whole has to be proven, also by re-test reliability. More distinct and 
rigorous validation criteria have to be applied. A distinction among emotional, intuitive, 
and irrational decision-making approaches and intelligence is essential. Former studies 
have found positive correlations between DMC related measures and tests for aspects of 
intelligence (e.g. Bruine de Bruin et al., 2007). In this context, a positive correlation of DAC 
and IQ would indicate convergent validity. However, further studies have to prove the 
distinction between DAC and fluid intelligence so that it becomes explicit that the DAC-
test provides additional benefit in comparison to common tests for fluid intelligence. 
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DAC could be seen as one aspect of DMC or the combination of various analytical 
abilities of the general construct of DMC. This relation could be seen as one reason why 
the correlation of DAC and the scales of the MDMQ-II (Mann et al., 1997) are not so high. 
Direction for further research should include more decision-analytical specific criteria for 
validation. One potential scale developed recently82 is the proactive decision-making scale 
of Siebert and Kunz (2016). However, as DAC intends to capture parts of the decision-
analytical components of DMC a correlation of DAC and DMC and correspondingly DMC-
related constructs was assumed.  
To provide a more holistic picture of the construct, OBJECTIVES has to be tested in a 
way that the test results show enough variance that could be analysed. Also, a method 
has to be found to quantitatively operationalize IMPLEMENTATION and thereby complement 
the DAC-test by capturing all eight cognitive dimensions. Even though the present 
research presents impetuses to assess FITNESS and ALTERNATIVES quantitatively, future 
studies could be dedicated to the research of different aspects of these two DAC-
dimensions.  
 
Having overcome these obstacles, it would definitely be worthwhile to examine the 
already designed parallel-test, which had to be rejected after the pre-testing due to time 
constraints.  
Furthermore, a joined study measuring A-DMC, which captures the behavioural 
decision science side, and the DAC-test, which measures the prescriptive side of 
decision-making, would be of interest, as a good decision-making process involves the 
ability to deal with decision biases and the ability to analytically solve a decision problem 
(e.g. Baron, 2008).   
                                                
82 The proactive decision-making scale was published 2016. Unfortunately, this was too late to include it 
in the present research and thereby use it as a criterion for validation.  
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7 CONCLUSION 
Decision-making builds key competences - in terms of business (e.g. Hoffman et al., 
2011) as well as in private lives (e.g. Keeney, 2008). Various research groups commit 
themselves to the interdisciplinary topic of decision-science. Within this context, the 
descriptive approach with its roots in behavioural psychology investigates how people 
naturally solve decision problems (e.g. Gilovich, Griffin & Kahneman, 2002; Takemura, 
2014); the normative approach originates from decision theory and analyses how choices 
can be made ideally (e.g. Edwards, Miles Jr., & von Winterfeldt, 2007), and the 
prescriptive approach connects the two prior research fields and is dedicated to the 
analysis of decision-making processes, helping people to improve their decision-making 
by developing efficient decision supporting systems and strategies (e.g. D. E. Bell et al., 
1988; Keeney, 1992).  
Due to this diversity of research interests, a variety of approaches for defining 
decision-making competence (DMC; Finucane & Lees, 2005) have been proposed in the 
literature. Nevertheless, no consistent definition of DMC with a stated set of related 
dimensions is generally accepted, even though decision scientists, such as Milkman et al. 
(2009) or Stanovich and West (2000), assume that DMC builds a higher-order factor 
underlying a set of cognitive abilities. 
Psychometric instruments to measure DMC and especially performance-based 
measures are still rare. Concomitantly, attempts to operationalize DMC from the decision-
analytical avenue of decision theory in a theory-driven manner were missing.  
 
The present dissertation aimed to address this gap of a lack of a performance test to 
measure the quality of individual decision-analytical competence (DAC). Hence, the main 
goal of this research was to create a theory-driven and evidence-based test with good 
statistical properties quantifying DAC on an individual level.  
 
The thesis had four main research objectives. The first research objective was to 
identify the strengths and weaknesses of prevalent definitions and measures of DMC and 
identify gaps for improvement. Besides a variety of attempts on measuring DMC by self-
rating scales (e.g. Mann et al., 1997; Mann, Harmoni, Power, et al., 1988), most recent 
research operationalizes DMC by a set of performance-based tasks. The Adult Decision-
Making Competence index score (A-DMC) of Bruine de Bruin et al. (2007), which focuses 
on findings from behavioural psychology and normative decision science, appears as a 
promising approach to the perspective of DMC as a higher-order construct. Since other 
MEASURING DECISION-ANALYTICAL COMPETENCE - A PSYCHOMETRIC ONLINE PERFORMANCE TEST 
 
 189 
performance tools, such as the work of Finucane and Gullion (2010), are often situation-
specific, the A-DMC was identified as one of the most advanced approaches in this field 
trying to capture general DMC. The perhaps greatest potential for improvement for 
developing a new test instrument to measure DMC lies in the fact that the A-DMC only 
focuses on the assessment of abilities to deal with decision biases and thus, misses 
aspects derived from prescriptive decision science. 
 
For this reason, the second research objective was the conceptualisation of DAC as 
a psychological construct, consisting of a concrete number of measurable dimensions 
according to the theory of decision analysis. Introduced in this context was the Process 
Cycle of Decision-Analytical Competence with its eight dimensions, deduced from 
decision-analytical literature (e.g. Bazerman & Moore, 2009; W. Edwards, 1954; 
Hammond et al., 1999; Hastie & Dawes, 2010; Howard, 2007; Keelin et al., 2009; 
Keeney, 1992; Siebert & Keeney, 2015). These eight dimensions embrace the ability to 
recognise decision opportunities (OPPORTUNITIES), the ability to assess decision fitness 
(FITNESS), the ability to frame a decision (FRAME), the ability to envision one’s objectives 
(OBJECTIVES), the ability to identify relevant alternatives (ALTERNATIVES), the ability to deal 
with uncertainty (UNCERTAINTY), the ability to integrate information (INFORMATION), and the 
ability to plan to implement a decision (IMPLEMENTATION), and eventually build the 
theoretical basis for the DAC-test construction.  
 
The development of corresponding item sets to operationalize the various theoretical 
DAC-dimensions and in parallel, the construction of a psychometric performance test to 
measure DAC, formed the third main research objective. Test constructional 
considerations led to the decision of presenting the DAC-test as an online test, which 
consists of content-wise connected items, in a wider sense capturing the complex 
decision situation everyone faces at least once in their lifetime “What to do after having 
completed school”. Young adults between 18 and 30 years built the target group for the 
DAC-test study.  
For all DAC-dimensions, except IMPLEMENTATION, a set of quantitative assessable 
items was developed and pre-tested on a sample group of 143 young adults. The pre-
testing served to examine the quality of items and the dimensionality of the construct. The 
corresponding exploratory factor analysis with non-orthogonal promax rotation extracted 
a one-factor solution explaining 29% of the observed variance, which supported the 
theoretical assumption of DAC being a higher-level measure, underlying a set of related 
dimensions. 
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Subsequently the fourth research objective was to examine the proposed 
psychometric DAC-test in terms of its reliability and validity relating to its empirical 
evidence for sound decision-making as measured by a set of appropriate criteria for 
validation. In the main testing, the final version of the DAC-test was examined by 368 test 
participants, of which 47.5% were male and 52.7% female. On average, test participants 
were 24 years old (M = 23.8; SD = 3.4). The 49 items of the six dimensions, which 
showed sufficient variance in the data83, presented a Cronbach’s alpha of α = .85 and the 
z-scores of the sub-scales sum-scores a McDonald’s omega of ωH = .72 for internal 
consistency. While the scales of FITNESS, FRAME, and ALTERNATIVES were homogeneous, 
the other DAC-test sub-scales were not. The DAC-test sub-scales of OPPORTUNITIES, 
UNCERTAINTY, and INFORMATION showed internal consistency of ωH > .70.  
The assumed one-factor structure for DAC was confirmed by a confirmatory factor 
analysis showing a good model fit (CFI = .974, RMSEA = .051, SRMR = .031). Thus, 
according to the theory, the results of this research reinforced DAC, measured by the 
DAC-test, as a higher-level construct underlying a set of correlated dimensions.  
The validation of the DAC-test was examined by a set of 12 measures: seven self-
assessment scales, two performance tests, and three socio-demographic variables. 
Significant correlations could be observed for decision self-esteem (rP = .18; p < .001), 
vigilant decision-making style (rP = .17; p < .05), and interlorance of uncertainty (rP = -.20; 
p < .001). The relationships with fluid intelligence (rP = .49; p < .001) and problem-solving 
competence (rP = .34; p < .001) appeared highest. Also, the DAC-test overall scores 
correlated positively with the GPA (rP = .16; p < .001) and the point average in maths (rP = 
.28; p < .001). Thus, the results are treated as first evidence for the DAC-test’s validity.  
 
However, further research is necessary to examine the reliability of the DAC-test, its 
sub-scales, and in parallel, the sub-scales’ dimensionality, as the results of this study are 
not distinct for all corresponding coefficients. It would also be worthwhile to gather 
evidence on the DAC-test’s re-test reliability, as the present research did not cover this 
quality criterion. Additionally, further research should extend the catalogue of convergent 
and discriminant validation criteria for the DAC-test, and thereby elaborate a clear 
attribution of the DAC-test to approaches of analytical decision-making and provide a 
precise distinction from non-analytical approaches. The high correlation of DAC and fluid 
                                                
83 Due to a ceiling effect and thus missing variance within the test data, OBJECTIVES had to be excluded 
from the final analyses.  
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intelligence also needs more attention, resulting in a crucial contour between the two 
concepts.  
 
Referring to the main aim of the study, the present research should be treated as a 
first step in the direction of performance measures for DAC concerning complex decisions 
for the individual. It is desirable that further research attempts are undertaken to expand 
this work. A widely accepted, valid, and reliable psychometric performance test capturing 
the quality of DAC would build the basis for three application areas and thereby show 
high relevance for practitioners. Firstly, for the individual per se, it would allow for 
measuring and evaluating DAC on different dimensions. In this respect, it would be 
possible to provide detailed individual feedback about how well each ability of DAC is 
evolved. Courses and workshops could then respond to this assessment and address the 
gaps of the decision-maker. Secondly, for inter-individual differences, a comparison of 
individual performances in the processing of the DAC-test would allow for differentiating 
between decision-makers according to their performance quality of DAC. Consequently, 
the DAC-test could be applied within assessment centres by human resource 
departments to examine candidates’ level of DAC and thereby their qualification for 
certain occupational requirements. Thirdly, for measuring change, a DAC-test would allow 
for testing DAC before and after training units. Therefore, teachers, lecturers, or workshop 
leaders could gain data on students’ progress and so evaluate the impact of their work.  
 
Summarising, the present work is an attempt to measure DAC in a rigorous and 
systematic way. The constructed DAC-test shows promising first evidence of reliability 
and validity. Gaining more empirical insights on how to measure and assess DAC and 
thereby move this research topic further towards researchers and practitioners would help 
to establish DAC as a psychological construct. Further research to improve the DAC-test 
is of great importance as providing a performance test with good statistical properties 
could arouse increasing interest in domains as diverse as science, economics, and 
politics.  
Undertaking this journey is worth it, given the importance of decisions to individual 
and societal success and wellbeing, because “[t]he only way to exert control over your life 
is through your decision making. The rest just happens to you.” (Hammond et al., 1999, 
p. 234)   
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9 APPENDIX 
The following sections and sub-sections present contributory documents and 
partially statistical details of the present research. For contributory documents the original 
formatting and layouts are retained. In section 9.1 the pilot study to create the master list 
for the ability to envision one’s objectives is displayed. Section 9.2 shows the evaluation 
questionnaire of the qualitative pre-testing, following by section 9.3 with the guideline for 
the semi-structured interviews of the pre-testing. The acquisition emails for the pre-testing 
are presented for the LSE in section 9.4, for the FU and the UB in section 9.5, and for the 
main testing for the LSE in section 9.6. The cover letter of the mailing-list for the main 
testing is displayed in section 9.7. Section 9.8 and its sub-section include the final version 
of the DAC-test with the complete set of instructions, items and response sets. While 
section 9.9 presents the DAC-test certificate, which test participants received after the 
completion of the DAC-test, section 9.10 gives an overview of the surveyed socio-
demographics and the test barometer. The chosen measure for validating the DAC-test 
are listed in section 9.11 and its sub-sections and section 9.12 presents additional results 
of the item analyses ran in the main testing.  
9.1 SURVEYING OBJECTIVES FOR OPERATIONALIZING THE ABILITY TO ENVISION ONE’S 
OBJECTIVES 
In 2012, 59 students of the London School of Economics and Political Science 
summer school course in “Judgement and Decision Making for Management” helped to 
generate the master list of objectives for operationalizing the ability to envision one’s 
objectives respectively to the original study of Bond et al. (2008). The main aim for 
creating such a master list was to provide future test participants an exhaustive list of 
relevant possible objectives.  
 
The students were on average 20 years old (M = 20.21; SD = 2.34; range: 18 – 24). 
Fifty-seven per cent of the group were female and 43 per cent were male. On the very first 
day of their summer school course, the students were given the following instruction: 
Imagine you have to decide what to do after finishing school. What would be your most 
relevant objectives for choosing a direction? Please list as many objectives as you can 
think of. 
The students had 20 minutes to complete the task. They were informed that this 
survey is connected to their course work, that they will learn more about how to envision 
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one’s objectives in the course, and that the study serves to support a Ph.D. research 
project.  
After eliminating redundancies and aggregating similar objectives to a broader 
category of objectives, a list of 37 objectives remained (cf. Table 9-1).  
 
Table 9-1 First draft of master list of 37 objectives surveyed in pilot study  
Object ives 
1. Acquiring knowledge about something 2. Becoming influential 
3. Being independent of parents 4. Being with friends/partner/family 
5. Bringing about a positive change in 
something 6. Characteristics of desired job/profession 
7. Contributing positively to society 8. Costs of further education 
9. Developing skills 10. Diversity of people to work/spend time 
with 
11. Doing something I am good at 12. Doing something that is important to me 
13. Earning my own money 14. Enhancing my resume 
15. Enjoying myself 16. Expected work-load 
17. Exploring new fields 18. Financial support available 
19. Friendliness of environment 20. Geographic location 
21. Getting to know the world 22. Having an enjoyable life in the future 
23. Having free time 24. Improving chances of finding a job 
25. Improving personal status 26. Making new friends/finding a mate 
27. Making the world a better place 28. Not having to go to school anymore 
29. Personal development 30. Possibility of having fun/party 
31. Potential for personal growth 32. Rank of institution (university, company, organization) 
33. Receiving support by others 34. Reputation of choice 
35. Satisfying parents/family 36. Self-discovery/identification process 
37. Serving others, who need help  
 
The first draft of the master list was presented to a small group of eight psychology 
master students from Free University of Berlin. Their feedback was used to revise the draft 
and create the final master list with 43 objectives (cf. appendix sub-section 9.8.1). 
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9.2 EVALUATION QUESTIONNAIRE OF QUALITATIVE PRE-TESTING 
Thank you very much for participating in the pilot-study of the DAC-test.  
We would very much appreciate if you could provide us with detailed feedback on your 
test experience.  
In the following you will find a list of expressions that characterise different moods. Please 
take a look at the list, word by word, and mark for each word the answer that represents 
best the actual intensity of your mood status. Please judge only how you feel at this 
moment, and not how you normally or sometimes feel. 
Right now I feel … 
      
Definitely 
not Not Not really A little 
Very 
much 
Extreme-
ly 
... content ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
... rested ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
... restless ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
... bad ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
... worn-out ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
... composed ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
... tired ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
... great ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
... uneasy ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
... energetic ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
... uncomfortable ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
... relaxed ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
... activated ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
... superb ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
... calm ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
 
Please indicate, for each statement how strongly you agree or disagree. 
Taking the test … 
     
Strongly 
disagree ... Strongly agree 
… was fun ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
… was interesting  ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
… was entertaining  ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
… was exhausting ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
… was boring ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
... was diversified  ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
... gave me a hard time.  ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
I would like to learn more about individual 
decision-making. ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
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I have learned something new taking this 
test. ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
 
If you did not like some of the tasks, please tell us which and why not? 
_____________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Please indicate for each statement how strongly you agree or disagree. 
 Strongly disagree ... Strongly agree 
The test instruction was displayed well and 
understandable.  ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
After reading the instruction I knew what to 
do and expect.  ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
The instructions for each item were clear and 
understandable. ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
I always knew what was expected by each 
item. ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
On average the items were too easy.  ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
On average the items were too difficult.  ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
If you have perceived (an) item(s) as delicate, please tell us which and why?  
_____________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
If you see any (ethical) issues with the test, please tell us which and why? 
_____________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
If you have ideas that could help to increase the test’s professionalism, please tell us here: 
_____________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
What did you like best about the test? 
_____________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
What didn’t you like about the test? 
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_____________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
Do you still have any remaining/open questions regarding the test?  
_____________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Thank you very much for your part ic ipat ion and your honesty! 
  
MEASURING DECISION-ANALYTICAL COMPETENCE - A PSYCHOMETRIC ONLINE PERFORMANCE TEST 
 
 212 
9.3 SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW GUIDELINE FOR THE DAC PRE-TESTING 
" Annotations for the interviewer are italicized. 
A. INTRODUCTION PART 
! Welcome the interviewee: Thank you very much for your time and support!  
 
! Explanation of the process of the interview (objective, duration): This 
interview is intended to clarify outstanding issues concerning your test-taking 
experience and your feedback in the questionnaire. So it will help us to 
optimise the DAC-test. It will take no longer than 20min. 
 
! Question of consent to the recording on tape: Do you agree that I can record 
our conversation on tape? This serves only for simplicity. 
 
! Opportunity for questions: Do you have any questions before we start? 
 
B. INFORMATION COLLECTION 
! First of all, please tell me in a few words how you were feeling during and after 
having taken the test?  
" Check the answers to item 1 for undesirable answers. If undesirable answers have been given, ask: 
! Can you explain why you have perceived the test as... 
 
! Which case (Investment vs. Education) did you like better and why? 
 
! Did you find some of the tasks better or worse than others? 
" If yes, please ask  
! Do you remember which and why? 
 
! Do you have any ideas for improvement to address your critique?  
 
" Check whether the feedback and/or the certificate were assessed negatively. If this appears, ask: 
! I can see that you do not like ... What don’t you like about it?  
 
! How do you like the test’s overall layout?  
 
! Do you have ideas for improvements concerning the layout?  
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! How do you like the test/item instructions?  
 
! Do you have ideas for improvement concerning the instructions? 
 
! Which items do you like best?  
 
! Which items didn’t you like and why?  
 
! Did you perceive items as too easy?  
" If yes, please ask:  
! Do you remember which and why? 
 
!  Did you perceive items as too difficult?  
" If yes, please ask:  
! Do you remember which and why? 
 
" Check whether items 7 and/or 8 have been filled out (delicate items, ethical issues). If yes, please ask:  
! I can see that you perceived items as ... / see any (ethical) issues. Do you 
remember which and why? 
 
" Check whether items 9 – 12 have been filled in. If yes, please ask:  
!  I can see that you ... Can you please explain again what you mean?  
 
! Do you have any general ideas to improve the test?  
 
C. INTERVIEW COMPLETION 
! Opportunity for ideas/additions: Would you like to add anything? 
 
! Thank the participant: Thank you very much for the conversation! 
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9.4 ACQUISITION  E-MAIL FOR PRE-TESTING (LSE) 
Dear students, 
As part of your course MG110 we invite you to participate in the following test: 
www.idmc-test.net to assess your individual decision-making competence. The test is 
compulsory and the deadl ine for submission is the 17th of July 2014. 
 
Durat ion  
Please note that the test will take approx. 2hours to complete. So please allow yourself 
enough time. Once you have started with the testing you cannot stop and continue later. 
Of course, you can take a break, but you have to leave the browser window open. 
(If you close it, you will have to start again from the beginning.) 
 
Benef i ts 
By taking the test: 
- ...you will receive individual feedback on your performance and discover how 
capable you are in making decisions.  
- ...you will receive a personalised certificate with your test score.  
 
Proving your part ic ipat ion 
As the test is anonymous and does not save any personal data, please bring your printed 
personalised certificate to the course on Friday, 18th of July 2014 to show to me. 
 
About the test 
The present IDMC-test is part of the Ph.D. research of Nadine Oeser at LSE. The aim of 
the research project is to provide a valid and reliable psychometric performance test to 
measure Individual Decision-Making Competence. The present test is a prototype. Your 
participation will help to improve its validity. 
 
If you have any clarification questions, please feel free to contact the survey manager: 
N.Oeser@lse.ac.uk. 
Thank you in advance for doing the test. 
Best regards, 
Gilberto Montibeller  
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9.5 ACQUISITION  E-MAIL FOR PRE-TESTING (FU & UB) 
Online study -  
Measuring Individual Decision-Making Competence 
Thank you for your interest in our research! We are conducting a psychometric test on 
measuring Individual Decision-Making Competence84 (IDMC). 
 
Why take the test? 
Taking the IDMC-test offers several benefits for you. By completing the IDMC-test... 
...you will receive individual feedback on your performance and discover how capable you 
are in making decisions.  
...you will receive a personalised certificate with your test score.  
 
What to expect?  
The IDMC consists of different components: 
! Agreement to participate, socio-demographic data, pre test barometer (5min) 
! Performance test for IDMC (approx. 45min) 
! Self-assessment questionnaire (15min) 
! Post test barometer and feedback (3min) 
! Reasoning matrices test (10min) 
All together the test will take you approx. 1 – 1.5 hours to complete. We did our best to 
make it interesting, entertaining and educating at the same time. Thus, it will be good 
investment of your time! 
 
Which kinds of aids are allowed? 
During the test you are encouraged to use paper, pencil and, calculator.  
 
Attention!  
! Our research results depend on high quality data. Thus, please make sure to follow 
all test instructions precisely.  
! Please note that the test will take approx. 1 – 1.5 hours to complete. So please 
allow yourself enough time.  
                                                
84 Decisions influence the way we live our lives and people face thousands of decisions every day. Many of those decisions 
are fast and frugal ones, such as what to eat or to drink, or which movie to watch. But obviously, not all decisions people 
have to address are ‘no-brainers’. The majority of important decisions are demanding ones, which are defined by high 
stakes and serious consequences. e.g. health decisions or educational choices. In those cases the decision environment is 
complex, uncertain, dynamic, competitive and resources are finite. The competence to solve these kinds of decisions is 
called Individual Decision-Making Competence (IDMC). 
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! If you can take a break, you have to leave the browser window open. (If you close it, 
you will have to start again from the beginning.) 
! You cannot go back in the test. (If you try, the system will force you to start again.) 
! On the page you receive your feedback you will be ask to follow a link to a second 
(very short) test. This is the reasoning matrices test and thus the final part of your 
testing.  
 
Please select the link to participate in the study —> www.idmc-test.net 
 
Thank you very much in advance!  
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9.6 ACQUISITION E-MAIL FOR MAIN TESTING (LSE) 
Dear students, 
Only one week is left until we will welcome you to our LSE summer school this year. We 
are looking forward to introducing you to the world of decision-making. 
In preparation for your course MG110 we would like to test your current decision-making 
capabilities via an online performance test. 
The majority of important decisions that we face are demanding ones, which are defined 
by high stakes and serious consequences e.g. health decisions or educational choices. In 
those cases the decision environment is complex, uncertain, dynamic, competitive and 
resources are finite. The competence to solve these kinds of decisions is called Individual 
Decision-Making Competence. 
The online performance test will allow you to: 
! get an initial overview of what complex decision-making is about by being led 
through the various decision-making tasks of the test 
! receive feedback on your individual decision-making performance directly at 
the end of the test in the form of your test scores 
! receive a personalised certificate with your test score at the end of the test  
 
Please follow this link to the test " www.idmc-test.net 
 
About the test 
The present IDMC-test is part of the Ph.D. research of Nadine Oeser at LSE, which is 
supervised by Drs Fasolo & Montibeller. The aim of the research project is to provide a 
valid and reliable psychometric performance test to measure Individual Decision-Making 
Competence. With your participation you help to improve its validity. 
 
Deadl ine 
The test is conducted as a preparation for your LSE summer school course. Thus, the 
deadline for submission is the 5th of July 2015.  
Hints 
! Please make sure to follow all test instructions precisely. 
! The test will take approx. 1.5 hours to complete. So please allow yourself 
enough time and answer each item with consideration and very thoroughly. 
! If you take a break, please leave the browser window open. If you close it, you 
will have to start over again. 
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! You cannot go back in the test. If you press enter the system will guide you to 
the next page. 
! On the page with your feedback you will be asked to follow a red link to a 
second (very short) test. This is the reasoning matrices test and the final part of 
your testing. 
 
If you have any clarification questions, please feel free to contact the survey manager: 
N.Oeser@lse.ac.uk. 
 
Many thanks for completing the test. See you soon in London! 
Best regards, 
Gilberto Montibeller and Barbara Fasolo 
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9.7 COVER LETTER OF MAILING-LIST FOR MAIN TESTING 
Dear all, 
My name is Nadine Oeser. I am a Ph.D. student of London School of Economics and 
Political Science. In the framework of my research I have created a psychometric online 
performance test to measure Individual Decision-Making Competence for complex 
decision situations. 
After the phase of item analysis and validation I am looking for students (between 18 and 
30) for my main testing. 
 
It would be great if you could share my request and the attached handout with your 
colleagues from decision science or forward the handout to interested students. 
Furthermore, it would be great if you could assign participation as homework of your 
class. In this case I would provide you with a report on the decision competence of your 
students. 
For teachers, lecturers and professors of decision science a performance test 
measuring Decision-Analytical Competence (DMC) offers three advantages (cf. figure): 
- First, it would allow pre-post-tests to be conducted. Thus, class teachers, lecturers and 
co. would be able to test students before and after a course in decision-making or related 
subjects and compare the results of the two testing times. The results might be used to 
empirically confirm that you and your course have a positive impact on the Decision-
Making Competence of your students. 
- Second, it would allow an individual’s DMC to be assessed on various dimensions. 
Hence, a person interested in his/her test score could receive detailed feedback about 
which dimensions of DMC (e.g. ability to deal with uncertainty or integrate information) are 
already well evolved and which dimensions need more training. 
- Third, it would allow differentiation between people. For example, when recruiting a new 
employee with good decision-making competence, one could run the test and choose 
the candidate with the best testing results.  
 
For test participants it would be beneficial to take the test as they... 
! ...will receive feedback on their individual decision-making performance 
! ...will receive a personalized certificate with their test score 
 
Thank you very much for your support! 
Best wishes, Nadine  
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9.8 THE FINAL DAC-TEST  
The following sub-section presents the DAC-test in its final version as it was given to 
the test participants of the main testing. The original online display of the DAC-test may 
differ in comparison to this presentation. Page breaks are used so that the actual page-
layout is comprehensible.  
Sub-section 9.8.1 gives an overview of the task to envision one’s objectives. Sub-
section 9.8.2 shows the list of the seven items for the ability to realise decision 
opportunities and sub-section 9.8.3 the eight items to measure the ability to assess 
decision fitness. The eight items of the ability to frame a decision are shown by sub-
section 9.8.4 and the seven items of the ability to identify relevant alternatives by sub-
section 9.8.5. The remaining seven items of the ability to deal with uncertainty are 
presented in sub-section 9.8.6. Sub-section 9.8.7 gives an overview of the 12 items of 
the ability to integrate information.  
For each item an explicit item ID, for instance EO_01, is assigned so that the 
statistical results presented within this research can clearly be assigned to the 
corresponding item. However, the item ID are not presented to the test participants.  
9.8.1 Ability to Envision One’s Objectives 
Imagine you have to decide what to do after finishing school. What would be your most 
relevant objectives for choosing a direction? Please list as many objectives as you can 
think of, writing each one in the lines (from A to AD) below (cf. example item).  
A 
B 
C 
D 
E 
... 
.... 
... 
Z 
AA 
AB 
AC 
AD 
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Again, imagine after you finished school you have to decide what to do now with your life. 
Please select all objectives that appear relevant to you for selecting a direction for your life 
by ticking the checkbox on the left of each objective in the list below (cf. example item). 
I would like to ... 
! ... acquire knowledge about a specific topic. 
! ... be independent of parents/earn my own money.  
! ... contribute positively to society in the short- or long-run. 
! ... develop/improve my skills.  
! ... do something for which I could get financial support.  
! ... do something I am good at.  
! ... do something in a desirable geographic location.  
! ... do something that is challenging. 
! ... do something that is diversified.  
! ... do something that is fun.  
! ... do something that allows me to keep my pet/take care of my pet.  
! ... do something that allows me to take care of my grandma, younger brother, etc.  
! ... do something that fulfils criteria like helping humans or animals, dealing with IT, saving                                                           
our planet, being creative, etc. 
! ... do something that gives me planning reliability/security.  
! ... do something that gives me the chance to be with my family/friends/partner.  
! ... do something that gives me the chance to make new friends/find a mate, etc.  
! ... do something that gives me the chance to travel/live abroad/get to know the world, etc.  
! ... do something that gives me the choice of self-discovery/identification process.  
! ... do something that improves my personal status in the short- or long-run.  
! ... do something that is accessible without any problems with my disability.  
! ... do something that is affordable/not to expensive/well paid.  
! ... do something that is family-friendly.  
! ... do something that is important to me.  
! ... do something that paves the way for becoming influential. 
! ... do something that paves the way for a high salary.  
! ... do something that paves the way for good career prospects.  
! ... do something that paves the way for having an enjoyable life in the future.  
! ... do something that provides a good work-life-balance. 
! ... do something that takes place in a friendly environment where people support each other.  
! ... do something with a good reputation/which enhances my resume.  
! ... do something which is more practically or more theoretically oriented.  
! ... do something which satisfies my parents/others.  
! ... enjoy myself/celebrate/party, etc.  
! ... explore new fields/do research, etc.  
! ... get in touch with diverse people.  
! ... improve my chances of finding a job.  
! ... meet people who are like I am.  
! ... personally grow from what I do.  
! ... take on responsibility.  
! ... try something totally new. 
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Please match each objective you listed in the first task (now displayed on the left side 
below) to the objectives on the right side by writing its letter to the left of them. If some of 
your personal objectives do NOT match any objective here, please write them down in the 
shaded area below (cf. example item). 
I would like to ... 
___ ! ... acquire knowledge about a specific topic. 
___ ! ... be independent of parents/earn my own money.  
___ ! ... contribute positively to society in the short- or long-run. 
___ ! ... develop/improve my skills.  
___ ! ... do something for which I could get financial support.  
___ ! ... do something I am good at.  
___ ! ... do something in a desirable geographic location.  
___ ! ... do something that is challenging. 
___ ! ... do something that is diversified.  
___ ! ... do something that is fun.  
___ ! ... do something that allows me to keep my pet/take care of my pet.  
___ ! ... do something that allows me to take care of my grandma, younger brother, etc.  
___ ! ... do something that fulfils criteria like helping humans or animals, dealing with IT, saving       
our planet, being creative, etc. 
___ ! ... do something that gives me planning reliability/security.  
___ ! ... do something that gives me the chance to be with my family/friends/partner.  
___ ! ... do something that gives me the chance to make new friends/find a mate, etc.  
___ ! ... do something that gives me the chance to travel/live abroad/get to know the world, etc.  
___ ! ... do something that gives me the choice of self-discovery/identification process.  
___ ! ... do something that improves my personal status in the short- or long-run.  
___ ! ... do something that is accessible without any problems with my disability.  
___ ! ... do something that is affordable/not to expensive/well paid.  
___ ! ... do something that is family-friendly.  
___ ! ... do something that is important to me.  
___ ! ... do something that paves the way for becoming influential. 
___ ! ... do something that paves the way for a high salary.  
___ ! ... do something that paves the way for good career prospects.  
___ ! ... do something that paves the way for having an enjoyable life in the future.  
___ ! ... do something that provides a good work-life-balance. 
___ ! ... do something that takes place in a friendly environment where people support each 
other.  
___ ! ... do something with a good reputation/which enhances my resume.  
___ ! ... do something which is more practically or more theoretically oriented.  
___ ! ... do something which satisfies my parents/others.  
___ ! ... enjoy myself/celebrate/party, etc.  
___ ! ... explore new fields/do research, etc.  
___ ! ... get in touch with diverse people.  
___ ! ... improve my chances of finding a job.  
___ ! ... meet people who are like I am.  
___ ! ... personally grow from what I do.  
___ ! ... take on responsibility.  
___ ! ... try something totally new. 
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Finally look at all objectives you have selected in the second task and the ones in the 
shaded area. Please mark the 10 most relevant ones for you by ticking the checkbox on 
their very left side. Don’t worry if you have selected less than 10 objectives (cf. example 
item).  
I would like to ... 
! ___ ! ... acquire knowledge about a specific topic. 
! ___ ! ... be independent of parents/earn my own money.  
! ___ ! ... contribute positively to society in the short- or long-run. 
! ___ ! ... develop/improve my skills.  
! ___ ! ... do something for which I could get financial support.  
! ___ ! ... do something I am good at.  
! ___ ! ... do something in a desirable geographic location.  
! ___ ! ... do something that is challenging. 
! ___ ! ... do something that is diversified.  
! ___ ! ... do something that is fun.  
! ___ ! ... do something that allows me to keep my pet/take care of my pet.  
! ___ ! ... do something that allows me to take care of my grandma, younger brother, etc.  
! ___ ! ... do something that fulfils criteria like helping humans or animals, dealing with IT, 
saving our planet, being creative, etc. 
! ___ ! ... do something that gives me planning reliability/security.  
! ___ ! ... do something that gives me the chance to be with my family/friends/partner.  
! ___ ! ... do something that gives me the chance to make new friends/find a mate, etc.  
! ___ ! ... do something that gives me the chance to travel/live abroad/get to know the world, 
etc.  
! ___ ! ... do something that gives me the choice of self-discovery/identification process.  
! ___ ! ... do something that improves my personal status in the short- or long-run.  
! ___ ! ... do something that is accessible without any problems with my disability.  
! ___ ! ... do something that is affordable/not to expensive/well paid.  
! ___ ! ... do something that is family-friendly.  
! ___ ! ... do something that is important to me.  
! ___ ! ... do something that paves the way for becoming influential. 
! ___ ! ... do something that paves the way for a high salary.  
! ___ ! ... do something that paves the way for good career prospects.  
! ___ ! ... do something that paves the way for having an enjoyable life in the future.  
! ___ ! ... do something that provides a good work-life-balance. 
! ___ ! ... do something that takes place in a friendly environment where people support each 
other.  
! ___ ! ... do something with a good reputation/which enhances my resume.  
! ___ ! ... do something which is more practically or more theoretically oriented.  
! ___ ! ... do something which satisfies my parents/others.  
! ___ ! ... enjoy myself/celebrate/party, etc.  
! ___ ! ... explore new fields/do research, etc.  
! ___ ! ... get in touch with diverse people.  
! ___ ! ... improve my chances of finding a job.  
! ___ ! ... meet people who are like I am.  
! ___ ! ... personally grow from what I do.  
! ___ ! ... take on responsibility.  
! ___ ! ... try something totally new. 
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! __________________________________________________________________________________ 
! __________________________________________________________________________________ 
! __________________________________________________________________________________ 
! __________________________________________________________________________________ 
! __________________________________________________________________________________ 
! __________________________________________________________________________________ 
! __________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
!  I have selected 10 objectives (max).  
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9.8.2 Ability to Realise Decision Opportunities 
Please read the following case descriptions carefully and decide whether the character is 
facing a concrete decision situation or not by ticking the appropriate button.  
 
If you think that the character is facing a decision situation, an additional question will 
appear. If this is the case please assess the potential impact of this decision on the 
character’s life by ticking the appropriate button (cf. scale explanation). 
 
If everything goes well, Luca will obtain his school-leaving qualifications next year. He has 
talked a lot with his parents about what he wants to become when he is grown up. Now 
he is thinking about what to do after passing his exams. Tomorrow, he will be able to 
apply for study programmes online, using his last school report. 
DO_01  ! No    ! Yes     ! I do not know 
DO_02  ! Big decision   !   ! Small decision ! I do not know 
 
Inès is delighted. She has received an offer to enrol in highly sought-after further 
education, which is offered by the company she is working for. The seminar is starting next 
May and will last for 6 months. Actually, she wanted to go on holiday in August. She has 
already booked the flights to Madeira. However, Inès knows that if she enrols she won’t be 
allowed to take vacations.  
DO_05  ! No    ! Yes     ! I do not know 
DO_06  ! Big decision   !   ! Small decision ! I do not know 
 
Kilian is studying at the Montgomery University. Right now Kilian is taking a multiple-choice 
exam. The question he is facing just in this second is quite difficult. He is fairly sure, that 
two of the answers given are unlikely to be true. But for the other two, he does not know 
at all.  
DO_07  ! No    ! Yes     ! I do not know 
DO_08  ! Big decision   !   ! Small decision ! I do not know 
 
Last week Antoine and his friends had a meeting with their career advisor in order to 
develop some ideas about what to do after finishing school. Antoine has tried to find out 
more about possible courses of study. His advisor tells him that for pursuing a medical 
degree, James would need much better grades. 
DO_09  ! No    ! Yes     ! I do not know 
  ! Big decision   !   ! Small decision ! I do not know 
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Two months ago, Christopher started dating a girl from his university. He had secretly 
fancied her since he had first seen her on campus. During a friend’s party he had the 
courage to talk to her and they had fun dancing together. She became Christopher’s first 
girlfriend. It was a very exciting time for him and he spent almost all his free time with her. 
Today, Christopher is facing his first year final exams. This morning on his way to university 
he feels he should have spent more time learning. 
DO_10  ! No    ! Yes     ! I do not know 
  ! Big decision   !   ! Small decision ! I do not know 
 
Conan is in his third semester of studying Chemistry at university. He enjoys being in 
university a lot. He has many friends, a new kind of freedom and exciting experiences in 
the huge city of London. Up to now he has been doing quite well, but recently, his marks 
have got worse. There is just too much going on to be able to concentrate on the learning 
part of studying. Today, Conan is told by his professor that he will not pass the course on 
Physical Chemistry this semester. Conan exclaims: “But Sir, if you won’t let me pass this 
would mean I cannot go on studying!” 
DO_12  ! No    ! Yes     ! I do not know 
  ! Big decision   !   ! Small decision ! I do not know 
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9.8.3 Ability to Assess Decision Fitness 
Please read the following case descriptions carefully and pay attention to the character’s 
physical condition and emotions. Please decide whether it is advisable to make a decision 
in his or her situation. For each case, please tick the appropriate button (cf. scale 
explanation). 
Susan’s parents expect her to become a dentist, like her father. Susan however would 
rather study literature. Tonight they had a heated argument on this topic. Her parents 
refuse to finance her “foolish ideas” and Susan shouted back at them. She ran back to her 
room, slammed the door and thought: “I will show them how I can study literature. I don’t 
need their help! I will complete my online application now.”  
DF_01   ! No    ! Yes   ! I do not know 
 
Thomas is in the middle of his preparations for his final examination. He is studying the 
whole day, but it is very difficult for him to concentrate. He always thinks about what to do 
after his exam. “Should he study? Should he take a Gap Year and travel? Or maybe it 
would be better to do an internship first?” It is only one week until he has to be fit for his 
exam and he really needs to concentrate on his studies. “If I decide now on what to do 
after my exam, I don’t need to think about it any longer and I will be able to truly 
concentrate on my exam”, he thinks. 
DF_02   ! No    ! Yes   ! I do not know 
 
Sophie is working at the bar of a club in order to make some money for traveling. After 
leaving school, she did not know what to do and so she decided to take some sort of Gap 
Year first. She wanted to earn some money, do a bit of travelling and maybe an internship 
or two. This morning she came home at 7.30 in the morning because there was a big 
party at the club she is working in. Completely exhausted, she fell into her bed. At 9 am, 
she is suddenly awoken by her telephone ringing. A friend of hers has a surprising idea. 
She proposes to fly to India together. Sophie’s friend has found a very cheap offer for flight 
tickets that she could book for the two of them. Unfortunately, the offer will expire today so 
she wants Sophie to take the decision immediately. 
DF_03   ! No    ! Yes   ! I do not know 
 
Daniel has just finished his final exams in high school. He decided to take up his studies in 
molecular biology. He has come to this decision after an internship in a research institute 
during the last summer break. He asked the researchers which universities they 
recommend for studying and also visited some of the universities in his country to collect 
his own impressions. He compared the education costs and found out that there were 
ways to get financial support. Now he has offers from three different programmes of study 
and the deadline for registration is tomorrow.  
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DF_04   ! No    ! Yes   ! I do not know 
 
Cheryl is enraged. She just talked to her boss about the inappropriate behaviour of her 
colleague. “He is making remarks about my dress and my figure and he is making 
whistling noises when I pass. He doesn’t stop even though I have told him to stop it.” Her 
boss didn’t seem to take her seriously. “He is just making compliments to his good-
looking colleague. Other women would be happy if they elicit this kind of response from a 
charming man.” At first, she was so stunned, she didn’t know what to say. She looked at 
her boss and thought “He cannot be serious!” She left his office, slammed the door and 
said aloud. “This is it, I am quitting this job!”  
DF_05   ! No    ! Yes   ! I do not know 
 
Nasir is 24 and has just had a job interview. The day was exhausting; he had to get up at 5 
am to be at the site on time. Then he had to demonstrate his analytical thinking in a 
computer task that took 2.5 hours. After a little snack, he went through an assessment 
centre with interviews, a group discussion, role plays and an “in tray” task. At the end of 
the day, he had a feedback round. All in all, he must have mastered the tasks to the 
interviewers’ satisfaction. They offered him a job and said he could sign the contract right 
away if he wished so. Nasir cannot believe his luck. The good news almost cleared his 
exhaustion away. He feels a warm tingling in his stomach and a sense of elation. 
DF_06   ! No    ! Yes   ! I do not know 
 
Mrs Baker has been a surgeon for 15 years now. She likes her job very much. As a 
cardiothoracic surgeon, she is performing surgery on people who have serious problems 
with their heart or lungs. The operations are usually very long (2 - 5 hours) and demanding. 
Mrs Baker has to be highly concentrated and work to within a millimetre. Lately however, 
her job has become more and more challenging. Her back is hurting and her fingers are 
tingling after standing in OR for a couple of hours. She is less concentrated and has 
trouble sleeping. Last week during a cardiopulmonary bypass operation, she even had to 
ask her assistant surgeon to take over. Now she has requested a week of unpaid leave in 
order to recover and think about her options. She will not get any younger and the work 
will remain demanding. Maybe she should hand in her notice and become a general 
practitioner? 
DF_07   ! No    ! Yes   ! I do not know 
 
Christian has always wanted to become an engineer in the automotive industry. However, 
when he applied for admission to study mechanical or automotive engineering, he was 
rejected by each university. His grades didn’t fully meet the requirements and there 
seemed to be many applications. Christian decided to re-apply the following year. To get 
to learn more about the work and processes he started working as an unskilled production 
helper in a car factory. The year passed and again his applications were rejected. Christian 
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kept working his shifts in the factory, annoyed by the fact that he is not able to work there 
as an engineer and that there is still no place at university in sight. He wonders whether his 
application will be more successful one year later. As he was always interested in 
architecture, too, he could also see himself studying this. Christian researches on the 
Internet and procures all brochures he needs and finds out that his chances of being 
accepted for architecture right away are much higher. 
DF_08   ! No    ! Yes   ! I do not know  
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9.8.4 Ability to Frame a Decision  
Please, read the following decision case carefully.  
Martine currently attends a college in the UK. She will finish her final exams in school next summer. 
She has always been a comparatively good student. Now she and her classmates have to start 
thinking about what to do after obtaining their school leaving certificates. Last Wednesday they 
had an information session at school where a former student talked about his experiences during a 
Gap Year. When Martine came home that day, she told her parents about what she had heard 
about the Gap Year but her parents were not very enthusiastic. “Maybe you should better think 
about what you are going to do with your life. You can’t spend your life just travelling and 
expecting us to pay for you. Unfortunately, we would not be able to support you financially.”  
The conversation with her parents made Martine seriously think about what she’d do after leaving 
school. She feels inclined towards educating or supporting young people. Maybe she should 
become a teacher or social worker!? However, for becoming either one, she would have to take up 
studies at some university. Applications would take place soon, with her next grade report. 
Hopefully her grades would be good enough to be accepted.  
Later that day, Martine called her friend Patricia to complain about her parents’ reaction:  
Martine: “Hi Trish! Imagine, my parents won’t let me do a Gap Year. They say I should earn my 
own money first. But I really would love to travel the world or at least live in another county for 
some time.” 
Patricia: “Oh no, and what are you going to do now?” 
Martine: “I don’t know. Maybe I could do a Gap Year with work and travel and study afterwards. 
That would give me the possibility to see the world without being dependent on financial support. 
But I think that won’t give me the possibility to save money for my study afterwards.” 
Patricia: “Yeah, I guess you’re right.” 
Martine: “Are you going to study after finishing school?”  
Patricia: “Yes, I’ll study Business and Economics. The companies always need managers.” 
Martine: “Hmm. I’d like to become a teacher or a social worker. Do you think it will be expensive?”  
Patricia: “Well, if your parents cannot support you it will be hard. Fees are quite high. But you could 
take up a student loan.”  
Martine: “No, I definitely do not want to get indebted! Maybe I can work part-time.”  
Patricia: “Yes, but that might not be enough to finance your study. You should try to get a 
scholarship! That would solve your financial problems, allow you to study right away and those 
scholarship programmes often include a semester abroad.”  
Martine: “Sounds like a possibility. I will talk to Professor Morgan about that tomorrow. Thanks and 
‘night Trish” 
Patricia: “Good night. See you tomorrow.” 
Just before midnight Martine went to bed but could not sleep for quite a while. “Is there a likelihood 
to get a scholarship? How high is the chance of finding enough jobs during the Gap Year, which 
allow me to earn more money than I’ll be spending? Maybe I should follow my parents’ advice and 
earn my own money first. After working for one or two years I would have saved some money to 
study. That is a quite appealing idea. But in this case, I probably will not be able to see a lot of the 
world.” ... 
 
While Martine and Patricia are having lunch in the school canteen the next day, Patricia is 
making some notes on what Martine is telling her. 
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Please have a look at the following list of facts Patricia has collected, and decide which 
kind of information it is in the decision-making situation by choosing the most appropriate 
description from the drop-down menu for each fact (cf. definitions). 
Item ID Fact Drop-down menu with response set 
FD_01 Saving money and travelling now 
Objectives 
Conflicting objectives 
Alternative(s) 
Uncertainty  
Time frame  
Decision-maker 
Resources 
Friend 
Family  
Location 
FD_02 Grades 
FD_03 
Would love to travel the world or at least live in another 
county for some time and educating and/or supporting 
young people 
 Martine 
FD_04 Supporting young people and saving money 
FD_05 Go straight to university and find a job to earn money 
 Application period is close 
FD_06 Take a gap year and study then 
FD_07 Try to get a scholarship 
 Patricia 
FD_08 Getting a scholarship 
 Martine’s parents 
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9.8.5 Ability to Identify Relevant Alternatives 
Please read the following decision problem carefully:  
Brad, a classmate of Martine is about to complete his secondary education as well. He is also 
facing the question of what to do after school. “Well, what alternatives do I have for now?” he asks 
himself. 
 
Here is what Brad thinks is relevant regarding his decision: 
! “I am really happy to be out of school now. I am not going to study straight away – 
Forget it!” 
! “Whatever it is – I need to get some money for living. My parents aren’t going to pay.” 
! “I have always liked the countryside. Which alternatives are out there that let me 
spend some time outside?” 
  
Knowing more about Brad’s objectives now, please choose which of the following 
alternatives fit his three objectives all at the same time. Please tick the appropriate buttons 
(cf. scale explanation). 
IA_03 Work on a fishing boat ! Does not fit ! Does fit ! I do not know 
IA_04 Volunteering in an orphanage 
! Does not fit ! Does fit ! I do not know 
IA_05 Starting an apprenticeship as a carpenter 
! Does not fit ! Does fit ! I do not know 
IA_06 Going on an outdoor holiday 
! Does not fit ! Does fit ! I do not know 
IA_07 Go on a pilgrimage ! Does not fit ! Does fit ! I do not know 
IA_08 Start online-gaming ! Does not fit ! Does fit ! I do not know 
IA_09 Become a photo-journalist ! Does not fit ! Does fit ! I do not know 
IA_10 Win a scholarship and study geography 
! Does not fit ! Does fit ! I do not know 
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9.8.6 Ability to Deal with Uncertainty 
Martine thought a lot about her alternatives. Then she has the idea to write each 
alternative on a piece of paper and just draw one of them. In this case, destiny would 
decide for her. “But is it just luck to win a lottery?” She asks herself. 
 
Please read the following case description carefully. 
While thinking about this question, Martine decides to actually take part in a lottery. There 
are two different lotteries: one of them says: “Every 20th lottery ticket is a winning ticket!” 
Hmmm… this makes 5%, thinks Martine. She knows of another lottery with a probability of 
winning which is 10%.  
Which lottery should Martine play to maximise her expected value? Please tick the 
appropriate button 
DU_01   ! 5%    ! 10%   ! I do not know  
 
Please read the following case description carefully. 
Martine really has to focus, so she thinks about two scholarships her teacher has told her 
about. They would be a good chance for her. The association offering the two 
scholarships (A and B) takes affirmative action in order to promote equality of opportunity 
for members of both sexes (50/50). Therefore, the applicants are selected to keep the 
proportion of men and women equal. To be able to assess which of the scholarships 
offers the higher probability for being selected, she requests a list of applicants (cf. figure): 
 
Applicants are chosen randomly by a computer programme. What is the probability of 
Martine being selected for scholarship A and for scholarship B if the proportion of men and 
women should be equal? Please give your answer by selecting the closest whole number 
from the lists below. 
DU_02  
The probability of Martine being selected for scholarship A is  
! 0%   ! 1%  ! 2%  ! 3%  ! 5%  
! 10%   ! 13%  ! 17%  ! 20%  ! 35% 
! 52%   ! 80%  ! 90%  ! 95%  ! 96%  
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! 97%   ! 98%  ! 99%  ! 100%  
 
DU_03 
The probability of Martine being selected for scholarship B is  
! 0%   ! 1%  ! 2%  ! 3%  ! 5%  
! 10%   ! 13%  ! 17%  ! 20%  ! 35% 
! 52%   ! 80%  ! 90%  ! 95%  ! 96%  
! 97%   ! 98%  ! 99%  ! 100%  
 
Martine decides to apply for scholarship A. What would a probability of 17% mean in her 
case? Please tick the appropriate button. 
DU_04 
# Martine will definitely get the scholarship.  
# If she applied for the same scholarship 100 times, she would be admitted on exactly 17 
occasions. 
# Martine might get a scholarship. 
# Out of 17 persons who applied, one will get a scholarship.  
# Martine will not get a scholarship.   
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Please read the following case description carefully. 
As the next big school holidays are not far away, Martine’s friend Patricia has applied for 
an internship with a big company in London to gain some work experience. This company 
has published some statistics on its website: 
 - Of all applicants, 15% are invited to interviews. 
 - Of those who had the chance to present themselves, 20% are offered a position. 
What is the probability of getting a job offer after having sent application materials? Please 
select the right answer by choosing the closest whole number from the list below.  
DU_05 
! 0%   ! 1%  ! 2%  ! 3%  ! 5%  
! 10%   ! 13%  ! 17%  ! 20%  ! 35% 
! 52%   ! 80%  ! 90%  ! 95%  ! 96%  
! 97%   ! 98%  ! 99%  ! 100%  
 
Let’s say the probability of getting this job is 3%. Patricia thinks: “Wow, that is not really a 
good chance of getting this job. I could also try to roll doubles with 6-sided dice. What 
would be more likely?” Please calculate the probability of getting doubles with a 6-sided 
dice and select the right answer by choosing the closest whole number from the list 
below.  
DU_06 
! 0%   ! 1%  ! 2%  ! 3%  ! 5%  
! 10%   ! 13%  ! 17%  ! 20%  ! 35% 
! 52%   ! 80%  ! 90%  ! 95%  ! 96%  
! 97%   ! 98%  ! 99%  ! 100%  
 
Please read the following case description carefully. 
Martine has found out more about financial schemes for studying at two different 
universities.  
The first university has annual tuition fees of 9,000£. The only funding available is a 
National Scholarship – about 200,000 students apply for it every year, but only one tenth 
will be successful. Winning it will give you an annual grant of 3,000£. 
The other university has fees of £8,000 per year. There is a lottery amongst all applicants 
to distribute 15 full scholarships (these lucky people will not have any fees to pay) and 30 
awards of 3,000£. About 500 students apply for this lottery.  
What is the expected value (cf. definition) of costs for a three-year program at each 
university? Please DO NOT ROUND UP OR DOWN (cf. scale explanation).  
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DU_07  The expected value for the first university is _ _. _ _ £.  
DU_08  The expected value for the second university is _ _. _ _ £.   
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9.8.7 Ability to Integrate Information 
Please read the following case description carefully. 
Martine is still undecided about what to do after her A-Levels. She is thinking about going 
abroad to gain some experience. Eventually, she would like to become a teacher. 
However, her parents are not able to support her financially. She therefore has to find a 
way of supporting herself. 
Let’s take a closer look at her objectives, her alternatives and how she should decide. 
Her objectives are:  
- Does want to have money to study 
- Educating and/or supporting young people 
- Would love to travel the world or at least live in another country for some time  
And the alternatives are:  
A) Take a Gap Year and study afterwards 
B) Go straight to university and get a scholarship 
C) Find a job to earn money, save the money and study afterwards  
 
Martine assesses how well her objectives are met by each alternative (cf. figure) by using 
pie icons:  
 
Please put the alternatives in order according to Martine’s objectives for her decision. Start 
with the most preferred alternative (cf. scale explanation).  
II_04  Most preferred alternative 
  ! A    ! B   ! C   
  ! A and B  ! A and C   ! B and C    
  ! A, B, and C  ! /  
II_05  Second most preferred alternative  
  ...  
II_06  Least preferred alternative 
  ....   
MEASURING DECISION-ANALYTICAL COMPETENCE - A PSYCHOMETRIC ONLINE PERFORMANCE TEST 
 
 238 
But Martine’s objectives aren’t all equally important: 
- Having money for her study is in between: 33% 
- Educating and/or supporting young people is the most relevant: 47% 
- Travelling the world/living in another country is the least relevant: 20% 
 
To remember cf. figure: 
 
Please put the alternatives in order according to Martine’s assessment of the relevance of 
her objectives. Start with the most preferred alternative (cf. scale explanation).  
II_07  Most preferred alternative 
  ! A    ! B   ! C   
  ! A and B  ! A and C   ! B and C    
  ! A, B, and C  ! /  
II_08  Second most preferred alternative  
  ...  
II_09  Least preferred alternative 
  ....  
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It looks like Martine can now easily decide which alternative to choose to best pursue her 
objectives. But there are certain risks she has not yet included in her calculations. 
Her marks might not be good enough for getting a scholarship. In this case studying on a 
scholarship would not be an option any more. Martine thinks that she has a 20% chance 
to get the scholarship. (For your calculation please assume that in case of not getting the 
scholarship the expected value for alternative B would be 0.) To remember cf. figure: 
 
 
Please put the alternatives in order according to the probabilities of Martine’s alternatives 
(cf. scale explanation). 
II_10  Most preferred alternative 
  ! A    ! B   ! C   
  ! A and B  ! A and C   ! B and C    
  ! A, B, and C  ! /  
II_11  Second most preferred alternative  
  ...  
II_12  Least preferred alternative 
  ....  
MEASURING DECISION-ANALYTICAL COMPETENCE - A PSYCHOMETRIC ONLINE PERFORMANCE TEST 
 
 240 
Martine has simplified the comparison of alternatives by distributing pie icons by gut feeling 
in order to assess how well one alternative fits one objective. It was clever of her to use 
one type of scale for all objectives, as it makes it easier to compare.  
But Martine thinks again about the comparison: Maybe she could have done a more 
precise job. What if she had used whole numbers between 0 (zero fit) and 100 (perfect fit) 
to assess how well one alternative fits one objective? 
 
Here is the information on the money Martine could save:  
A) Take a Gap Year and study afterwards: £5,000 
B) Go straight to university and get a scholarship: £48,000 
C) Find a job to earn money, save the money and study afterwards: £15,000 
 
Please translate the money Martine would be able to save for her study, into whole 
numbers between 0 and 100 for each alternative, given that  
- £55,000 is the whole amount of money Martine needs to finance her study  
- Martine does not want to get indebted 
- the more money the better 
- the scale is interval-scaled, which means that the distance between 0 and 20 is 
equivalent to the distance between 60 and 80.  
 
II_13  Take a Gap Year and study afterwards (£5,000):  
  __ __ (please round to whole numbers)  
 
II_14  Go straight to university and get a scholarship (£48,000):  
  __ __ (please round to whole numbers) 
 
II_15  Find a job to earn money, save the money and study afterwards (£15,000):  
  __ ___ (please round to whole numbers) 
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9.9 DAC-TEST CERTIFICATE 
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9.10 SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHIC VARIABLES & TEST BAROMETER 
Please help us to map your data from the different test parts and enter an alphanumeric code 
following the instruction below.  
1. = The first letter of the street you live in (e.g. Morgan Street " M)  
2. = The fifth number of your local phone number (e.g. 33567-32 " 7)  
3. = The third letter of your mothers first name (e.g. Maggie " G)  
4. = Your favourite number (e.g. My favourite number is 23 " 23)  
5. = The first letter of your fathers first name (e.g. Frank " F)  
 
Before the DAC-test 
The following few questions are not part of the assessment of your Individual Decision-
Making Competence. They just serve to give us some further information.  
Before you can start with the testing, please give us some information about your 
background. This is needed for statistical purposes. 
What is your current age?  
 
 
" I confirm that I am 18 years or older.  
How would you rate your English language skills? 
# Basic English skills   # Good/conversant   # Fluent 
# Very good/business-fluent   # Mother tongue 
Have you learned about good decision-making before? 
# No, I have never heard about it.  # Yes, I have learned about good decision-making 
If YES:  
" I have taken a class in school/university about decision analysis or decision science. 
" I had a workshop on decision-making 
" I have read a book on the topic 
" Other " Please describe:  
 
How did you get to know about this test? Please select your source:  
" LSE  " FU  " HU  " UB  " VT  " MPI 
" Misc. " Please specify: 
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How far do the following statements apply to you? Please indicate, for each statement 
how strongly you agree or disagree. 
I am taking this test because… 
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…I am interested in individual decision-making. ! ! ! ! ! 
…I would like to learn more about individual 
decision-making. 
! ! ! ! ! 
…I would like to find out about my own decision-
making competence. 
! ! ! ! ! 
…I want to reach a high test score. ! ! ! ! ! 
...I would like to find out about my own decision-
making competence. 
! ! ! ! ! 
…I would like to have a certificate of participation. ! ! ! ! ! 
 
Again, how strongly do you agree with each statement given below? 
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Doing well on this test is important to me. ! ! ! ! ! 
I want to be among the top scorers in this test. ! ! ! ! ! 
I am determined to complete this test. ! ! ! ! ! 
I usually do pretty well on tests.  ! ! ! ! ! 
My test scores don’t usually reflect my true 
abilities.  
! ! ! ! ! 
Once I undertake a task, I usually push myself to 
my limits. 
! ! ! ! ! 
I try to do well in everything I undertake ! ! ! ! ! 
 
After the DAC-test  
Finally, we would like to ask you a few more questions about your background. These are 
not used for identifying you, but needed for statistical purposes. 
Are you...? 
# Male # Female  # Other 
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What is your nationality? 
 
What is your highest completed degree of education? 
# No school leaving certificate # Certificate after 9 or 10 years of school education 
# University-entrance diploma # Certificate for apprenticeship 
# Bachelor’s degree   # Diploma or Master’s degree 
# PhD      
# Other " Please state:  
 
What is your mark average of your school leaving examination?  
# A+  # A  # A-  # B+  # B  # B- 
# C+  # C  # C-  # D+  # D 
What is/was your mark average in mathematics at your school leaving examination?  
# A+  # A  # A-  # B+  # B  # B- 
# C+  # C  # C-  # D+  # D 
Have you already entered professional life? 
# Yes  # No 
What is your former, current or intended profession? Which field does it belong to? 
# Architecture and Engineering Occupations 
# Arts, Design, Entertainment, Sports, and Media Occupations 
# Building and Grounds Cleaning and Maintenance Occupations 
# Business and Financial Operations Occupations 
# Community and Social Services Occupations 
# Computer and Mathematical Occupations 
# Construction and Extraction Occupations 
# Education, Training, and Library Occupations 
# Farming, Fishing, and Forestry Occupations 
# Food Preparation and Serving Related Occupations 
# Healthcare Practitioners and Technical Occupations 
# Healthcare Support Occupations 
# Installation, Maintenance, and Repair Occupations 
# Legal Occupations 
# Life, Physical, and Social Science Occupations 
MEASURING DECISION-ANALYTICAL COMPETENCE - A PSYCHOMETRIC ONLINE PERFORMANCE TEST 
 
 245 
# Management Occupations  
# Military Specific Occupations 
# Office and Administrative Support Occupations 
# Personal Care and Service Occupations 
# Production Occupations 
# Protective Service Occupations 
# Sales and Related Occupations 
# Transportation and Material Moving Occupations" 
# Other " Please state:  
 
Do/did you currently/previously have managerial responsibility?  
# Yes  # No 
If YES, how many persons did you supervise? 
# 1-5  # 6-20 # 21-50 # 51-100 # More than 100 
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9.11 CRITERIA FOR VALIDATION – CHOSEN MEASURES  
The present appendix-section lists the chosen measures that were applied to validate 
the DAC-test. To assess decision self-esteem the Melbourne Decision Making 
Questionnaire I is used (cf. sub-section 9.11.1), to assess differences in decision-making 
style the Melbourne Decision Making Questionnaire II (cf. sub-section 9.11.2), and to 
assess decision satisfaction the Satisfaction with Decision Scale (cf. sub-section 9.11.3). 
One aspect of intolerance of uncertainty is measured by a sub-scale of Uncertainty 
Impeding Action (cf. sub-section 9.11.4), fluid intelligence is captured by the short version 
of the Hagen Matrices Test (cf. sub-section 9.11.5), and problem-solving competence is 
assessed by the Tower of Hanoi (cf. sub-section 9.11.6).  
9.11.1 Melbourne Decision Making Questionnaire I – Decision Self-Esteem 
Within this Ph.D. research, decision self-esteem is measured by the six items of the 
Melbourne Decision Making Questionnaire I of Mann et al. (1998). In the following the 
applied instruction is displayed and Table 9-2 shows its items with the response set:  
In the following, you’ll find a number of statements on how one might describe oneself. 
Please tick the appropriate button to describe how accurately each statement describes 
you. Please answer according to your first impression. 
Table 9-2 Melbourne Decision Making Questionnaire I – Decision Self-Esteem (Mann et al., 1998) 
# Item Scale 
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1 I feel confident about my ability to makes decisions. ! ! ! 
2 I feel inferior to most people in making decisions. (R) ! ! ! 
3 I think that I am a good decision maker. ! ! ! 
4 I feel so discouraged that I give up trying to make decisions (R) ! ! ! 
5 The decisions I make turn out well. ! ! ! 
6 It is easy for other people to convince me that their decision rather then mine is the correct one. (R) ! ! ! 
Note. (R) = The bracketed R identifies negatively-keyed items that are phrased so that an agreement with 
the item represents a relatively low level of the attribute being measured. If a survey contains positively- 
and negatively-keyed items, the latter item type has to be reverse-scored for statistical analyses. 
9.11.2 Melbourne Decision Making Questionnaire II – Decision-Making Style 
Various styles of decision-making are assessed by the 22 items of the Melbourne 
Decision Making Questionnaire II of Mann et al. (1997). Below the scale instruction is 
presented and Table 9-3 displays the items with the response set: 
MEASURING DECISION-ANALYTICAL COMPETENCE - A PSYCHOMETRIC ONLINE PERFORMANCE TEST 
 
 247 
In the following, you’ll find a number of statements on how one might describe oneself. 
Please tick the appropriate button to describe how accurately each statement describes 
you. Please answer according to your first impression. 
Table 9-3 Melbourne Decision Making Questionnaire II – Decision-Making Style (Mann et al., 1997) 
# sc Item Scale 
 
No
t t
ru
e 
fo
r m
e 
So
m
et
im
es
 tr
ue
 
Tr
ue
 fo
r m
e 
1 V I like to consider all the alternatives. ! ! ! 
2 V I try to find out the disadvantages of all alternatives. ! ! ! 
3 V I consider how best to carry out a decision.  ! ! ! 
4 V When making decisions I like to collect a lot of information. ! ! ! 
5 V I try to be clear about my objectives before choosing. ! ! ! 
6 V I take a lot of care before choosing. ! ! ! 
7 B I avoid making decisions. ! ! ! 
8 B I do not make decisions unless I really have to. ! ! ! 
9 B I prefer to leave decisions to others. ! ! ! 
10 B I do not like to take responsibility for making decisions.  ! ! ! 
11 B If a decision can be made by me or another person I let the other person make it. ! ! ! 
12 B I prefer that people who are better informed decide for me. ! ! ! 
13 P I waste a lot of time on trivial matters before getting to the final decision. ! ! ! 
14 P Even after I have made a decision I delay acting upon it. ! ! ! 
15 P When I have to make a decision I wait a long time before starting to think about it. ! ! ! 
16 P I delay making decisions until it is too late. ! ! ! 
17 P I put off making decisions. ! ! ! 
18 H Whenever I face a difficult decision I feel pessimistic about finding a good solution. ! ! ! 
19 H I feel as if I am under tremendous time pressure when making decisions. ! ! ! 
20 H The possibility that some small thing might go wrong causes me to swing abruptly in my preference. ! ! ! 
21 H I cannot think straight if I have to make a decision in a hurry. ! ! ! 
22 H After a decision is made I spend a lot of time convincing myself it was correct. ! ! ! 
Note. sc = sub-scale of MDMQ-II; V = Vigilance; B = Buck-passing; P = Procrastination; H = 
Hypervigilance. 
9.11.3 Satisfaction with Decision Scale 
The Satisfaction with Decision Scale of Holmes-Rovner et al. (1996) is used to 
measure decision satisfaction. The scale instruction is shown and the six items with their 
corresponding response set are presented in Table 9-4: 
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Please think about the latest complex decision you were facing. Answer the following 
questions about your decision. Please indicate to what extent each statement is true for 
you at this time. 
Table 9-4 Satisfaction with Decision Scale (Holmes-Rovner et al., 1996) 
# Item Scale 
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1 I am satisfied that I am adequately informed about the issues important to my decision. ! ! ! ! ! 
2 The decision I made was the best decision possible for me personally. ! ! ! ! ! 
3 I am satisfied that my decision was consistent with my personal values. ! ! ! ! ! 
4 I expect to successfully carry out (or continue to carry out) the decision I made. ! ! ! ! ! 
5 I am satisfied that this was my decision to make. ! ! ! ! ! 
6 I am satisfied with my decision. ! ! ! ! ! 
9.11.4 Intolerance of Uncertainty – Sub-scale Uncertainty Impeding Action 
Buhr and Dugas (2002) developed the Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale, of which the 
sub-scale uncertainty leads to the inability to act is applied for this research. The applied 
instruction and its eight items with their response set (cf. Table 9-5) are shown in the 
following:  
Please think about the latest complex decision you were facing. Answer the following 
questions about your decision. Please indicate to what extent each statement is true for 
you at this time. 
Table 9-5 Intolerance of Uncertainty – Sub-scale Uncertainty Impeding Action (Buhr & Dugas, 2002) 
# Item Scale 
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1 Uncertainty stops me from having a strong opinion. ! ! ! ! ! 
2 Uncertainty keeps me from living a full life. ! ! ! ! ! 
3 When I am uncertain, I can’t go forward. ! ! ! ! ! 
4 Being uncertain means that I am not first rate. ! ! ! ! ! 
5 When I am uncertain, I can’t function very well. ! ! ! ! ! 
6 The smallest doubt can stop me from acting. ! ! ! ! ! 
7 Being uncertain means that I lack confidence. ! ! ! ! ! 
8 I must get away from all uncertain situations. ! ! ! ! ! 
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9.11.5 Hagen Matrices Test – Short Version 
To assess fluid intelligence the short version of the Hagen Matrices Test of Heydasch 
et al. (2013) is applied. Figure 9-1 gives an overview of its instruction and an example 
item.  
 
Figure 9-1 Hagen Matrices Test – Short Version (Heydasch et al., 2013) 
9.11.6 Problem Solving Competence  – Tower of Hanoi 
Problem-solving competence is captured by the Tower of Hanoi. As the Tower of 
Hanoi is a relatively well-known task, whose solution can be found on the Internet, within 
the present research, the Tower of Hanoi was named ring task. In the following the 
instruction and a visual clarification (cf. Figure 9-2), which was also presented to the test 
participants, are shown:  
 
For the following task, please try to place all rings from the middle on one of the other 
rods. It does not matter whether you choose the left or the right rod.  
 
There are three rules you have to follow:  
- A larger ring can never be placed on a smaller ring.  
- You can only move one ring at one time.  
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- A ring can only be moved if it is the topmost ring on a pile. 
  
Try to complete the task in as little moves as possible. One move is started whenever you 
choose a ring to be moved. A move cannot be made undone. You can see your number 
of attempted moves below (cf. example). 
 
Figure 9-2 Problem Solving Competence – Tower of Hanoi 
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9.12 ITEM ANALYSIS OF MAIN TESTING  
For the sake of completeness, the current appendix section presents the statistical 
properties for the items of the DAC-test sub-scales of the main testing, including item 
difficulty indices and discriminatory power coefficients. 
  
Table 9-6 gives an overview of the statistical properties for the items of the DAC-test 
sub-scale OPPORTUNITIES. Item DO_01 was excluded from the final statistical analyses as 
it turned out to be unintentionally negatively-poled.  
Table 9-6 Statistical properties of OPPORTUNITIES (main testing) 
Item ID M SD pi pi_c rit AoMT 
Reason for exclusion from 
statistical analyses 
DO_01 .77 .42 .78 .56 .37 no unintentionally negatively-poled 
DO_02 .60 .49 .77 .65 .53 yes  
DO_05 .90 .31 .89 .79 .23 yes  
DO_06 .23 .42 .25 -.12 .38 yes  
DO_07 .76 .43 .78 .56 .53 yes  
DO_08 .66 .47 .87 .80 .63 yes  
DO_09 .57 .50 .60 .20 .46 yes  
DO_10 .78 .41 .80 .60 .49 yes  
DO_12 .69 .46 .73 .46 .51 yes  
Note. N = 368; pi = item difficulty index/100; pi_c = corrected item difficulty index/100; rit = item 
discriminatory power coefficient; AoMT = selected for the analyses of the main testing; DO = Item ID for 
the DAC-dimension of OPPORTUNITIES. 
 
Table 9-7 shows the statistical properties for the items of FITNESS. Item DF_02 was 
excluded from the final statistical analyses as it turned out to be negatively-poled. 
Table 9-7 Statistical properties of FITNESS (main testing) 
Item ID M SD pi pi_c rit AoMT 
Reason for exclusion from 
statistical analyses 
DF_01 .72 .45 .73 .47 .51 yes  
DF_02 .58 .49 .61 .22 .31 no unintentionally negatively-poled 
DF_03 .49 .50 .51 .02 .64 yes  
DF_04 .95 .22 .96 .93 .11 yes  
DF_05 .69 .46 .72 .44 .57 yes  
DF_06 .44 .50 .47 -.06 .57 yes  
DF_07 .77 .42 .81 .62 .30 yes  
DF_08 .80 .40 .87 .74 .34 yes  
Note. N = 368; pi = item difficulty index/100; pi_c = corrected item difficulty index/100; rit = item 
discriminatory power coefficient; AoMT = selected for the analyses of the main testing; DF = Item ID for 
the DAC-dimension of FITNESS. 
 
The statistical properties for the items of FRAME are presented in Table 9-8.  
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Table 9-8 Statistical properties of FRAME (main testing) 
Item ID M SD pi pi_c rit AoMT 
Reason for exclusion from 
statistical analyses 
FD_01 .44 .50 .44 .39 .50 yes  
FD_02 .27 .44 .27 .20 .31 yes  
FD_03 .62 .49 .62 .58 .55 yes  
FD_04 .48 .50 .48 .43 .38 yes  
FD_05 .56 .50 .56 .52 .56 yes  
FD_06 .55 .50 .55 .50 .55 yes  
FD_07 .41 .49 .41 .36 .51 yes  
FD_08 .37 .48 .37 .31 .47 yes  
Note. N = 368; pi = item difficulty index/100; pi_c = corrected item difficulty index/100; rit = item 
discriminatory power coefficient; AoMT = selected for the analyses of the main testing; FD = Item ID for 
the DAC-dimension of FRAME. 
 
The statistical properties for the items of the DAC-test sub-scale ALTERNATIVES are 
displayed in Table 9-9. Item IA_05 was excluded from the final statistical analyses as it 
turned out to be unintentionally negatively-poled. 
Table 9-9 Statistical properties of ALTERNATIVES (main testing) 
Item ID M SD pi pi_c rit AoMT 
Reason for exclusion from 
statistical analyses 
IA_03 .91 .29 .91 .82 .15 yes  
IA_04 .77 .42 .83 .67 .41 yes  
IA_05 .52 .50 .58 .16 .31 no unintentionally negatively-poled 
IA_06 .76 .43 .79 .59 .54 yes  
IA_07 .66 .47 .72 .44 .67 yes  
IA_08 .89 .31 .94 .88 .20 yes  
IA_09 .81 .39 .85 .69 .39 yes  
IA_10 .78 .41 .80 .60 .39 yes  
Note. N = 368; pi = item difficulty index/100; pi_c = corrected item difficulty index/100; rit = item 
discriminatory power coefficient; AoMT = selected for the analyses of the main testing; IA = Item ID for 
the DAC-dimension of ALTERNATIVES. 
 
Table 9-10 gives an overview of the statistical properties for the items of the DAC-
test sub-scale UNCERTAINTY. Item DU_01 was excluded from the final statistical analyses 
as it turned out to be unintentionally negatively-poled. 
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Table 9-10 Statistical properties of UNCERTAINTY (main testing) 
Item ID M SD pi pi_c rit AoMT 
Reason for exclusion 
from statistical analyses 
DU_01 .78 .42 .90 .81 .17 no unintentionally negatively-poled 
DU_02 .61 .49 .61 .59 .81 yes  
DU_03 .57 .50 .57 .54 .82 yes  
DU_04 .55 .50 .55 .44 .47 yes  
DU_05 .81 .39 .82 .81 .40 yes  
DU_06 .43 .50 .43 .40 .50 yes  
DU_07 .20 .40 .22 * .45 yes  
DU_08 .11 .32 .13 * .26 yes  
Note. N = 368; pi = item difficulty index/100; pi_c = corrected item difficulty index/100; rit = item 
discriminatory power coefficient; AoMT = selected for the analyses of the main testing; DU = Item ID for 
the DAC-dimension of UNCERTAINTY. 
* Items are not multiple-choice items. Guessing correction is not necessary to calculate the item difficulty 
index. 
 
Table 9-11 shows the statistical properties for the items of INFORMATION.  
Table 9-11 Statistical properties of INFORMATION (main testing) 
Item ID M SD pi pi_c rit AoMT 
Reason for exclusion 
from statistical analyses 
II_04 .82 .38 .82 .80 .42 yes  
II_05 .69 .46 .69 .65 .64 yes  
II_06 .74 .44 .74 .70 .57 yes  
II_07 .86 .35 .86 .84 .37 yes  
II_08 .32 .47 .32 .22 .74 yes  
II_09 .29 .45 .29 .19 .66 yes  
II_10 .28 .45 .28 .18 .60 yes  
II_11 .39 .49 .39 .30 .55 yes  
II_12 .30 .46 .31 .21 .63 yes  
II_13 .50 .50 .54 * .85 yes  
II_14 .51 .50 .55 * .84 yes  
II_15 .53 .50 .57 * .87 yes  
Note. N = 368; pi = item difficulty index/100; pi_c = corrected item difficulty index/100; rit = item 
discriminatory power coefficient; AoMT = selected for the analyses of the main testing; II = Item ID for the 
DAC-dimension of INFORMATION. 
* Items are not multiple-choice items. Guessing correction is not necessary to calculate the item difficulty 
index. 
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Table 9-12 presents the distribution of the item difficulty indices of the pre-testing 
and the main testing.  
Table 9-12 Distribution of item difficulty indices (pi /pi_c) per DAC-dimension (pre-testing & main 
testing) 
 Pre-testing Main testing 
Scale  M SD Range M SD Range 
DO .53 .20 .23 – .80 .54 .22 .20 – .80 
DF .44 .17 .21 – .76 .53 .29 .02 – .93 
FD .42 .15 .21 - .61 .41 .12 .20 - .58 
IA .45 .15 .22 - .65 .67 .15 .44 - .88 
DU .36 .23 .05 - .72 .45 .23 .13 - .81 
II .40 .21 .20 - .78 .48 .25 .18 - .84 
Note. N = 143 (pre-testing); N = 368 (main testing); pi = item difficulty index/100; pi_c = corrected item 
difficulty index/100; DO = Ability to recognise decision opportunities; DF = Ability to assess decision 
fitness; FD = Ability to frame a decision; IA = Ability to identify relevant alternatives; DU = Ability to deal 
with uncertainty; II = Ability to integrate information.   
